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INTRODUCTION
Dictatorships can be very different1. Even though the word “dictatorship” itself
has a clearly negative connotation and is normally associated with underdevel-
opment and backwardness, some dictatorships manage to attract a lot of foreign
investments, provide conditions for stable economic growth, ensure low levels of
corruption and high quality of governance, and even respect human rights. Some-
times, dictatorship perform both in terms of economic performance and in terms
of human rights protection even to a better extent than many advanced Western
democracies.
If that sounds hard to believe, take the example of Singapore. This country
is clearly not a democracy: its ruling party, People Action Party (PAP), has been
governing the country unilaterally since its independence in 1965. Although political
opponents are not imprisoned (at least since the late 1980s) and although there are
even no obvious irregularities on electoral day, the country is infamous for the
use of defamation laws against the independent media, putting pressure on voters
(Rodan 1998), manipulating electoral law (Tan 2013), and other practices which
make it very hard for the opposition to get even a single seat in the parliament
and makes it completely impossible to get the majority. PAP vote share never
dropped below 60% while their share of seats in the parliament had always been
100% or very close to it. However, contrary to what one would expect from a
dictatorship, by absence of corruption, contemporary Singapore is ranked the 3rd in
the world (according to Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International
2019), together with Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland and it is superseded only
by Denmark and New Zealand; so Singapore shows a much better result in terms of
control of corruption than many old democracies, like the United Kingdom, United
States, Canada, and many others. Its per capita GDP is also impressive: with
outstanding $85500 (PPP. constant 2011 international dollars), it is ranked the
4th among world economies, overtaken only by Luxembourg, Macao (calculated
separately from mainland China), and Qatar, even though the country does not have
any natural resources. Another example of good autocratic performance is China:
although the Chinese regime is still repressive and has a bad record of human rights
violation, the country’s economic performance is exceptional. According the World
1Here and further on, I use the terms «dictatorship», «autocracy» and«authoritarian regime»
interchangeably, and by them, I mean any regime in which the power is acquired and lost by any
means other than competitive elections. More on conceptualization of democracy and autocracy
can be found in Chapter II.
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Bank data, Chinese GDP per capita (PPP, constant 2011 international dollars) in
1990 was slightly below than that of democratic India (around $1500 vs. $1700
respectively; I took India as an example so that the country size and population is
comparable); in 2017, it more than doubles Indian GDP per capita (around $15300
vs. $6500 respectively), even though India also experienced robust growth during
all these years.
Most dictatorships, however, perform exceptionally badly and correspond much
more to the “classical” image of dictatorships. Among the most recent examples
of economic disasters which happened under autocratic rule, one could think of
a contemporary Venezuela (as of 2019), which, in spite of having enormous oil
reserves and oil exports, has been experiencing economic disaster since 2014, with
GDP falling at the rate of around 15% annually, inflation reaching, estimatedly,
10,000,000% by the end of 2018, 3 million people having fled from the country, and
the government using lethal violence to deal with protesters (Parish Flannery 2018,
Phillips 2018, Melimopolous 2019)
Equally disastrous was the economic situation in Zimbabwe under Mugabe’s
rule: because of Zimbabwean military involvement in the Second Congolese War
and especially because of state-sponsored seizures of land from previous owners
(Richardson 2005), the country was in acute crisis economic, with hyperinflation
peaking in November, 2008 reaching, estimatedly, 79,600,000,000% monthly (Hanke
& Kwok 2009), and with GDP declining during the entire period of 2002-2008
(the biggest drops happened in 2002 and 2008, with the rates of -17% and -18%2
respectively).
It is not possible to explain these differences if one considers all dictatorships to
be equally bad. A classical view within political science that, overall, democracy
is more beneficial for a country performance than dictatorship (see, for example,
Olson 1993 for theoretical model of why this should be the case) cannot explain why
some dictatorship are much better than most democracies, while other dictatorships
are much worse than even the the worst democracy. A closer look is thus in order
to explain differences in the performance of autocratic regimes.
One explanation of differences among dictatorships is that some dictators are
more “enlightened” than others, or that motives of some dictators are less selfish than
the motives of the others; in other words, it is possible to study dictators’ preferences
2Source: World Bank.
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directly. Clearly, there is evidence that some dictators are genuinely committed to
making their country a better place, while others (perhaps the majority) care mostly
about their personal interest. For example, tremendous success of Singapore can
be, to a certain extent, attributed to personal commitment of Lee Kuan Yew, who
has been in charge of the ruling party party and the country since its independence
in 1965 till 1990 (and who remained involved in politics for another 20 years), to
eradicating corruption. He is famous for his quote, “Start with putting three of your
friends to jail. You definitely know what for, and people will believe you” (Lee Kuan
Yew 2000), and he genuinely followed his own advice, imprisoning several high-rank
officials charged with corruption. This can be compared to an extremely relaxed
attitude towards corruption expressed by L.Brezhnev, C.P.S.U. Secretary General
and de facto head of the U.S.S.R. in 1964-1982 who reportedly said, “No one lives
on wages alone. I remember in my youth we earned money by unloading freight
cars. So what did we do? Three crates or bags unloaded and one for ourselves.
That’s how everybody lives” (Treml 1990, cit. in Nelson et al. 1997).
It is possible to study dictators’ personalities in biographic studies. To quote
some examples of this kind of scholarship, Barr (2000) condicted a biographic study
of above-mentioned Lee Kuan Yew, while Decalo (1989) conducted a biograph-
ical study of three most violent African dictators, namely, Idi Amin (Uganda),
Jean-Bedel Bokassa (Democratic Republic of Kongo) and Francisco Macías Nguema
(Equatorial Guinea). In the field of Political Psychology, Schmitt & Winter (2008)
go beyond single cases, analyzing and comparing instead the motives of four Soviet
leaders (Stalin, Khruschev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev) based on official party reports,
and also comparing motives of each leader with societal motives of the Soviet soci-
ety at times of their rule. Similarly, Hermann (1980) who also worked in a field of
political psychology used content analysis of official speeches to study personality
of 20 members of Soviet Politburo (the governing body of the Communist party).
This demonstrates that it is possible to directly study leaders’ motives in compar-
ative studies. Yet if the goal is to draw conclusions which would be generalizable
beyond a small group of leaders or countries, it becomes close to impossible to find
a quantitative indicator of dictators’ motives applicable to most countries in the
world. It would be incorrect to ascertain about whether the dictators are benevo-
lent or enlightened by outcomes of their rule if the dependent variable of interest
in is precisely the dictatorial outcomes; otherwise, it becomes a circular argument
(i.e. “dictator’s performance is good because he 3 is benevolent, and we know he is
3As Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) pointed out, “[t]he gender is not accidental. Except for women
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benevolent because his performance is good”). One can approximate dictators’ “en-
lightenment” by some facts from dictators’ background, for example, by experience
of education in democratic countries, which is, while definitely not the best indica-
tor, is at least directly measurable and is not outcome-based. One would assume
that, if a dictator used to study in an advanced democracy, he would value human
rights more and would also understand better how a country’s economy should be
managed. However, although (to the best of my knowledge) there have not been
systematic studies about an impact of dictators’ background on policies, some anec-
dotal evidence suggests that the relation is, at best, weak. It is well-known that
some of the most violent and/or the least economically successful dictators got their
education or used to live and study in the West. For example, Pol Pot, dictator of
Cambodia who killed millions of people during his short rule, used to study in Paris
(although he did not get a degree); Kim Jong Un, current dictator of North Korea,
whose domestic and foreign policies are not at all different from the policies of his
father and grandfather, used to study in Switzerland incognito for several years at
school up to 2001 (according to multiple journalists 4), while Bashar al-Assad, dicta-
tor of Syria under whom the country has been going through a civil war for 8 years,
studied for a year in the U. K. as an ophthalmologist. This list of exceptionally bad
dictators with some form of education in democratic countries is not exclusive. So,
it does not seem to be that being “enlightened” (at least if one associates living and
studying in a developed democratic country with “enlightenment”) guarantees any
good performance.
Another possibility is to study authoritarian institutions. There institutions
can be formal , such as parties, parliaments, and elections, but can be also infor-
mal , meaning de facto rules which determine how dictator is selected and what
dictator can and cannot do. Both dictators’ preferences and institutions within
which they operate matter for the overall performance of authoritarian regime, es-
pecially given that authoritarian institutions are much more affected by dictators’
will than democratic ones. However, I believe studying institutions is more fruit-
ful for systematically understanding the difference between dictatorships directly.
Apart from practical difficulties of studying dictators’ preferences directly within
the framework of large-N study, there are two reasons which make studying au-
thoitarian institutions more reasonable for this project. First, dictators themselves
do not come from nowhere, and the way they are chosen is often determined by
who served as interim leaders – Queens Dzeliwe and Ntombi in Swaziland during the early 1980s,
Ertha Pascal-Trouillot in Haiti in 1990 and Ruth Perry in Liberia in 1996 – dictators are men”.
4Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11388628 .
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institutions in which they operate. In some cases dictators come to power during
coups, revolutions, or transform into autocrats after being democratically elected,
in which case dictators’ background can be treated as exogenous variable. However,
many dictatorships, like the U.S.S.R, Mexico until 2000, as well as currently existing
regimes in China, Vietnam, Middle Eastern monarchies, witnessed many changes
of dictators without collapsing; in this case, dictators’ degree of “enlightenment”
directly depends on institutions which determine selection of a new dictator – in
which case dictators’ individual characteristics themselves can be treated, at least
partially, as product of institutions. To put it simply, it is not random that some
authoritarian countries get better dictators than others. Secondly, it is possible to
indirectly account for dictators’ preferences within the framework of institutional
study. Authoritarian institutions can be regarded not just as exogenous constraints
to dictators but also as a product of preferences of multiple actors. The literature
on rational choice institutionalism (overviewed in Schepsle 2008) which is widely
used in authoriarin studies treats institutions as outcomes or interaction rationally
behaving actors who shape institutions according to their preferences. In case of
authoritarian institutions, these actors are the dictator himself, the ruling group,
and the opposition. Relative strength of these groups affects the configuration of
institutions. From that, it is possible to identify structural factors which affect the
relative strength of actors and to insert these factors in the regression model for
analysis. Even if in these case, dictators’ preferences are assumed rather than iden-
tified empirically, rational choice institutionalism often allows to make reasonable
assumptions about those preferences.
In addition to modelling dictators’ preferences using rational choice institution-
alist framework, there is also a method to indirectly account for unobserved factors
influencing dictators’ preferences in a quantitative study (even if those factors can-
not be accounted by rational choice paradigm, for example, “enlighenment”). The
method which allows to do so is called tho-stage Heckman model, which is a sta-
tistical method that allows to deal with self-selection bias. A self-selection bias in
studying authoritarian institutions occurs because authoritarian institutions are of-
ten purposefully selected by dictators and not distributed randomly. Without going
into technical details at this stage5, this method allows to model systematic factors
affecting selection of authoritarian insititutions and then to use the error terms of
that model as a proxy for unobserved factors affecting selection of institutions -
among which there are dictators’ tutelary motives. Using both assumptions derived
5A detailed description of this method is provided in Chapter IV
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from rational choice institutionalism at the theoretical level and two-staged Heck-
man model at the methodological level, dictators’ motives and preferences can be
taken into consideration in the study, even if they are not studied directly.
The literature about the impact of authoritarian institutions on regime perfor-
mance is already abundant. In has been demonstrated that formal and informal
authoritarian institutions, contrary to conventional wisdom, are not just window-
dressing. They are shown to have a systematic impact on economic growth, foreign
investments, social development, and probability of regime collapse (as well as on
issues not related to regime performance, such as post-exit faith of dictators). The
contribution of this dissertation is to go from the level of outcomes of authoritarian
regimes to the level of institutions which make these outcomes possible. What is
not quite clear in the existing literature is how authoritarian institutions make good
outcomes possible.
In this thesis, I concentrate on the impact of authoritarian institutions on the
rule of law. The rule of law in this thesis is defined in a narrow sense, primarily
following Kaufman et al. (2009). According to Kaufman et al., , the rule of law is
“the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by the rules of society, and
in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well
as the likelihood of crime or violence”. As one can see, general absence of crime
and violence are included to this definition of the rule of law; however, I do not in-
clude any requirements for the rule-making process in the definition. The reason for
choosing this particular definition over more extended ones is that the literature on
institutional econimics which demonstrates the importance of the rule of law focuses
not on the way the laws are made but on security of property rights protection and
predictability of rules implementation, which are the main conditions under which
economic actors can be certain that their property and their profits cannot be ex-
propriated by the state or destroyed by private actors. The importance of the rule
of law (in this narrow sense) for economic development has has been initially the-
orized by North (1989), and, further on, multiple scholars find empirical evidence
in favor of that. Among the most promiment ones, one can mention Rodrik et al.
(2004) who demonstrated primacy of the rule of law for economic developement in a
large-N, cross-country study while also dealing with potential endogeneity between
the rule of law and economic development. One must also mention a seminal work
of Acemoglu & Robinson (2012) who introduced a distinction between extractive
and inclusive institutios (both political and economic). By inclusive economic in-
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stitutions, they meant precisely the definition of the rule of law I mentioned above.
Further on, in a series of case studies, they demonstrated that the difference in
economic development between countries which are otherwise very similar can be
solely attributed to presence or absence of inclusive institutions. Thus, excluding
any requirements for the law-making process from the definition of the rule of law is
in line with existing literature on institutional economics. Furthermore, given that
this thesis is focused on authoritarian regimes, any extended definitions of the rule
of law (for example, the ones which require that the laws are passed according to
democratic norms) would be inapplicable.
After analyzing the impact of authoritarian institutions on the rule of law in gen-
eral, I will unpack the rule of law in order to investigate the impact of authoritarian
institutions on property rights protection and human rights protection respectively.
While historically, in Western Europe, property rights protection and human rights
protection evolved simultaneously, today, in many non-democratic countries, strong
property rights protection coexists with widespread human rights abuse, and vice
versa, thus, these two aspects of the rule of law can be studied separately.
Current study covers most autocratic country-years (excluding small countries,
for the absence of some key data on authoritarian institutions for them) for the
time period of 1992-2008. This is the time period after the end of the Cold War,
when the Soviet Union could no longer support friendly Communist autocracies
and the U. S. also no longer needed to support friendly non-Communist autocracies
(like the military regimes of Latin America). Since 1992, it is possible to assume
presence of Western efforts in democracy promotion globally. On the other hand,
ending the dataset in 2008 allows to exclude the past decade in which the autocracy
promotion by China or Russia became visible and effective (Obydenkova & Libman
2014) In this way, limiting the time frame of the research allows to avoid controlling
for international pro-democratic and pro-autocratic pressures.
This research is warranted for two reasons. First, as I will discuss in greater
length in Chapter I, the literature in institutional economics largely claims the rule
of law, and especially property rights protection, to be one of the key institutions
for attracting investments and fostering economic growth – a realtionship which has
been modeled theoretically and proved empirically. Thus, it is logical to suggest that
authoritarian institutions lead to better (or worse) economic performance by the
way they affect the state of the rule of law in the country; if this is confirmed, this
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study will get closer to identifying the causal mechanism which links authoritarian
institutions and their economic performance (even though, within the framework
of a quantitative cross-country study, it is not possible to trace an actual causal
mechanism). Second, the rule of law, as well as property rights protection and
human rights protection (which I consider the main sub-components of the rule of
law and will study separately) are important in their own right, even regardless
of their effect on economic performance, and it is relevant to understand which
institutions make some authoritarian regimes more repressive or more prone to
violating property rights than others.
Throougout the study, I demonstrate empirically that both formal and informal
authoritarian institutuions genuinely matter for the state of the rule of law. More-
over, I demonstrate that the effect of formal institutuons is mediated by the degree
of informal constraints. I show that regimes which are both formally institutional-
ized and informally constrained perform significantly better that the others, even
though the relation betweem formal institutions and informal constraints does not
exactly correspond to initial theoretical expectations. I also find evidence that the
impact of institutions is higher for property rights protection than for human rights
protection.
The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter I, I review exist-
ing literature on both authoritarian institutions and the rule of law. Chapter II is
devoted to conceptualization and operationalization of authoritarian regimes and
authoritarian institutions which are used in this project. In the same chapter, I
thoroughly review some of the most populat conceptualizations and operational-
izations of authoritarianism and authoritarian institutions in order to explain why
I use some of them and not others. Chapter III formalizes the research question
and hypothesis and describes the research methodology. Chapter IV provides the
empirical test of the impact of authoritarian institutions on the rule of law, while
Chapter V tests the impact on the two components of the rule of law, namely,
property rights protection and human rights protection. In the conclusions, I sum-
marize the findings, discuss their limitations and propose some avenues for future
scholarship.
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CHAPTER I. LITERATURE REVIEW
Authoritarian institutions
In the chapter, I review the literature on authoritarian institutions. In particular,
I start my review from Geddes’ influential typology of authoritarian regimes which
is based on the nature of the ruling group effective constraints imposed on the
autocrat. Second, I review the literature on formal authoritarian institutions such
as parties, parliaments, and elections. Third, I review the works combining the
two above-mentioned streams of literature. Finally, I draw some conclusions about
what is already known about of varieties of authoritarian rule and their impact, as
well about what is not know yet6.
a) Informal authoritarian institutions: typology of authoritarian
regimes by Barbaba Geddes
A crucial point of the literature on authoritarian regime types and their per-
formance is the work by Barbara Geddes (1999). Trying to answer the question
of why the results of studies on authoritarian regimes and on their modes of tran-
sition reached mixed and indecisive conclusions, Geddes asserted that authoritar-
ian regimes cannot be treated as a homogeneous category. In fact, she claims,
authoritarian regimes differ from each other no less than they are different from
democracies, and this heterogeneity accounts for the differences among autocracies.
Geddes originally distinguished between military, single-party, and personal
regimes, as well as mixtures of pure types, based on the institution which con-
straints the dictator and the channel of leadership and political elite selection.
She created a time-series dataset on the types of regimes, based on these categories,
which also included the mode of their breakdown (both transition to democracy and
transition to another autocracy). It has been constantly amended and updated, the
last version of this dataset is presented in Geddes et al. (2014) in the supplementary
material. In the updated version, Geddes and her co-authors decided to introduce
monarchies as a separate category (meaning monarchies where the monarch is a de
facto ruler, like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Morocco) which was previously excluded
because of their relative rarity. The temporal coverage of the dataset is 1946-2010,
6In what follows, I focus mostly on the effects of formal and informal authoritarian institutions
on economy-related issues In doing so, I not review a set of literature which studies the impact of
these institutions on other issues, such as, for example, political violence (Wilson & Piazza 2013)
or the mode of regime transition and post-exit fate of the dictators (Geddes 1999, 2014). This
choice is based on the fact that the initial puzzle of this research, outlined in the introduction, is
why some autocracies perform better than other in terms of economic and social development.
12
and the spacial coverage is all countries in the world with population exceeding 1
million people for 2010 or for the last year of their existence.
In military and single-party regimes, the leader, constrained and can be removed
by, respectively, the military officers and the ruling party. In personalist regimes
and monarchies, the dictator is unconstrained in his decision-making. As for the
selection of the leader and top officials, for military and single-party regimes this
process goes through, respectively, party and military hierarchy. In personalist
regimes the top officials and the next leader are selected from a personal network
of the dictator. In monarchies, selection of the next leader works through the royal
family.
Importantly, the mere fact that dictator has a military backgound or creates his
own party is not enough to classify the regime as military or single-party, in other
words, it is not the formal institutions which is the basis of classifications. It is de
facto constraints imposed on the leader by the military officers or by party leadership
that represent a distinguishing feature of military and single-party regimes. The
judgment on whether in a given country the ruling party or the military leadership
matter for leadership selection and actually constrain the dictator is based on expert
evaluation, as it is rarely possible to judge about these constraints only by formal
rules. In authoritarian regimes, it is not always a formal head of state of a head
of government who is the actual dictator7, neither do the formal rules of leadership
selection correspond correspond to actual ones.
Geddes’ main theoretical puzzle is the question of regime change. Although this
is different from my research, it is still useful to make an overview of her arguments
on regime longevity, as it might have an impact on economic performance as well8.
Geddes et al. (2014) claims that the focus of political scientists on democratiza-
tion hides the fact that there are not just transitions from autocracy to democracy
(or backwards) but also transitions from one autocracy to another, like a revolution
in Cuba in 1959 (from a personalist to a single-party regime, when dictatorship of
7For example, in the U.S.S.R., a formal head of state was the Chairman of the Presidium of
the Supreme Council, and a formal head of government was the Chairman of the Government;
however, since the death of Lenin, in was always the C.P.S.U. Secretary-General (or, in Khruschev’s
times, the C.P.S.U. First Secretary) who was an actual ruler. In China of 1980s, it was even more
complicated as Deng Xiaoping, who was a de-facto ruler, formally assumed just some secondary
offices withing the Chinese state and the Communist party.
8Some studies which I review below, such as Wright (2008) take into account the time horizon
of the dictator (operationalized as predicted probability of the regime to collapse in a given year,
taking into account the current regime type and economic conditions) as one of the variables which
influence growth and investment.
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Fulgencio Batista was replaced by dictatorship of the communist party led by Fidel
Castro), when the leadership and power relations changed completely but the coun-
tries remained autocratic9. For example, after WWII, a breakdown of autocracy is
followed by a subsequent autocracy more frequently than by democracy. A failure
to identify these autocracy-to-autocracy transitions may lead to overestimation of
longevity and resilience of authoritarian regimes.
Geddes (1999) develops a game-theoretical model of regime transition for each
type of the regime which attempts to explain the diversity in regime longevity, and
it can be summarized as follows.
While personalist regimes, single-party regimes, and monarchies have the only
goal to stay in power (as it is normally assumed by scholars studying authoritar-
ian regimes), the military regimes are different: according to Geddes, the military
is mostly preoccupied with its corporate interests, namely, by its autonomy from
the civilian institutions and its sufficient funding, while politics itself may be not
interesting for the military. So they intervene in politics only when they perceive
threat for their interests from the politicians. Moreover, they are preoccupied with
the unity of the military and try to do everything in order to avoid fractions inside
the military. Thus, for the military it is more preferable to be either “together in
barracks” or “together in power” rather then to split among themselves over the
question whether to stay in power or not, since clashes within the military may
result in civil war. This model helps to explain the empirical observation that the
military coups most of the time occur only after long informal negotiations among
different groups of the military about future power-sharing and that, once in power,
the military are normally willing to return power to the democratic governments
when the conflicts within the military become too intense. This is the way all mili-
tary regimes which existed in South America in the 1970s-1980s (Brazil, Argentina,
Chile10, Colombia, Paraguay, Uruguay) collapsed before the 1990s.
For other regimes, the assumption about willingness to stay in power as long as
possible holds true. However, personalist regimes tend to perish when the dictator
is dead as in personalist regimes (unlike in single party regimes or monarchies)
9Transition from one autocratic regime to another one of the similar type also counts as a regime
transition, in case if the group whose interests are represented by a constraining body changes:
for example, if a junta dominated by one ethnic group is changed by another one, dominated by a
different ethnic group, it also counts as a regime change. However, a simple change of a dictator
without a change of a ruling group does not count as a regime change.
10According to Geddes et al. (2014), Chile was a military-personal hybrid rather than a pure
military regime.
14
power transfer to another dictator is complicated. It does not happen frequently
that a current dictator in a personalist regime manages to appoint the successor
before death – and there are no formal or informal institutions which would be able
to do so after the dictator’s death. Also, during their rule, personalist dictators
tend to remove all potential challengers to their power in one way or another, in a
way that, when the dictator is dead, there are no capable people among political
elites anymore to take over; so, even if someone becomes a next personalist dictator,
this is normally a weak person incapable of ruling the country (Geddes 1999)11. In
monarchies, the power is transferred to another member of the royal family, and in
singe-party regimes, selection of a new leader is done by the party establishment.
In both cases, there are clear rules how that should be done.
The difference between Geddes’ regime types are summarized in Table 1.
11One of the contemporary examples of that is Nicolàs Maduro, current president of Venezuela
who used to be a bus driver and never got higher education; the only reason he took power was
his personal loyalty to Ugo Chàvez, who, dying from cancer, made Maduro acting president and
supported his candidacy for presidential elections; his disastrous economic performance is described
in the introduction.
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Some regimes are coded as amalgamic types (such as military-personal or party-
personal) if in a given regime the ruling party of the military retain some autonomy
but cannot control the dictator as effectively as in “pure” regime types. For example,
the regime of Pinochet in Chile is considered to be military-personal as Pinochet
quickly concentrated power in his hands after the coup but the junta did not become
entirely irrelevant. For a similar reason, the regime in North Korea is coded as party-
personal. “Indirect military” regime refers to the situation in which the military
exercise control either over key decision making or over the list of candidates who
can run for public offices, while the elections themselves are reasonably free and
fair (this was the case of some Latin American countries in the 1960s and 1970s).
“Oligarchy” refers to a regime in which elections are free and fair but in which some
racial or ethnic groups are excluded from the electoral process (like in South Africa
during apartheid). Their notion of “oligarchy” is very close to the concept of “racial
democracy” by Linz (1975). Iran since 1979 is not coded anyhow, due to peculiarity
of this authoritarian regime12, however, in the article which introduces the dataset,
Geddes et al. (2014) call it “theocratic” and in the codebook to the dataset they
recommend to merge it, if necessary, with single-party.
The difference between a single-party regime and a personalist regime with a
party (or, similarly, the difference between a military regime and a personalist
regime of a “military strongman”) might seem overly theoretical and difficult to grasp
in practice. To give a real-world example of the difference between a personalist
regime with a party and a single-party regime, political regime of the U.S.S.R. up
to late 1980s and the one of contemporary Russia (as of 2017) are compared below.
The U.S.S.R. was a single-party regime: although the Secretary General of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) was a de facto ruler of the country,
it was not him alone who took the decision but the collective body called Politburo(a
collective decision-making body of the C.P.S.U. consisting of up to 25 members).
An attempt of Khrushchev to take decisions unilaterally and to undermine the role
of the C.P.S.U. in early 1960s led to his ousting in 1964 by his fellow party mem-
bers. The main reason for this removal was the introduction of rotation of 1/3 of the
members in each party committee on every election, including the Central Commit-
tee and Politburo, which was undermining the influence of prominent party figures
12In Iran, there is a meaningful competition for the presidential office and for the parliamentary
majority; however, it is the Supreme Leader who is the head of state (both formally and in pracice)
and who can decide who is allowed to compete. The Supreme Leader is not elected by popular
vote, he is formally appointed by the Council of Experts for 8 years and can be re-elected unlimited
amount of times, however, he is claimed to be essentially independent on them, and both Supreme
Leaders of Iran since 1979 ruled till their death.
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other than Khrushchev. After ousting of Khrushchev, three consecutive Secretary-
Generals (Leonid Brezhnev, Yurij Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko) managed to
stay in power till their death, but de facto decision-making process remained collec-
tive, and if there was no consensus among Politburo members on certain policies,
taking a decision was postponed (an extensive discussion on coalition formation
within Soviet Politburo can be found in Ross 1980). The party elite was also in
charge of selecting a new Secretary General (both de jure and de facto), and all Sec-
retary Generals started their political career from within the party had been high
rank party officials before their appointment13. Recruitment to the governmental
offices was also made through the party hierarchy, and the members of Politburo of
C.P.S.U. combined top-level party office with prominent offices in state institutions
(the government, the parliament, important ministries, security services).
Current Russia (as of 2019) is a personalist regime. According to Geddes, this
is the case since 1994 when Yelstin unilaterally abolished the previous Constitution
in October 1993 by his decree and dissolved the Parliament without having a legal
power to do so, crashed the resistance of the Parliament two weeks later using tanks,
and then managed to impose a new Constitution with extended presidential powers
through the referendum of 12 December 199314 (a democratic interlude between two
dictatorships in Russia took just two years, 1992-1993)15. Although a stable incum-
bent party (called “United Russia”) exists since early 2000s and repeatedly gains an
absolute majority in federal and regional legislatures, it has an impact neither on
decision-making, nor on Putin himself. In 2008-2012, Putin was a President of the
party without even being its member (the party statute was amended to make that
possible). The party is also not a way to recruit a new elite. Most of the members of
the government, heads of publicly-owned companies, and other prominent members
of the establishment are recruited not through the party channels but through per-
sonal connections with Putin. Most of them are his former colleagues from KGB,
13Khrushchev had beed head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Ukraine
in 1938-1947 and a member of politburo in Moscow since 1938 onwards; Brezhnev used to be in
different top party offices in Ukraine, Moldova, and Kazakhstan; Gorbachev used to be a head of
Stavropol’ brunch of C.P.S.U. (southern Russia).
14Interestingly, this referendum was conducted on the same day as elections to the first State
Duma – which was the the parliament according to the draft of the new Constitution (which
had yet to be approved) but not according to the old one. This suggests that Yeltsin himself
considered the results of this referendum to be pre-determined. Some more concrete evidence of
manipulations during that referendum are presented in Myagkov et al. (2009).
15Defining Yeltsin’s regime as autocratic is not uncontroversial, as in 1990s Russia was charac-
terized by quite competitive legislative elections on the federal level on which the pro-presidential
parties got less than 15% of seats in 1993 and 1995 elections; also, the opposition routinely took
power on the regional level. However, presidential elections of 1996 were strongly manipulated
through the media to achieve Yeltsin’s victory; more details can be found in Levitsky & Way
(2010)
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however, it has been pointed out by both Russian and Western media that the
members of “Ozero” (“Lake”) country house cooperative which Putin was a part of
since 1996, became prominent people in the Russian establishment in 2000s16, and
the same goes for many of his friends from his early years17. The above-mentioned
facts clearly show that the ruling party does not have anything to do with recruiting
the political elite. As for the leadership selection in this regime, Putin himself was
de facto appointed by Yeltsin who resigned from his presidential office on the 31st
of December, 1999, and made it clear that he sees Putin as his successor, by making
him an acting president before new elections (technically, he had been appointed
prime minister several months before the resignation, and, by the Constitution, he
became an acting president after Yeltsin resigned); this decision to resign and to
transfer power to Putin was made by Yeltsin personally, and the pro-presidential
party at the time called “Yedinstvo” (“Unity”) was not involved in this decision at
all; in fact, it was completely unexpected and shocking to everyone 18 19.
From these two cases it is clear that, although there is a dominant pro-incumbent
party in both cases, it is only in the case of the Soviet Union that the party was
really influential and constraining to the dictator. This allows to classify the Soviet
Union as a single-party regime and contemporary Russia as a personalist one.
I will further refer to these regime types as “informal institutions” (as it is pre-
cisely informal rules of behavior of the dictator which is the basis of classification)
or, interchangeably, “informal constraints”, as opposed to formal authoritarian in-
stitutions (such as parliaments, parties, and elections) discussed below.
To the best of my knowledge, no systematic research has been carried out thus
far that explicitly deals with the impact of Geddes’ regime types per se on economic
performance or on the rule of law. Existing works deal with impact of Geddes’s
regime type on regime longevity, on modes of regime transition, or on post-exit
faith of dictators (Geddes 1999, Geddes et al. 2014), on their resilience when faced
16For example: Vladimir Yakunin became a long-time head of public ralway company
“RZD”(until 2015); Andrei Fursenko became a minister of education; Yurij Kovalchuk became
a billionnaire with big shares of public companies with a big state share, such as “Gazprombank”,
see Petrova & Shirokov 2011
17For example: Vyatcheslav Zolotov became a head of the National Guard; Rotenberg brothers
became billionaires as the main government contractors; Gennadij Timchenko became a billion-
naire as an exclusive oil trader of “Rosneft”, an oil company with major public shareholding, see
Galeotti (2014)
18Yeltsin (2000) in his memories claims that, apart from him and Putin, no one, not even
members of Yeltsin’s family, knew about his decision until the day he actually signed a decree
about his resignation. family
19In this respect, Russian personalist regime is quite exceptional as, normally, in personalist
regimes, the dictator rules till his death and does not appoint a successor or appoints a weak one
who does not manage to hold power for long.
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sanctions (for the latter, see Wright & Escribà-Folch 2010). Other studies, however,
study the impact of regime types on economic performance in interaction with
formal authoritarian institutions. I turn on these works later in this chapter.
b) Formal authoritarian institutions
Other insights about the difference between authoritarian regimes come from
the literature on formal authoritarian institutions, such as legislatures, parties,
and elections.
An important piece of theory-building about the role of formal authoritarian
institutions is Gandhi & Przeworski (2006). They reject the usual understanding of
authoritarian institutions as mere “window-dressing”, claiming that if it was true,
these institutions simply would not be necessary. They also reject the understanding
of authoritarian institutions as arenas for redistribution of spoils as, they claim,
money and privileges can be redistributed without any institutions.
Part of the explanation for why authoritarian regimes have formally democratic
institutions is a Western pressure to have them. This is the main argument of
Levitsky & Way (2010) who introduce the notions of Western leverage (the ability
of the West to influence a given country) and links to the West (socioeconomic and
cultural ties of a given country with the West, which affects the probability that the
West will implement its leverage to push a given country towards democratization).
They claim that this became relevant after the end of the Cold War when the
West lost any incentives to support friendly dictatorships (as it often did during
the Cold War) and when it lost the main competitor, the USSR, who was the main
supported of Communist, non-democratic regimes. In the same book, they do a
series of small case studies, analyzing how different degrees of Western leverage and
links to the West affect the process of democratization in different countries. From
a quantitative side, some papers, like Escribà-Folch (2009), show that there is a
statistically significant impact of the amount of democracies in the world on the
likelihood of institutionalization of authoritarian regimes. In other words, there is
indeed evidence that spreading democracies in the world increases the need for the
dictators to imitate democracies by introducing seemingly democratic institutions
in order to maintain their domestic and international legitimacy.
However, the need to satisfy the West is definitely not the entire explanation
for the existence of authoritarian institutions. No one in the West is treating North
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Korea or China as democracies in spite of the fact that these countries have parlia-
ments, parties (formally, there are even several parties different from the Communist
one in both countries, even though they never get a single seat in the legislature),
and elections. Moreover, in these two countries, parliaments, parties, and elec-
tions existed long before the end of the Cold War when the Western pressure to
democratize could have any effect in that part of the world20.
Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) offer their own model of formal institutions under
dictatorships, which is repeated in Gandhi (2008a) and which can be summarized
as the following.
Any dictatorship has a two-fold tasks. First, it needs to prevent rebellion by the
elites by rewarding and punishing them. Second, it needs to foster popular support
and cooperation (since even dictators need public support in order to stay in power
and to rule the country). Solving these tasks can be accomplished by redistributing
spoils (such as money and privileges) in exchange for loyalty. However, in order to be
able to provide these spoils, the dictator needs some cooperation with the society
(to put it simply, he needs to collect taxes), and the need for cooperation with
the society varies depending on how much dictator’s revenues depend on society.
Also, just redistributing spoils may not be enough; opposition may demand policy
concessions, and in some cases it may be sufficiently strong to obtain them.
If the need for cooperation with the society is high and/or the opposition is
strong, policy concessions become inevitable. While redistributing spoils can hap-
pen on an ad hoc basis, without any institutions, policy concessions can be accom-
plished only through institutions to make them at least somewhat credible and also
to reduce transaction costs of making concessions, compared to ad hoc bargaining
with the opposition. So, authoritarian legislatures and parties help dictators to
make concessions to the elites or to certain groups of population without risking
their own power.
Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) construct a formal model of authoritarian institu-
tions based on the above-mentioned criteria, from which it follows that the need for
institutions in authoritarian regimes depends on four factors. First, it depends on
the need for cooperation with the society, which is lower if a dictator has sources
20Even if I suggest that having a parliament, parties, and elections in China is a product of a
Soviet influence, this still does not explain why the Soviet Union, which, because of its military
and economic power, was immune from almost any external pressures, also had these institutions.
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of income independent from society (such as income from oil, gas, or mineral ex-
port) and does not need society in order to raise funds. Second, it depends on the
chances of the opposition to overthrow the dictator, with higher chances requiring
more policy concessions (and, thus, more institutions). Third, it depends on the
risks of the opposition in case of failure of the rebellion, higher risks resulting in
lesser concessions. And forth, it depends on the degree of polarization between
the dictator and the opposition, lower polarization resulting in higher willingness
of the dictator to make concessions, as if the preferences of the dictator and the
oppositions diverge too much, concessions become more costly for the dictator.
In that article Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) also conduct empirical analysis, pro-
viding some preliminary operationalizations of the four factors determining the need
for authoritarian institutions mentioned above: the need for cooperation witht the
society, chances and risks of the opposition, and degree of polarization between the
opposition and the dictator. Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) indeed find statistically
significant relations between the proxies of the four factors relevant for their theo-
retical framework and the measurements of the institutionalization of the regime.
Another interpretation of the role of authoritarian parties and elections, which
implies a different causal mechanism behind their creation (but which is not in-
compatible with the previous one) was suggested by Geddes (2006). Rather than
seeing formal authoritarian institutions as arenas of policy concessions to potential
opposition, she theorizes the following.
As far as parties are concerned, a party is an organization which is able to
redistribute different material benefits among its members (such as good salaries
for party officials, privileged access to public offices through the party, and so on21),
which makes a broader share of population personally interested in preserving the
regime. It does not matter that much whether the party manages to redistribute
benefits among a large share of population or just among high-rank party members;
in any of the two cases, the party creates a certain amount of people who have
stakes at preserving the current regime (but, of course, if a number of people who
benefit from the ruling party is higher, the support base of dictatorship is stronger).
This helps to deter potential rivals, mostly form the military and security services,
21For example, Matthews (2013)[1978] provides a good account of a list of various privileges
that Soviet party officials enjoyed. Even though the wage difference between party officials and
ordinary people was not high, party nomenklatura had access to goods and services (like access to
special shops, access to better accommodation, higher availability of foreign and domestic travel)
which other people could not get access anyhow, even if they had money.
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from rebellion, as they become aware that, in case they attempt a coup, the party
will mobilize a lot of people for supporting the dictator22 The reason why this can
deter potential military rivals is that the military officers are normally unwilling
to order to shoot at civilians as some of the military may disobey or even join the
people.
As for elections, Geddes (2006) theorizes that their primary goals to demon-
strate potential rivals (in this case, mostly civilian ones) the overwhelming resource
imbalance between the incumbent and potential rivals, and the overwhelmingly high
figures of support for the incumbent, which is supposed to discourage them from
defecting from the incumbents and joining the opposition. This explains why many
authoritarian regimes, in spite of all their control they have over electoral process
and absence of any real chances of victory for the opposition, still invest a lot in
campaigning. Wright (2011) studies the patterns of spending for dictatorships and
finds evidence that, in pre-electoral period, short-term spending increases in all dic-
tatorships (while long-term spending increases only in personalist regimes), exactly
the same way as it often happens in democracies23. This finding shows that dic-
tatorships which confront elections indeed take them seriously and struggle to win
with as bigger margin of victory as possible. This can also explain why “honest”
victory during authoritarian elections (in a sense that there is no obvious electoral
fraud but rather more subtle pre-electoral manipulations and domination in the
media) is preferable to electoral fraud, since in case of more “honest” elections po-
tential rivals treat an overwhelming electoral support as a more genuine indicator
of capacities of the incumbent24 (Geddes 2006).
Neither parties nor elections are cost-free for dictators. Parties are costly because
they need resources to redistribute which could have otherwise been appropriated by
the dictator; furthermore, if the party becomes developed enough, it may become
constraining for the dictator and even empower itself to a degree that it will be
able to remove the dictator. Elections are risky because, even given all the existing
advantages of the incumbent in financial resources, media coverage, its control over
22That could have been the case during an attempted coup in Turkey in 2016 when a lot of
activists from Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party went to the streets to oppose the military
(of course, assuming that the coup itself was genuine and not orchestrated by Erdogan himself).
23A meta-analysis of scholarship about political budget cycles can be found in Cazals & Mandon
(2016) who claim that spending does increase in pre-electoral periods, although the magnitude of
this phenomenon are often overestimated by scholars.
24As an illustration: Russian parliamentary elections of 2011 were so obviously fraudulent and
the result of the ruling party was so unconvincing (49%) that it led to the biggest anti-governmental
protests in a decade; for presidential elections of 2012, Putin allowed multiple observers to monitor
the electoral process and even to install web cameras in polling stations – just to demonstrate that
he is capable of winning elections even without open electoral fraud.
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electoral authorities, and others – authoritarian elections still may, in rare cases,
lead to an unexpected failure or to the need to openly cheat – which may cause
popular uprising and eventually a regime collapse (that was what happened with
the regime of Eduard Shevarnadze in Georgia in 2003 or with the regime of Askar
Akayev in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, which is commonly referred to as “color revolutions”).
For these reasons, not all dictators choose have parties and elections. However, it is
shown empirically that, on average, both parties and elections prolong the existence
of authoritarian regimes (Geddes 2006).
Geddes (2006) does not entirely reject the account by Gandhi & Przeworski
(2006); however, she claims, it does not happen that frequently that authoritarian
parties or legislatures have a genuine impact on policy-making. She claims, based
on qualitative evidence, that in many autocracies the parliaments and parties just
rubber-stamp dictators’ decisions (exactly as conventional wisdom suggests). Thus,
one should be careful to assert that authoritarian institutions represent (even some-
what) credible commitments in all autocracies. I will get back to this insight later,
discussing the interplay between formal and informal authoritarian institutions.
As for the outcomes of authoritarian institutions, they are expected to have im-
plications for economic development (Gandhi 2008, 2008a): although authoritarian
institutions are not as credible as democratic, they still lower uncertainty about
the rules of the game, decrease the probability of protest events, and improve the
flows of information between dictator and population, all of which is important to
investments and to economic development in general. Gandhi (2008, 2008a) tests
the impact of authoritarian institutions on economic performance using panel data
analysis and finds out that there is indeed statistically significant relation between
higher degree of institutionalization of authoritarian regime25 and higher rates of
economic growth. She also tests whether the same relation holds for social spending
but does not find a significant relation – which, as she claims, may be not necessarily
the fault of the theory but a question of poor data sources and suboptimal proxies.
Gandhi & Przeworski (2006), Gandhi (2008, 2008a) are important works in
terms of providing the theoretical framework for authoritarian institutions, show-
ing the potential systematic reasons why these institutions exist in some authori-
tarian regimes and not in others. Some other authors confirmed expectations of the
25These studies normally operationalize the degree of institutionalization of authoritarian regime
as an ordinary variable, coded as 0 if there is no legislature and no parties, as 1 if there is a
legislature with no parties or a legislature with single party, and 2 if there is a legislature and
multiple parties in the parliament
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theoretical framework of Gandhi and Przeworski, using even more more rigorous
methodology that Gandhi and Przeworski did. For example Escribà-Folch (2009)
confirms a negative link between having oil as primary export commodity and being
more institutionalized, using multinomial and ordered logit models, also correcting
for self-selection of institutions by autocrats. He further finds that there is sta-
tistically significant difference between the share of tax and non-tax revenues in
non-institutionalized and institutionalized regimes. More institutionalized regimes
tend to rely more on tax revenues. The two findings provide additional evidence
that authoritarian institutions are needed in order to foster cooperation with the
population.
Other studies aslo show that higher degree of institutionalization of authoritar-
ian regime does indeed lead to better outcomes in terms of decreasing economic
inequality (Hanson 2013), decreasing infant mortality, increasing investments in
education and health care (Miller 2015)26.
c) Interaction between formal and informal institutions in authoritar-
ian regimes
Although Gandhi (2008a) references Geddes (1999) and uses part of her frame-
work (for example, in what concerns the motivation of the military rulers versus
all the others), she does not use her typology explicitly, as the two authors study
different issues: while Gandhi & Przeworski (2006), Gandhi (2008, 2008a) focus
on the outcomes of formal institutions under authoritarianism, typology of Geddes
(1999) operationalizes informal, de-facto constraints on dictators.
Another difference between the two approaches is that Gandhi and Przeworski
focus on dictators as actors, and their strategic use of formal institutions as a means
to hold in power while Geddes focuses on regimes as sets of informal institutions
within which dictators operate. A death or removal of a dictator does not necessarily
mean the end of the regime: China survived multiple power transitions since the
1950s27 without any change of basic rules of leadership and elite recruitment, as
well as constraints imposed on the leader. All the establishment is still recruited
exclusively through the party channels, and key decisions are made collectively by
politburo, and, since Deng Xiaoping, rotation of leadership on all level every 10 years
26To be more precise, Miller (2015) used not the Gandhi operationalization of institutionaliza-
tion of autocratic regimes but the notion of electoral authoritarianism by Levitsky & Way(2010);
however, substantially, electoral authoritarianism and highly institutionalized authoritarianism are
very close; it is discussed in Chapter II why the concept of electoral authoritarianism is not used
in this work
27Consecutively: Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping.
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(including the leader himself) is a routinized practice28. The difference between a
change of a dictator and a regime change is even more evident in case of monarchies
(Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia).
These two approaches differ substantially. Gandhi and Przeworski look at au-
thoritarian institutions as outcomes of strategic choices of dictators. Geddes treats
informal authoritarian institutions more like external constraints to dictators; it is
not exclusively (or at all) a dictator’s choice to have a constraining military or a
constraining single party but more an outcome of the strength of the military or the
party in a given country. Moreover, informal authoritarian institutions, according
to Geddes et al. (2014), also define the way in which dictators are selected and
removed. From this point of view, as it was mentioned in the introduction, it is
possible to treat even dictators themselves (at least to some extent) as products of
these informal institutions. To put it in a broader theoretical context, Gandhi and
Przeworski’s theory can be classified as rational choice institutionalist theory, as in-
stitutions are perceived not as exogenously given and immutable but as purposefully
created depending on dictator’s preferences and strength of potential opposition29.
In contrast, Geddes’ approach can be treated as classical institutionalist, as she
perceives their regime types as mostly exogenous, and theorize more about the out-
comes of these institutions rather than about their origins. Geddes et al. (2014)
mention that the regime type is an outcome of strength of representation of specific
interests by certain societal groups, military and party being the most frequent and
the most well-organized of these groups. However, Geddes and her co-authors do
not develop further on conditions under which these groups are (or are not) strong
enough to constrain the dictator and to influence leadership selection, remaining
agnostic about the origins of these institutions.
Although these two approaches belong to different types of institutionalism,
there does not have to be a contradiction between the two frameworks because, as
mentioned before, they do not apply to the same institutions. It is plausible that
formal authoritarian institutions (parties, parliaments, elections) can be established,
changed, and abolished by a dictator at his will while informal institutions are
relatively rigid and cannot be manipulated by the dictator so easily. It is also
logical to suggest that the function of authoritarian institutions may be dependent
28It has to be pointed out that in 2018, the rule that made leader replacement obligatory was
removed, and Xi Jinping is likely to stay in power even after his second 5-year term is over. It is
mentioned in multiple sources that Xi Jinping has been consolidating his personal power in recent
years (see, for example, Chen 2018).
29An overview of rational choice institutionalism can be found in Shepsle (2008).
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on informal constraints. In other words, it can be that in some autocracies the role
of formal authoritarian institutions is to make partial concessions to the opposition
and to ensure cooperation from the citizens (as described by Gandhi & Przeworski
2006, Gandhi 2008, 2008a) while in others it is just to make people personally
interested in regime survival and to demonstrate overwhelming advantage of the
incumbent (as described by Geddes 2006). Indeed, there are some studies that try
to combine the two streams of literature, building and testing a common theoretical
framework for formal and informal authoritarian institutions.
For example, Wright (2008) studied conditions under which authoritarian par-
liaments are established in different types of authoritarian regime as well as an
impact of regime types and of authoritarian parliaments on GDP growth and FDI
influx. In this article, he combines the typology of Geddes with the literature on
formal authoritarian institutions. Focusing on authoritarian parliaments, Wright
theorizes that functions of legislative bodies is not the same for all dictatorships.
Namely, parliaments genuinely help to further constrain the dictators in military
and single-party regimes and foster cooperation with the population, but in person-
alist regimes and monarchies, a parliament is just a means by which dictator can
reward and punish political elites, and does not bind the dictator.
Wright (2008) deals with several questions. First, he analyses the conditions
under which different regime types occur. Second, he analyses conditions under
which autocrats in different regimes decide to introduce parliaments. Finally, he
identifies the effect of having a parliament on GDP per capita growth and FDI
influx in different types of authoritarianism.
Wright’s conclusions are the following. To start with, he finds out that person-
alist regimes are more likely to occur in countries with larger oil reserves, lesser
domestic investments, and smaller populations (in other words, in situations when
a dictator needs only minimal cooperation with the society in order to get rev-
enues and stay in power). Secondly, Wright observes that military and single-party
regimes tend to establish legislatures when they have less oil reserves, when they are
richer and more stable while personalist regimes tend to establish legislatures when
they are most endangered30 (suggesting that in personalist regimes and monarchies
30To operationalize this, Wright uses a predicted probability of failure of a given dictatorship
in a given year, based on the existing statistical models of regime failures and assuming that
dictators estimate their probability of getting ousted in the same way as researchers. Although
this assumption looks overly strong and unrealistic, Wright claims that all the other existing
proxies for regime fragility are even worse.
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parliaments are used only as a short-term strategy in order to survive). Finally, his
findings show that parliaments improve GDP per capita growth and FDI influx only
in the former types of regimes, which is consistent with the theoretical proposition
that parliaments bind the dictator (and thus decrease uncertainty about the rules
of the game) only in non-personalist regimes.
In addition to the studies on ecnomic performance, other works have investi-
gated interaction between formal authoritarian institutions and regime types in
non-economic areas. For example, Wright & Escribà-Folch (2011) study the im-
pact of authoritarian legislatures and parties on the likelihood of democratic and
autocratic transitions. They find out that legislatures generally decrease the likeli-
hood of both democratic and autocratic transition of a given regime while parties
increase this likelihood – but this mostly works for non-personalist regimes in which
parties and legislatures are not just tools for the dictators.While this finding is not
directly related to economic performance, it is another piece of evidence that the
same formal institutions may matter differently depending on informal ones.
d) Moving forward
Thus, from the literature on varieties of authoritarianism, the main conclusions
can be the following. First, not all authoritarian regimes are the same, they differ
by the degree of constraints imposed by the dictator as well as by the type of actors
who constrain the dictator. Second, formal authoritarian institutions like legisla-
tures and parties are not just window-dressing, they serve either a purpose of foster-
ing cooperation with the citizens and preventing rebellion or a purpose of making
people engaged in maintaining regime stability and demonstrating overwhelming re-
source advantage of the incumbent. Third, formal authoritarian institutions matter
differently in different types of authoritarianism, as in some regimes these institu-
tions help to constrain the dictator while in others they serve as a tool to actually
empower the dictator. Finally, the type of authoritarian regime, formal authoritar-
ian institutions, and their interaction play a significant role for regime longevity and
for many aspects of economic performance, including economic growth, investments,
and social development.
However, how some types of regimes do manage to attract investments and foster
growth is still an understudies question. In particular, work is needed to theoreti-
cally model and empirically test the relationship between authoritarian institutions
and economic development.
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While this particular questions seems to be understudied from the perspectve
of the literature on autocratic institutions, the investigation of the institutional
determinants of economic growth is a long-established research question that has
already been explored extensively, especially in the literature on institutional eco-
nomics. Below, the literature on institutional determinants of economic growth is
reviewed with the view to find what can be the missing link between authoritarian
institutions and their economic outcomes.
Rule of law as the main driver of economic growth
Following from North’s seminal works (1987, 1989), there is now substantial evi-
dence that economic growth is profoundly related to institutional factors. North
was the first to introduce institutions in the economic analysis. Unlike neoclas-
sical economists who believed that transaction costs are non-existent or at least
are neutral and inconsequential to economic development (which is more or less a
fair assumption if it is applied to advanced Western economies), North insists that
these transaction costs are, first of all, important enough to be taken seriously, and,
secondly, vary a lot and depend mostly not on technologies but on institutions.
North distinguishes between forth types of transaction costs: costs of measuring
the attributes of goods and services, costs of making contracts, costs of enforcing
contracts, and costs of ideological attitudes (the latter define how likely is it that a
person will engage in opportunistic behavior if it is potentially profitable). These
costs do not exist in small scale personal exchange which took place in small soci-
eties with strong interpersonal ties; however, as the scale of production and trade
increases and as specialization and division of labor develops, they increase and
become obstacles for economic development unless they are decreased by the strong
third party, which is the state. According to North, having the functional state
is necessary but not sufficient condition for economic development: in order to en-
able the state to decrease transaction costs, it must be characterized by stability
of property rights, both in terms of legal definition of property rights and contract
obligations and in terms of enforcement of these rights and obligations.
North also found that, historically, it was very infrequent and exceptional rather
than normal for states to create and enforce efficient system of property rights as for
the interests of the rulers it might be much more profitable to design and implement
29
rules which serve only the interests of themselves and their constituencies, not of the
population as a whole. It is only a very particular set of context-specific conditions
in some Western countries which led to creation of efficient institutions...
From the empirical side, Rodrik et al. (2004) review the literature about de-
terminants of economic development in a long-term perspective, and distinguish
between three types of explanations: geographical explanations (related to the im-
pact of climate on agricultural productivity), explanations related to international
trade openness, and explanations related to the quality of institutions (the latter
being represented by North, whose theory is reviewed above). To test the role of the
institutional factors, Rodrik and his co-authors use two-staged regression analysis
with instrumental variables, which allow them to deal with the problem of endo-
geneity which are relevant in all institutionalist studies31. They show that, if to
look at simple correlations, all the three types of explanations look plausible, as
the measurements of trade openness, measurements of institutional quality (they
use the WGI Rule of Law index by the World Bank), and several measurements of
geographic conditions are all correlated with GDP per capita. However, once all the
variables are introduced in the regression model, institutional variable trumps all the
others, and the impact of the other variables becomes either substantially or even
statistically insignificant. It means that, even if the role of non-institutional fac-
tors in long-term economic growth is non-negligible, institutional factors are clearly
dominant.
This point to one of the institutions whose impact on economic growth is proven
and shown to be crucial, namely, the rule of law. Indeed, the rule of law guarantees
property rights, which is the key factor that determines the investors’ decision on
whether to invest or not. Rodrik et al. (2004) also point out that it is not specific
legal definition of property rights which is important but their actual implementa-
tion. They illustrate it by the example of China and Russia, pointing out that while
Russian legal definition of property rights is much stronger and much closer to the
Western one than the one in China (Chinese legal definition of property rights still
bears socialist legacy), it is in China that the property rights are protected better
in practice.
31The problem of endogeneity is caused by potential reversed causality or simultaneous relation
between institutions and economic development: it is possible that it is economic development that
shapes institutions (rather than the other way around), or that specific institutions and economic
development mutually influence each other. The use of instrumental variables which are directly
linked to the independent variable but not to the dependent one allows to deal with this problem
and to show that there is a direct link between institutions and economic development (although
it cannot exclude the presence of a reversed causal link at the same time).
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The importance of secure property rights, the rule of law, public services, and the
freedom contract is further ascertained in Acemoglu & Robinson’s (2012) seminal
book. They distinguish between extractive economic institutions aimed at extract-
ing revenues from the majority of the population in favor of the minority groups,
and inclusive economic institutions which allow a majority of the population to
participate in economic activities and gain profit. Inclusive economic institutions
mean exactly secure property rights, the rule of law, public services, and the free-
dom contract, as only these institutions provide incentives for the people to become
more productive and to develop their abilities, which ultimately leads to innovations
in the economy. Acemoglu & Robinson recognize that extractive institutions can
produce short-term growth if the ruling elites move resources to the sectors of econ-
omy which are productive and which they themselves can benefit from. They quote
Stalin’s industrialization of 1930s as an example of that. However, such growth is
not sustainable and does not involve technological change.
An important contribution of the Acemoglu & Robinson book is the link between
economic and political institutions (which is definitely not a new idea, however,
their contribution is thick description of cases which give convincing evidence in
favor of their point). The authors claim that, most of the time, extractive economic
institutions are underpinned by extractive political institutions which concentrate
power in the hands of the narrow minority, and inclusive economic institutions
are underpinned by inclusive political institutions which distribute power broadly
in the society. Importantly, according to them, inclusive institutions require not
just political pluralism but also a centralized state, as political pluralism without
centralization means not a democracy but anarchy, like in Somalia. Acemoglu
& Robinson claim that combinations of extractive and inclusive institutions are
generally unstable, as they tend to challenge each other, although they mention
some examples in which extractive political institutions coexisted with inclusive
economic institutions (such as South Korea in the 1970-1980s, and, with a lot of
reservations they make, current China).
Acemoglu & Robinson also recognize that the inclusiveness of both political and
economic institutions is not a dichotomous variable but rather a scale. They claim
that, although Chinese political and economic institutions in general remain ex-
tractive, their economic institutions nowadays are much more inclusive than they
used to be before Deng Xiaoping reforms which took place in 1980s and early 1990s
(which gradually created free market in China and opened the country to foreign
31
investments). They also do not simply equate inclusive political institutions with
electoral democracy: for example, they label political institutions of many demo-
cratic countries of Latin America as extractive as they provide few constraints to
the executive; moreover, an ongoing rebel violence leads to unlawful destruction
or appropriation of property, which is as bad for businesses as expropriations by
the state (they go even so far as to characterize political institutions of Southern
states of the U.S. before the Civil Rights Movement as extractive as it was system-
atically discriminated against Black people). However, they do not seem to make a
distinction between autocracies, treating all of them as exclusively extractive.
Acemoglu & Robinson prove their thesis about criticality of institutions for eco-
nomic development qualitatively, using what can be called the most similar systems
design, although they do not this term themselves: they pick countries located
within the same geographic area and sharing the same culture but diverging rad-
ically in terms of economic development (such as North Korea and South Korea,
Botswana and Zimbabwe, Southern U.S. states and Northern states of Mexico), and
they further demonstrate that the only cause for this is the difference in institutions.
In short, the importance of institutions such as a rule of law and property rights
protection are backed both by qualitative and by quantitative evidence.
Acemoglu & Robinson’s seminal book makes an important theoretical and em-
pirical contribution to scientific understanding of the interplay between political
economic institutions. It also provides rich empirical evidence of how economic
institutions make a crucial difference for countries’ economic performance, other
things being equal. However, for the purposes of the current study, Acemoglu &
Robinson’s framework needs some refinement to make it more applicable to studying
the variety of authoritarian institutions, as Acemoglu & Robinson’s analysis, even
though it demonstrates that some countries with extractive political institutions can
develop more inclusive economic institutions, does not tease out systematic causes
of these developments.
When the authors describe how China managed to turn from extractive to semi-
inclusive economic institutions, they portray it as a completely contingent event,
namely, as a fortunate outcome of a power struggle between elite groups within
the Communist party after the death of Mao Zedong. The same holds for their
account of South Korean institutions in 1960-1980s (when the country was a mil-
itary dictatorship), which combined extractive political institutions and inclusive
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economic institutions. Yet, according to the literature on authoritarian types and
institutions, the difference between autocracies of different kind on economic and
social development is statistically significant even after controlling for all standard
socioeconomic variables. If economic institutions in each authoritarian country were
dependent only on contingent, context-specific factors and if one assumes that these
economic institutions have a crucial impact on economic performance (which has
been extensively shown above), then a difference in economic performance between
dictatorships of with different institutions would not be statistically significant when
examined. Since, in reality, multiple studies did find evidence that significant differ-
ence exists, it is plausible to hypothesize that there may be a significant difference
in economic institutions between dictatorships of different types.
If the rule of law and property rights protection are indeed crucial for economic
development at least in a long term perspective, it might be plausible to expect that
having a constrained authoritarian regime with higher degree of institutionalization
should lead to a higher degree of the rule of law and property rights protection. This
also makes sense from the theoretical point of view, if one applies the framework
of Acemoglu & Robinson. More institutionalized and constrained authoritarian
regimes can be considered to be more inclusive political institutions compared to
non-institutionalized and unconstrained autocracies (as I discussed before, author-
itarian parliaments and multiparty systems are needed to foster cooperation with
the citizens and avert rebellion; moreover, there is evidence that in non-personalist
regimes legislative bodies can be actually binding for dictators to a certain extent).
Consequently, it is possible to suggest that these more inclusive political institu-
tions in dictatorships should lead to more inclusive economic institutions – meaning
better state of the rule of law.
The reason I focus on institutions and not on specific policies fostering the eco-
nomic growth is that, as this literature shows, once institutions are introduced in
the analysis, the effect of policies on economic growth loses its statistical signif-
icance. This may be interpreted in several ways. On the one hand, institutions
can be regarded as cumulative outcome of the past policy actions, in other words,
“good” institutions are produced by “good” policy changes of the past. Thus, the
effect of specific policies is already “included” in the effect of institutions, so, it
is not possible to plug both institutional and policy variables in the same model
(Rodrik et al. 2004). On the other hand, following Acemoglu & Robinson (2012),
one can claim that it is impossible to have “good” policies within the framework of
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“bad” (extractive) institutions as any attempts to implement “good” policies withing
the framework of “bad” institutions would undermine these “bad” institutions; thus,
any attempt to really implement beneficial policies will be blocked by the dominant
groups. For these reasons, I consider institutions to be more fundamental for eco-
nomic growth than any particular set of policies, and analyze the rule of law as the
most fundamental of these institutions.
Summary
In the current chapter, I reviewed of the literature on formal and informal authori-
tarian institutions and their impact on economic performance. I also reviewed the
literature which theorized and tested how formal and informal authoritarian insti-
tutions could interact with each other. An apparent gap in this literature is that,
while current studies demonstrate that authoritarian institutions matter for perfor-
mance, they do not empirically study the mechanism of how that happens. I further
reviewed the literature on institutional economics which modeled theoretically and
convincingly demonstrated empirically that economic growth was a phenomenon
which was primarily caused by institutions, and that the most important among
those institutions was the rule of law. Hence, I suggested that the link between
authoritarian institutions and their performance might be the way authoritarian
institutions affect the rule of law. In the following chapter of this dissertation, I
discuss conceptualization and operationalization of autocracy and authoritarian in-
stitutions which I will be using in the project. I will also discuss why some popular
conceptualizations and operationalizations of autocracy or autocratic institutions
are not used. This is necessary before formulating a precise research queston and a
set of testable hypothesis, which will be done in Chapter III.
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CHAPTER II. CONCEPTUALIZATIONS AND OP-
ERATIONALIZATIONS
Democracy and autocracy
Before studying the impact of authoritarian institutions on the rule of law, it is
necessary to, first of all, find a way to define which countries should be considered
authoritarian and which should not at any given time period. This question is
obviously linked to a question of how one should define the opposite of autocracy,
which is democracy.
In this project, I define democracy and autocracy procedurally, not on norma-
tive grounds. According to the procedural definition of democracy, democracy is a
political regime in which the power is acquired and lost by means of competitive
elections with near-universal suffrage. This definition originates from Schumpeter
(2003[1943]) and then is used, with slight modifications, by most scholars working
in the field of regime studies. Schumpeter (2003)[1943] rejects understanding of
democracy based on source of power (“popular will”) of the purpose (“common
good”), which were common for his time. He instead suggested a procedural defini-
tion of democracy, which has been dominant in regime studies at least since 1970s
(Huntington 1991) and still remains dominant now - mostly due to the fact that
procedural definition is relatively easy to be operationalized. Autocracy here is op-
erationalized as a political regimes in which the power is acquired and lost by any
means which are different from competitive elections with near-universal suffrage.
In this definition, elections, on their own, do not make any regime democratic; if
elections do not serve as means of acquiring and losing power but serve any other
goals (i.e. improving legitimacy of the regime), then a given regime is not considered
democratic.
There are good reasons why other definitions of democracy and autocracy are
normally not used in regime studies. Alternative, non-procedural concepts of democ-
racy convey normative ideals of democracy which have not been implemented yet in
any country. Concepts such as participatory democracy or deliberative democracy
do not have empirical examples, as none of the currently existing democracies fully
correspond to these normative ideals. In order to deal with this widespread confu-
sion between democracy as a normative ideal which has not yet been reached and
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democracy as a really-existing system with meaningful political competition and
universal suffrage, Dahl (1971) coined a term “polyarchy” to describe the latter;
however, the term was not universally adopted, so the confusion between the two
possible meanings of “democracy" still remains. Normative definitions of democ-
racy can also be useful for a different purpose, namely, for assessing the quality
of democracy in countries which meet the procedural definition of democracy in
the first place32. Countries of the world differ very much in terms of the extent
to which participatory procedures, such as referenda, are used (which is part of
the concept of participatory democracy) or to what extent the political debate is
meaningful (which is part of the notion of deliberative democracy). For example,
it is clear that there are no countries where local and national referenda are held
as frequently as in Switzerland. However, if alternation of power via elections in
a given country is not possible, operationalizing the degree of deliberation or par-
ticipation in a given country seems less meaningful. For this reason, procedural
definition of democracy is also frequently labeled “minimalist”: if a given regime
does not meet even the procedural criteria of democracy, a given regime is not con-
sidered democratic, even though it could have some level of direct participation or
deliberation33
Another advantage of adopting procedural definitions of democracy and autoc-
racy is that this definition does not imply anything about account regime perfor-
mance: nothing in this definition presupposes that a democracy must be efficient,
non-corrupt, fair, and so on, as well as nothing presupposes that autocracy must
necessarily have the opposite qualities (Huntington 1991). This is particularly im-
portant since, for the purposes of this project, since I am interested in regime
performance, it would have been undesirable if a definition of democracy also, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, assumed good performance for democracies (and, respectively,
bad performance for autocracies) by default.
The definition I presented above is the general definition of democracy and
autocracy. In what follows, I discuss a more operational definition which would dis-
tinguish between democracy and autocracy, and, more importantly, an operational
definition of authoritarian institutions, which are the main independent variables
32There are attempts to operationalize the level of direct participation or deliberation in democ-
racies to measure how close they approach the normative ideals; such an attempt was made, for
example, by the authors of V-Dem project.
33Some dictatorships introduce formal institutions which are, legally, more participatory or more
deliberative than institutions in democracies (likes Soviets in the USSR or self-governing communes
in Libya during Qaddafi’s rule); however, these institutions are completely controllable and have
limited impact on decision-making.
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of the current project.
Alternative conceptualizations: overview and critical discus-
sion
Before introducing the final conceptualizations and operationalizations of autocracy
and authoritarian institutions which I am using in this project, it is necessary to
critically discuss some of the most prominent concepts and operationalizations in
the field of political regime studies. First, I discuss several concepts which try
to conceptualize regimes which are different from classic democracies and classic
autocracies. This separate category has been labelled differently in the literature:
some scholars label them “hybrid regimes” (Diamond 2003, Morlino 2008, 2009),
while other call them “competitive authoritarian regimes” (Levitsky and Way 2010),
. Second, I discuss the use of indices of democracy which claim to operationalize to
what extent a given country is democratic. I focus on the most prominent of them:
Freedom House, Voice and Accountability, Polity IV, and Tatu Vanhanen’s index.
Third, I discuss a famous typology of non-democratic regimes by Juan Linz.
a) “Hybrid regimes” and “competitive authoritarian” regimes: critical
discussion
Some authors make a distinction between “pure” authoritarianism and “hybrid
regimes”, or “competitive authoritarian regimes” 34, suggesting that, apart from
democracy and autocracy, one should distinguish a third category of regimes with
distinct features which differentiate them from both democracies and autocracies.
The concept of “competitve authoritarian regimes” was popularized by Levitsky &
Way (2002, 2010), while other scholars working on political regimes, like Diamond
(2002), or Morlino (2008, 2009), introduced the term of “hybrid regimes”. These
two concepts are discussed below.
Levitsky & Way (2010), like virtually all scholars working with political regimes,
depart from a procedural definition of democracy, more specifically, from criteria
of polyarchy by Dahl (1971), which goes back to Schumpeter (2003)[1943]. From
Dahl’s definition, they deduce three main criteria of democracy: (1) free and fair
elections, (2) broad protection of civil liberties, (3) a reasonably level playing field.
These criteria are used for distinguishing between the types of regimes they intro-
duce.
34Levistky and Way prefer the term of “competitive authoritarianism” rather than “hybrid
regimes” to underline that they consider these regimes autocracies and not flawed democracies.
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According to them, a pure authoritarian regime is the one in which there are
no elections or the ones in which elections are non-competitive (the ones in which
virtually all viable non-incumbent candidates are excluded from electoral process or
in which electoral fraud is so massive that electoral process becomes meaningless),
civil liberties are not guaranteed, and there is obviously no level playing field because
there are no meaningful elections. In contrast, “hybrid regimes” (or “competitive
authoritarian regimes”, which is the term preferred by Levitsky & Way 2002, 2010
to indicate that these regimes are a sub-type of autocracy rather than democracy)
are the ones in which opposition is allowed to run for elections and the elections
are more meaningful in a sense that there is some correspondence between popular
preferences and electoral results but at least one of the following conditions are
present: a) electoral results are fraudulent, b) civil liberties, such as freedom of
speech, are frequently violated, which raises the costs of participation for opposition,
c) playing field is consistently skewed in favor of the incumbent, in a sense that the
opposition has lesser access to money, media coverage, and legal protection. As
far as the outcome is concerned, in hybrid regimes, according to Levitsky and Way
(2010), the incumbent is able to control electoral outcomes to a greater extent than
in democracies but to a lesser extent than in “pure” autocracies.
Levitsky & Way (2010) insist that, although authoritarian regimes with multiple
parties and competitive elections existed before, competitive authoritarian regimes
is a completely new phenomenon which emerged in the early 1990s, when, after
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Western pressure to democratize became really
strong and forced many non-democratic regimes to make elections more competitive
and more meaningful for the opposition to keep the West satisfied – while at the
same time finding ways to make sure they still can manipulate electoral outcomes
well enough to stay in power. According to them, Western leverage and links to
the West is the key explanatory factor why some authoritarian regimes eventually
have to democratize and why even higher number of non-democratic regimes have
been forced to maintain the democratic facade after the end of the Cold War.
The concepts of Western leverage and links to the West are, probably, the most
significant contributions of Levitsky & Way to the studies of political regimes)
Morlino (2008, 2009) has a somewhat different look on the concept of hybrid
regimes. Unlike Levitsky & Way (2010), he explicitly qualifies these regimes as
“hybrid", defining them as regimes which have some institutions and procedures of
democracy and not others, while at the same time maintaining or acquiring some
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autocratic feautures. In other words, hybrid regimes are defined in Morlino (2008)
as the regimes which do not have essential attributes to meet a minimal definition
of democracy or as a minimal definition of autocracy but has some features of both
democracy and autocracy. By minimal definition of democracy, Morlino (2008)
means a procedural definition, virtually identical to the one which I provided above
of this Chapter. By minimal definition of autocracy, Morlino means a definition
by Linz (2003), meaning a regime with the following properties: limited and ir-
responsible pluralism, discouraging participation, and absence of clear ideology35.
According to Morlino (2009), hybrid regimes are always a result of “corruption" of
pure regime types, in a sense that these regimes are either authoritarian/traditional
regimes which lost some autocratic/traditionalist features (e.g. relaxed restrictions
on political pluralism or mobilization) or democracies which lost some democratic
features (e.g. experienced the intervention from the military or other autocratic
veto players who imposed restrictions on electoral competitions).
Morlino (2008, 2009) further classifies hybrid regimes into three types. The first
type is labeled a “protected democracy”, which means a regime in which a powerful
autocratic veto player external to the electoral process (such as the monarch, the
military, or the foreign power) puts the limits to electoral competition by, for ex-
ample, banning certain parties from participating in elections. The second one is
called a “limited democracy", in which supreme power is acquired by a formally cor-
rect electoral procedure with electoral competition but in which civil rights are not
guaranteed, the media is monopolized by the incumbent, and there is no real party-
level opposition. A third concept is a "democracy without law" (Morlino 2008), or
"democracy without state" (Morlino 2009), which is a regime in which the state
does not have capacity to guarantee either either free and fair electoral process or
basic civil rights. The definition of “limited democracy” by Morlino (2008, 2009)
is the closest to the defintion of "competitive authoritarianism" by Levistky and
Way (2010). The definition of “competitive authoitarianism” by Levitsky and Way
explicitly excludes regimes in which the incumbent is not elected (such as monar-
chies), in which the elected officials are heavily influenced by non-elected actors
such as the military, and in which frequent violations of civil rights coexist with
genuinely competitive elections with no evidence of uneven playing field or electoral
fraud. In other words, the definition of “competitve authoritarianism” excludes
both “protected democracies” and “democracies without law” as defined by Morlino
(2008).
35Morlino also follows Linz (2003) in distinguishing traditional regimes like monarchies or sul-
tanistic regimes; more on Linz’s typology below in this Chapter
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Definition of a hybrid regime in Diamond (2002) is also close to Morlino (2007,
2008): Diamond (2003) defines hybrid regimes as regimes combining democratic
and authoritarian elements, so, it is not discussed in details.
Both the definition of competitive authoritarianism by Levitsky & Way (2010)
and the definition of hybrid regimes by Diamond (2003) and Morlino (2008, 2009)
deserve praise for capturing the important transformations that non-democratic
regimes have undergone since the early 1990s. It is undoubtedly true that an in-
creasing number of non-democratic regimes now have mutliparty elections and allow
a substantial degree of political pluralism. Nevertheless, there are several reasons
why I chose not to use these concepts in this projects.
Firstly, the difference between pure authoritarian regimes and hybrid (or com-
petitive authoritarian) regimes as far as it concerns the way the power is acquired
does not seem fundamental. Both in “classical” non-democratic regimes of the 1970s
and in modern non-democracies, which are labeled as “hybrid” or “competitive au-
thoitarian” the supreme power is not acquired by means of elections. The only
difference between the two is is that in most regimes that are defined by Levitsky &
Way (2010) as competitive authoritarian or defined by Diamond (2003) or Morlino
(2008,2009) as hybrid, the dictator or the ruling group allow the opposition to gain
more votes in the election, or even to win elections of secondary importance (local
elections or national parliamentary elections in countries with superpresidentialist
constitutions, i.e. in which the formal powers of the parliament are so weak that it
cannot really endanger presidential power), to co-opt them or to make some con-
cessions to them in a peaceful way, so that the opposition loses incentives to rebel.
Whether it is necessary to allow opposition to gain 10% of seats or 49% of seats
(or even more than half of votes in non-important elections) to accomplish this goal
is, in my point of view, only a question of strategy chosed by the dictator or the
ruling group rather than a defining feature of the regime. Thus, it seem unreason-
able to exclude these regimes from a sample of autocracies or to treat these regimes
separately from “classical” autocracies.
Secondly, both concepts include some regimes in which the alternation of power
via elections is actually possible, on the basis of the fact that these regimes do not
perfectly correspond to the definition of democracy. For example, Levitsky and
Way (2010) classify Georgia after the “revolution of roses” of 2003 as a competitive
authoritarian, even though the party of Mikheil Saakashvili, who became president
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in 2005, lost elections in 2012, and a candidate of his party lost presidential elections
one year later and acknowledge his defeat. The reason why Levitsky and Way
(2010) included Georgia in their sample was harrasment against journalists in before
parliamentary elections in 2004 and closure of some TV stations during 2007 state
of emergency. Likewise, many countries which Morlino (2008, 2009) included in
the category of “democracies without law” or “democracies without a state” (which
are part of his category of hybrid regimes) actually have regular alternation of
power, such as Albania, in which Socialist Party and Democratic Party alternate in
power every two electoral cycles, pretty much as frequently as it happens in most
advanced Western democracy. The basis for including these countries in hybrid
regimes is widespread violation of civil liberties due to the weakness of the state.
Speaking about Levitsky & Way’s classification, it seems debatable that regimes
in which the incumbent cannot guarantee the outcome of electoral procedure can be
called authoritarian, since, strictly following procedural definition of democracy, a
regime in which elections matter for acquiring and losing power is democratic, even
if it does not fully posess all the features which are present in advanced democracies.
In essence, if the incumbent does not control the electoral outcome with certainty,
the regime cannot be defined authoritarian, as elections remain a means of aquiring
and losing power.
It is natural for many incumbents (including the ones in democracies) to try to
stay in power as long as possible, and to use their incumbent position to get an unfair
advantage; however, not every leader which does that actually manages to transform
institutions in a way that makes him or her fully immune from electoral challenges.
For example, Silvio Berlusconi, former prime minister of Italy, directly or indirectly
controlled around 90% of Italian private media market via ownership and via state-
owned media outlets and intimidated independent journalists using defamation laws
during 2000s (Freedom House 2013); yet it did not prevent his electoral failure in
2006 and his final resignation in 2011. Another example of skewed playing field
is the U. S., which has a problem of partisan gerrymandering and of exclusion of
racial minorities from electoral process up to the present day. Actually, the first
studies on electoral fraud originated on the U. S. data and only then were applied to
non-democracies. The main issue about the U. S. elections, extensively studied in
the literature, is different legal mechanisms of excluding Black and other minority
voters from electoral process. Since members of these groups predominantly vote
for the Democrats, these mechanisms benefit the Republican party36. If one strictly
36For example, see Behrens et al. (2003), who claimed that laws restricting felons’ right to vote
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follows the codebook of Levitsky & Way (2010), Berlusconi’s Italy and the U. S. at
present times should be treated as competitive authoritarian regimes rather than
democracies, as, in both cases, the playing field was (or is) skewed. This way, too
many countries (even the ones which are undoubtedly democratic, like Italy or the
U.S.) in which alternation of power via elections is possible have to be considered
competitive authoritarian only because they do not fully correspond to the ideal type
of democracy. It is possible to use criteria of Levitsky and Way’s criteria to capture
attempts of democratic leaders to dismantle democracy and to become dictators.
However, not every democratic leader which attempts to become a dictator actually
manages to become one; transition from a democracy to an authoritarian regime
can be considered complete only when elections finally lose their function as a means
of acquiring and losing power.
Turning to classification by Morlino (2008, 2009), and, in particular, to his
category of “democracy without a law” within the category of hybrid regimes, it
seems debatable that a country with a regular alternation of power should be labeled
as a non-democracy only due to the lack of law enforcement, in spite of presence of
regular alternation of power (as in case of Albania). Including respect for civil rights
in a definition of democracy (explicitly or implicitly) makes an a priori assumption
about good performance of democracy, which departs from a purely procedural
definition of democracy. This is justifiable in other studies, for example, in studies
focusing on the quality of democracy; these studies may require a higher threshold
for democracy than a purely procedural, minimalist definition. However, in this
study, selecting countries for empirical analysis based on respect for civil liberties
in these countries (which is strongly related to the concept of the rule of law) would
mean selecting my cases on the dependent variable, which would lead to endogeneity
problem and thus bias the results of the study.
b) Indices of democracy and their criticism
Many scholars that attempt to take into account the impact of political regime
generally rely on some indices of democracy. These indices seem to be a convenient
way to operationalize political regime as a continuous variable, ranging from the
most autocratic to the most democratic. They also generally provide scholars with
a shortcut to assess the role of political regime as a background control variable.
were passed predominantly in areas with large minority population
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It is virtually impossible to list all scientific publications which use indices of
democracy, as there are hundreds, if not thousands of them. Here, I only provide ex-
amples of several prominent works using democracy indices: Genschel et al. (2016)
use Polity IV index to study the relation between political regime, country size,
and corporate taxation; Knack (2004) uses Freedom House and Polity IV indexes
to study the impact of foreign aid on democratization; Chowdhury (2004) use Free-
dom House indexes (“Freedom in the world” and “Freedom of press”) to study the
impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption; De Haan & Strum (2003)
use Freedom House index to study the impact of democracy on economic freedom;
Davenport & Armstrong (2006) use Polity IV and Tatu Vanhanen indices to study
the impact of democracy on the level of repression.
In spite of their popularity among scholars, these indices are not used in the
current project present some problems that make them not appropriate for the
purposes of this analysis. In what follows, I present a general argument against
using indices to operationalize a political regime and then put forward more spe-
cific critique of the most popular indices: Polity IV, Freedom House, Voice and
Accountability, and Tatu Vanhanen’s index.
General argument
A general argument against the use of any indices in the current project is the
following. A minimalist, procedural definition of democracy that is used in the cur-
rent work is in contradiction with the idea of a continuum between democracy and
autocracy, which is an underlying idea behind indices of democracy. According to
the definition here employed, democracy is a regime in which the power is acquired
and lost by means of competitive elections. Thus, in any given regime, the power is
acquired either by means of competitive elections (which means it is a democracy)
or by any other means (than it is not). If one accepts the minimalist, procedural
definitions of democracy, a “middle ground” is not logically possible.
By this, I do not mean that distinguishing empirically between democracies and
non-democracies is always easy and unambiguous. Sometimes, a slide towards au-
thoritarianism is slow and gradual, and it is hard to identify when a flawed democ-
racy finally turns into an authoritarian regime. For example, in their codebook,
Geddes et al. (2014) acknowledge the difficulties in ascertaining when the regime
of Hugo Chàvez in Venezuela crossed a line between a flawed democracy and elec-
toral authoritarianism. Hugo Chàvez started to consolidate his power since the very
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beginning of his presidential term in 1998: he proposed a new Constitution which
increased presidential power and allowed him to remove public officials at will, and
had it approved by the referendum in December 1999. He managed to win his next
presidential term also in 2001. In 2004, the opposition, which has been accusing
Chàvez of authoritarian tendencies for long, manage to collect enough signatures to
conduct a referendum on Chàvez’s recall – which Chàvez also won, and, according
to independent observers, overall, that referendum was still relatively fair. Later
on, Chavists managed to get rid of any judiciary independence, and thousands of
people among those who signed the petition for the recall referendum lost their
jobs, and next parliamentary elections of 2005 were boycotted by the opposition,
because the authorities could use the fingerprinting machines for voter registration
to identify and then to punish those who voted for the opposition (Geddes et al.
2014). In light of this trajectory, Geddes et al. (2014) consider early 2005 as the end
of democracy and beginning of a new autocratic regime. Similarly, slow autocrati-
zation can be observed in Hungary (Bozoki 2011, Agh 2016) in Turkey (Toktamis &
David 2018) during 2010s. In both cases, it is hard to identify whether the regime
in both countries is still democratic or already autocratic, and, if it is autocratic,
when the line between democracy and autocracy was crossed. However, empirical
difficulties of distinguishing between democracies and autocracies are not a good
reason to blur a theoretical distinction between democracies and autocracies.
Applying the ideas of Sartori (1970), there is a difference in kindbetween democ-
racies and autocracies; these two types of regimes are conceptually different. The
meaningful comparison of degree may be made only among the units of the same
kind. A given authoritarian regime may have a parliament and multi-party elec-
tions but that does not make it more democratic: survival of the dictator does
not depend on these elections as they are always manipulated in a way to make
sure the incumbent always wins (even if there is no obvious electoral fraud or ob-
vious coercion on electoral day)37 or the formal powers of elected institutions is
so insignificant that the dictator is not threatened even if the electoral outcome is
negative38. Furthermore, as previously discussed, the mere purpose of these insti-
tutions in authoritarian regimes is different from their purpose in democratic ones.
While in democracies parliaments legislate, parties compete for power and elections
serve to choose a new leadership, in authoritarian regimes all these institutions
37On the variety of ways in which the incumbent can manipulate electoral process in order to
stay in power, see Schedler 2002
38The most obvious examples are monarchies in Morocco or Jordan, in which the king does not
even need to manipulate elections, as the supreme executive power, both formally and substantially,
belongs to the king who is unelected.
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simply allow the dictator to co-opt potential opposition or to make some conces-
sions to it without putting their power at risk. Parliament, parties, and elections
just make authoritarian regimes more institutionalized and perhaps more inclusive
but not less authoritarian39. Thus, it seems inappropriate to apply the same opera-
tionalization and measurements to some properties of authoritarian and democratic
institutions in spite of the fact that they have the same name in democracies and
autocracies. In spite of the fact that many autocracies, have institutions which are
called parliaments, parties, and elections, authoritarian parliaments do not legislate,
authoritarian parties are not created to pursue electoral victory, and authoritarian
elections do not serve as a means of leadership selection40.
It could be argued that, in spite of this fundamental problem, certain indices of
democracy can still be applied for practical purposes, also because it is normally
believed that in quantitative research, in is more convenient to use continuous vari-
ables rather than typologies, as typologies are assumed to be less informative than
scale variables and to be more problematic in terms of statistical analysis (Gill 2006,
Salkind 2007, Stevens 1946, Young 1981, cit. in Collier et al. 2012). It can be also
argued that, empirically, democracies consistently have higher values of indices of
democracy than autocracies, and it is possible to empirically distinguish between
the two by establishing a certain threshold for these indices. To show that this is
also not the case, I further overview several most popular indices of democracy and
demonstrate that they are not suitable for the purposes of this research.
Polity IV index
Polity IV index (Marshall et al. 2017) operationalizes institutional features of
political regimes, both autocratic and democratic. The authors of the index distin-
guish between two ideal types of polities, one of which is institutionalized democracy
and another one is institutionalized autocracy. According to them, the institution-
alist features of a mature, internally coherent democracy are: 1) unrestricted and
competitive political participation; 2) elective executive recruitment, 3) substantial
constraints on on chief executive. Institutionalist features of a mature, internally
coherent autocracies are: 1) sharply restricted political participation, 2) selection of
a chief executive by a regularized process by the political elite, 3) few institutional
39For further discussion on why higher institutionalization does not make an authoritarian regime
more democratic, see conclusions of Gandhi (2008a)
40This is not to say that that these institutions are meaningless; quite the contrary, the idea
that formal authoritarian institutions are very important for dictators in precisely the core of
theoretical framework by Gandhi and Przeworski. However, the meaning of these institutions in
autocracies differs from the one in democracies.
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constraints on chief executive. Then, they operationalize these features of insti-
tutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy according to these criteria,
and obtain a democracy score and an autocracy score for a given country. Each
score is an 11-point scale (0-10), as a sum of scores for each characteristic of insti-
tutionalized democracy and institutionalized autocracy. A final Polity IV index is
obtained by subtracting autocracy score from democracy score.
According to the theory that Marshall et al. (2017) use, which goes back to
Eikstein and Gurr (1975, cit. in Marshall et al. 2017), a given polity can be
characterized by mixed patterns of authority and can combine both autocratic and
democratic features. They found out, based on the original dataset which included
country-years from 1800 to 1971 that internally coherent democracies and autoc-
racies are more durable than regimes which combine autocratic and democratic
features.
Policy IV score could be potentially considered as the measure of institutional
openness of a given regime because it is constructed by assessing the institutional
features of political regimes. However, the problem is that this index bunches to-
gether several theoretically distinct dimensions of political institutions. This is
a problem of most indices, which was critically pointed out by Schmitter (2015).
The authors of the index warn its users that summing up democracy and autoc-
racy score violates the original idea of Eikstein and Gurr and should be done with
caution (which is rarely taken into account by scholars who are using this index).
However, even if I used only autocracy score, the problem still remains: restricted
political participation and constraints on chief executive (which are two of the in-
dicators included in the autocracy score) are theoretically very distinct, as follows
from the theories of autocracy reviewed above: a regime with few institutional
constraints for a chief executive can at the same time allow for more political par-
ticipation than a regime with more institutional constraints. For example, one can
compare any single-party regime without multiparty elections, like the Soviet Union
or contemporary China, with any personalist regime with multiparty elections, like
contemporary Russia (as of 2019). The former allow for less political participation
than the latter, however, the former ones also effectively constrain a chief executive
more, in a formal or an informal way. It is not entirely meaningful to combine
two indicators of theoretically and empirically different dimensions in one index,
especially given the fact that variety of authoritarian institutions is the main focus
of the current project.
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Freedom House index and Voice and Accountability index
Two other popular operationalizations of political regime frequently used by
scholars are “Freedom of the world” index by “Freedom House” (further, FH index)
and “Voice and Accountability” index by the World Bank.
FH index is an average of two indices, namely, the index of political rights and
the index of civil liberties. Political rights score includes evaluation of: 1) electoral
process, 2) political pluralism and participation 3) functioning of the government
(dependence on elected bodies, corruption, accountability between elections). Civil
liberties index includes evaluation of: 1) freedom of expression and belief, 2) associa-
tional and organizational rights, 3) rule of law, 4) personal autonomy and individual
rights41. Assessment is done through expert evaluation. The methodology descrip-
tion states that this index is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.
The most evident reason for not using the index is that it includes assessment of
the rule of law, which is the dependent variable this research is dealing with. Hence,
using this index could cause endogeneity problem. However, this endogeneity could
have been potentially avoided if I used only political rights score, which does not
directly includes the rule of law.
A more fundamental reason not to use a Freedom House index is that it essen-
tially operationalizes not the regime itself but rather some properties which may
or may not be present in a given authoritarian regime42. Namely, political rights
score operationalizes fairness of electoral process, a possibility of opposition to par-
ticipate in the elections and the degree to which the government is accountable to
elected bodies while civil liberties score operationalizes the degree of repressiveness
of a given regime. The problem is that electoral fraud, severe restriction on activity
of political opposition, and repressiveness are not obligatory features of authoritar-
ian regimes. They are indeed present in many if them, but in some authoritarian
regimes opposition is allowed to participate in elections or sometimes even to win
some elections, and the government does not imprison anyone for political activity
– for a simple reason that these dictatorships have subtler strategies to ensure their
survival in power.
41A full description of methodology is available here: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world-2016/methodology
42Even the authors of the index themselves do not claim that their index operationalizes democ-
racy: it captures political rights and civil liberties.
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At the same time, in some democracies, the government may be corrupt, elec-
tions may not be entirely fair (for example, there may be partisan gerrymandering
or there may be some ways to suppress the vote or marginalized groups, like in the
U.S.), or some civil liberties may be restricted or violated – which does not influence
a regular alternation of power in the country.
This is not a merely theoretical problem. In some cases, using FH index does
not allow to distinguish between benevolent, non-repressive autocracies from prob-
lematic, unstable democracies, as both receive the same or similar FH score.
To give an example, the fact that Singapore has a FH score of 4.5 in 2010
does not make it more democratic than Nigeria with the FH score of 4.5 at the
same year. Singapore is a stable authoritarian regime (coded by Geddes as single-
party) since its independence declaration in 1965 with a continuous domination of
its Popular Action Party (PAP), which, although does not violently repress political
opponents and does not engage in electoral fraud, finds a way to put pressure on
political opponents by defamation lawsuits, tight media control, gerrymandering,
clientelism, and other non-repressive means. For example, in his memories, Lee
Kuan Yew acknowledged himself that, during his electoral campaigns, he made
it clear that the order of renovation of different parts of the city would depend
on the share of votes the ruling party would get in the elections (Lee Kuan Yew
2000). In contrast, Nigeria since 1999 has been having reasonably free and fair
competitive elections, although there have been numerous problems related mostly
to rebel violence. A use of FH score does not allow to make a clear-cut distinction
in such cases, which makes it unsuitable for distinguishing between democracies and
non-democracies in a general case43.
As for the “Voice and Accountability” index by the World Bank, similar problems
can be identified. According to the codebook, “voice and accountability captures
perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association,
and a free media”44, which is very close to the definition of FH political rights and
civil liberties indices. Moreover, “Voice and Accountability” index is composed of
several indications, among which there are also the two indices of Freedom House.
Thus, the empirical and theoretical problems raised with regards to Freedom House
43To be fair to “Freedom House”, they make it clear in the methodology description that their
indices operationalize a state of political rights and civil liberties rather than political regime types
44A full list of indicators used to compose Voice and Accounabiliry index can be found here:
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/va.pdf
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indices hold equally for the World Bank index on Voice and Accountability.
Tatu Vanhanen index of democratization
Another index quite frequently used to operationalize democracy/autocracy
(though less frequently than Polity IV and Freedom House indices) is Tatu Van-
hanen index (Vanhanen 1993, 2000). The index is simply a multiplication of two
shares: a share of seats obtained by non-incumbent party (or, for presidential elec-
tions, share of votes obtained by non-winning candidates) on the last national elec-
tions, which represent competition and a share of population which actually partic-
ipated in the last elections, which represents participation. If there are presidential
elections alongside with parliamentary ones, the average scores between the latest
elections of these two types is calculated. If a de facto head of state is not elected
and a parliament is elected (like in dualist monarchies or like in Iran where a head
of state is an ayatollah, who is elected not by a popular vote but by an expert coun-
cil, which is itself not elected), competition and participation score for executive
election are set to 0, and are averaged with competition and participation score for
parliamentary elections. Alliances of parties are coded as one unit. Multiplication
of two shares, rather than summing them up, reflects that both competition and
participation are equally necessary for democracy, and that it’s not possible to sub-
stitute one with the other. Both figures have to be high enough to get a high value
of the index. To give an example in a system in which electoral participation is
99% and electoral competition is 1% would get an overall score of 0.0099, which is
extremely low even though participation in elections is extremely high.
Tatu Vanhanen also establishes the thresholds of the lowest possible level of
competition (0.3), participation (0.1), and the overall index (0.05) below which the
country is not considered to be democratic in a given year. All the three numbers
must be higher than the threshold levels for a country to be considered democratic
in a given year.
The index reflects the classification of political regimes by Dahl (1971) who clas-
sified political regimes by the degree of participation and competition, and described
different modes of democratic transition based on whether increasing competition
precedes increasing participation or the other way around. He argued that, histori-
cally, the most successful democratic transitions started with increasing competition
(legalization of political opposition in the parliament) followed by increasing partic-
ipation (extension of voting rights), which is exactly how it happened in the U.K.
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or the U.S.
The advantage of Tatu Vanhanen index is that it is extremely parsimonious and
relatively easy to construct, and, for this reason, a dataset for this index covers the
time period for almost all countries in the world since 1800. It also lacks disadvan-
tages associated with expert evaluation as both competition and participation are
measured objectively, based on the official electoral results and the population data.
Also, Vanhanen’s index has more solid theoretical grounds than other indices such
as Freedom House score, as it operationalizes theoretical dimensions of democracy
introduced by Roald Dahl.
However, the same way as FH or Polity IV index, Tatu Vanhanen index has a
number of problems.
While higher electoral turnout and having multiple parties do make an author-
itarian regime more institutionalized, it does not make it more democratic: even
with comparatively low electoral results for the incumbent party the dictator is not
threatened, as he has multiple ways to ensure his power even without an overwhelm-
ing parliamentary majority, or even without a parliamentary majority at all. For
example, in Venezuela a pro-presidential party lost parliamentary elections in 2015
– which does not prevent Nicolás Maduro, the current president, from staying in
power, repressing his political opponents, and using lethal violence against people
protesting against him since 2015 up to now, as he still can rely on loyal police
and military forces (as of 2019). The same could be said about Russia since 1993:
pro-presidential parties were gaining just around 15% of seats during parliamentary
elections of 1993, 1995, and 199945 (14.4%, 12.2% and 16.2% of seats respectively).
The presidential elections of 1996 were won by Yeltsin during the second round by
a small margin. For this reason, the Tatu Vanhanen index scores for Russia for
these years are just high as (if not higher than) in advanced democracies. Yet nei-
ther Geddes et al. (2014), nor Przeworski (2000) or Cheibub et al. (2010) consider
Yeltsin’s Russia as a democracy in their datasets, and for valid reasons: as it was
mentioned in Chapter I, Boris Yeltsin used armed forces to resolve his conflict with
the previous parliament (the Supreme Council), enforced a new Constitution with
significantly extended presidential powers, and heavily skewed the electoral process
for 1996 presidential elections, which allowed him to win in spite of having single-
digit figures of public support in 1995. Yeltsin himself in his memories wrote that,
45Parties “Vybor Rossii” (“Russian Choice”), “Nash Dom Rossiya” (“Our home is Russia”) and
“Yedinstvo” (“Unity”) for 1993, 1995 and 1999 elections respectively.
50
in 1995, he had already prepared decrees to ban the Communist party (the party
of the main contender), to introduce a state of national emergency and to postpone
presidential elections for two years. He then reconsidered, and elections were held
as scheduled; however, he stated in his memories that failure was unacceptable for
him (Yeltsin 2000). These elections were marked by enormous incumbent advantage
in media coverage and campaign finance (OSCE 1996); also Myagkov (2008) found
also quantitative evidence of direct electoral fraud in some regions.
The same way, the fact that in some democratic countries the electoral system
leads to domination on two parties (like in the U.K. or the U.S.), and, thus, to
comparatively lower score of competition does not make them less democratic: the
U.K. and the U.S. are characterized by regular alternation of power, and no incum-
bent can control electoral outcomes with certainty46. Vanhanen tries to correct this
bias by establishing a maximal level of competition of 0.7 but this solution looks
like an ad hoc one, without a valid theoretical justification (as well as the thresholds
for democracy themselves).
In practice, it leads to similar scores for some autocratic and some democratic
regimes, namely, to similar scores for democratic countries with majoritarian elec-
toral systems and authoritarian countries with multi-party elections. To continue
above-mentioned examples, Russia in 2002 had a value of democratization index of
29.4% - even higher than the same value for Britain in 2002, which was 26.6%47.
In other words, applying Tatu Vanhanen index can lead to even more obvious mis-
takes in distinguishing between democracies and autocracies than Freedom House
or Polity IV.
Conclusion
In short, there are substantive reasons to justify my choice not to use indices of
democracy for the purposes of this work. The most important of these reasons that is
my theoretical starting point is a clear conceptual distinction between democracies
and autocracies. This conceptualization contradicts the idea of a scale between
democracy and autocracy, which is an underlying assumption behind any index
of democracy. There are also practical reasons not to rely on these indices in
this thesis: the indices reviewed above fail to operationalize the difference between
46It is true that gerrymandering as a means of ensuring electoral victory is pretty common in
the US on the state and local level. However, in spite of the fact that this practice obviously
goes against democratic principles and indicates low quality of American democracy, it does not
prevent alternation of power in the U.S. at least on the federal level.
47Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy, URL:https://www.prio.org/Data/Governance/Vanhanens-
index-of-democracy/
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authoritarian institutions in a way which would be useful for the purposes of this
project. Moreover, in some cases, the use of these indices is misleading even for a
purpose of distinguishing between democracies and autocracies.
c) Arguments against typology of Juan Linz
Finally it is necessary to discuss why a famous distinction between totalitarian
and authoritarian regimes introduced by Juan Linz (1975, 2001) is not used here.
Linz argued that there was a fundamental difference between two types of non-
democratic rule, one of which he labeled as totalitarian and another one as authori-
tarian. According to him, a totalitarian regime is the one which is characterized by
the following central features: 1) monistic center of power (the leader and his closest
collaborators); 2) a well-elaborated exclusive ideology which serves as a basis and
as legitimation of policies; 3) citizen participation and active mobilization in regime
support is encouraged and even demanded. The latter characteristic, paradoxically,
brings totalitarian regimes closer to democracies than to non-totalitarian autoc-
racies, as political participation and mobilization is something which is normally
associated with democracies. The difference, however, is that in totalitarian sys-
tems all political participation and mobilization is set by one center as has only one
possible purpose and direction (meaning that participate in politics only exclusively
in support of the regime).
From the three main features of totalitarian systems mentioned above, all the
others, are derived: importance of education and culture (as ways for the ruling
group to indoctrinate people and get them engaged in political participation, in a
desired way); elitism (as a distinction between the people who are actively engaged
in elaborating and maintaining the state ideology and all the others); a special
role of a single party, which penetrates society (as a tool to encourage and demand
political participation and mobilization by the people); quite often, terror, especially
within the elites (due to ideological commitment within the political elite, due to
their desire for monopolistic control and a fear of losing power); cult of the leader.
However, the last two features, according to Linz, are not essential for totalitarian
regimes but rather are present more frequently then not. What is crucial is that for
totalitarian regimes passive obedience of the citizens is considered undesirable, and
their active role in maintaining the regime is required.
Authoritarian regimes, according to Linz, are distinguished by almost the op-
posite features: 1) limited, irresponsible pluralism, 2) absence of clear ideology, 3)
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absence or deliberate discouragement of political participation and mobilization. Ir-
responsible pluralism is defined as a bunch of semi-opposition and pseudo-opposition
groups which are engaged in a partial criticism of the regime but which are not
willing to participate in power and never fundamentally challenge the regime; their
existence is tolerated by the regime. Participation in this type of regime is discour-
aged because popular engagement in politics without a totalitarian control over all
structures of society does not strengthen the regime but rather endangers it.
Linz further distinguishes between multiple types of authoritarian rule: 1) bureaucratic-
military authoritarianism (mostly, military regimes like in Latin America in 1970s),
2) organic statism (civilian neocorporatist regimes like the one of Juan Peron in
Argentina), 3) mobilizational post-democratic authoritarian regimes, 4) postinde-
pendence mobilizational authoritarian regimes, 5) racial and ethnic “democracies”
(South Africa during apartheid), 6) pretotalitarian regimes, 7) posttotalitarian
regimes.
Linz excludes from these typology the regimes which are based on traditional le-
gitimacy (monarchies) and the ones based on unconstrained authority of one person,
not bound by any ideology or bureaucratic organization, who rules by redistributing
rewards and punishments, and who use their power for private enrichment (these
regimes are labeled bs Linz as “sultanistic”). The reason for exclusion of these
regimes from the typology is that, according to him, both of them of them are close
to impossible in advanced industrialized societies.
Linz combines all of his political regime types in a typology which has three
dimensions (degree of ideologization, degree of mobilization, degree of pluralism).
Linz’s typology have been very influential in political science and have been
useful in classifying non-democratic regimes before the 1990s. Linz’s typology also
highlighted the fundamental difference between regimes like Nazi Germany or the
U.S.S.R. during Stalin’s rule on the one hand and regimes like Latin American
military dictatorships on the other, showing that, in the former, the degree of state
control over society was much higher than in the latter. However, several objections
can be raized against the usage of Linz’ typologies in this project.
First of all, there are empirical reasons not to use this classification. For the
time period under study, a category of totalitarian regimes has almost zero em-
pirical content: the only currently existing political regime which can be classified
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as truly totalitarian is probably North Korea. The same can be said about some
sub-types of authoritarian regimes, such as racial democracy (do not exist since the
apartheid regime in South Africa was abolished), post-independence mobilizational
authoritarian regimes (the ones which were established after decolonization do not
exist any longer), and possibly also other types. A typology where some of the
categories have zero or close to zero empirical content cannot be considered useful,
especially in a quantitative study in which no conclusions can be drawn from 1-2
cases. Linz’s typology is useful to classify non-democratic regimes which existed in
1930s-1970s but it seems much less useful for the universe of non-democracies since
1990s onwards.
Second, Linz’s sub-types of authoritarian regimes does not seem to be based
on clearly defined dimensions: although four dimensions of authoritarian rule are
indicated by Linz (degree of pluralism, degree of participation, degree of ideolo-
gization and degree of constitutionalism),his classification of authorirarian regimes
is not based on these dimensions. Rather, his types of authoritarian regimes were
first inductively elaborated from the regimes that existed in times when the book
was written and only then classified according to the dimensions. Only distinction
between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes is theoretically unambiguous and
directly applicable empirically. Problems of classification criteria used by Linz for
distinguishing between sub-types of authoritarian regimes was pointed out by some
prominent scholars, including Magaloni (2008).
Dichotomous definitions of democracy and autocracy
After having explained some conceptual decisions regarding the operationalizations
of regime types, it is possible to turn to the more detailed analysis of the definitions
of democracy which are consistent with my theoretical starting point. Namely,
these conceptualizations should define democracy and autocracy in procedural terms
and distinguish between them in a dichotomous way. I identified two definitions
which fulfill these criteria: one of these definitions is provided by Adam Przeworski
and another one is elaborated by Barbara Geddes. The one advocated by Adam
Przeworski, is more parsimonious and another, implemented by Barbara Geddes, is
more nuanced.
Adam Przeworski and his followers (such as Cheibub et al. 2010 who expanded
the democracy dataset constructed in Przeworski et al. 2000) define democracies as
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regimes in which incumbents lose elections, meaning that they cannot manipulate
the chances of candidates in the elections ex ante or avert electoral results ex post.
For them, the only proof that in a given political regime an incumbent can lose elec-
tion is a situation in which the incumbent actually loses them under current rules.
Basically, any regime is a priori treated as non-democratic until proven otherwise,
by the actual alternation of power under given institutions48. The advantages of
this definition is that it is consistent with the minimalist procedural definition of
democracy, and it has a clear and observable criterion of distinguishing between
democracies and non-democracies.
Geddes et al. (2014) have a slightly different approach. They accept the defi-
nition of democracy as a political regime in which the power is acquired and lost
by means of competitive elections. Their distinction between democracies and non-
democracies is also essentially dichotomous: they do not use any notion of “degree”
of democracy in their typology or any indices, nor do they accept the concept of
hybrid regimes (see the critique of this concept in Geddes 2006).
However, they define an authoritarian regime not just as anything different from
democracy (procedurally defined) but as a set of formal and informal rules that iden-
tify the group from which leaders can come and determine who influences leadership
choice and policy (Geddes et al. 2014), in other words, as a set of institutions. While
in Przeworski’s definition, the focus is on democracy (and autocracy is a residual
category), in Geddes’ definition, the focus is on autocracy (and democracy is one
of the residual categories among others).
Defining autocracy as a set of institutions has the following implications. First,
the definition of Geddes excludes the situations (country-years) in which there are
no domestic rule in a country at all (and, thus, no “regime”): foreign occupation,
anarchy, non-independence (colonial status). It also excludes provisional govern-
ments aimed at ruling the country during democratic transit. Second, it allows
to capture not only autocracy-to-democracy and democracy-to-autocracy transfor-
mations but also autocracy-to-autocracy ones in which a country does not become
democratic but formal and informal institutions of leadership selection and poli-
cymaking change. Following their definition, Geddes et al. (2014) define a set of
48More specifically, “a regime is a dictatorship if it fails to meet at least one of the following four
rules: (1) the chief executive must be elected; (2) the legislature must be elected; (3) there must
be more than one political party competing in elections; and (4) an alternation in power must
have taken place” (Przeworski et al. 2000, cit. in Gandhi 2008).
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situations which are coded as the start and the end of the regime49. With the use
of Przeworski’s definition, it is possible to capture only transitions from autocracy
to democracy and backwards.
Compared to Przeworski et al. (2000, 2013) or Cheibub et al. (2010), Geddes
does not use the alternation rule (the rule which count the alternation of power as
the only proof of democratic character of the regime), preferring instead the reports
of electoral observers to identify whether given elections were reasonably free and
fair. If this was the case, the regime is coded as democratic (at least till next
elections or till another event which made it impossible for the opposition to regain
power) even if the actual alternation of power did not happen. This is a “softer”
criterion for distinguishing between democracies and non-democracies, and more
demanding in terms of the information needed to apply it; however, it takes context
into account better than Przeworski’s definition, which may improve accuracy of
coding. To give an example, a strict application of alternation rule made Cheibub et
al. (2013) code South Africa after the fall of apartheid as non-democracy, simply due
to the fact that African National Congress, the party of Nelson Mandela which keeps
governing the country since 1994. Considering South Africa as a non-democracy is
surprising since there is no other evidence that elections in South Africa since 1994
has been fraudulent in any way or that other parties are excluded from electoral
competition or suffer from systematic disadvantages. Geddes et al. (2014) code
post-apartheid South Africa as a democracy, which seems to be more accurate.
There are a lot of democracies with the dominant party systems in which the
dominant party rarely loses power. For example, Swedish political system is domi-
nated by Social Democrats, Japan is dominated by Liberal-Democratic Party, and
India was dominated for many decades by Indian National Congress. If one ob-
served these countries in periods between the establishment of the current political
institutions and the first defeat of the dominant party (for example, Japan between
1955 and 1993, India between 1947 and 1977, or Sweden between 1932 and 1976)
and applied Przeworski’s criteria, one would wrongfully consider these countries as
autocratic50.
49An authoritarian regime is considered established if the power 1) is acquired by non-democratic
means (meaning reasonably free and fair elections), 2) acquired by democratic means but then
the rules are changed in a way to limit the electoral competition, 3) acquired during elections in
which the military prevented one or more parties from participation or dictated the policy choices
in important areas. An authoritarian regime in considered collapsed if 1) a non-incumbent wins
competitive elections and takes power, 2) incumbent is ousted violently, and the regime (defined
again as a set of institutions) changes, 3) the ruling group itself significantly changes the rules of
leader selection or constraints on the leader (Geddes et al. 2014).
50In the actual dataset by Cheibub et al. (2013), Sweden, Japan, and India are coded as demo-
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For these reasons, in this project, I choose to use Geddes et al. (2014) approach
in distinguishing between democracies and autocracies rather than the approach
by Przewoski et al. (2010) and Cheibub et al. (2013). In practice, though, the
implementation of the two approaches gives almost identical results in terms of
distinguishing between democracies and non-democracies, with very limited dis-
agreement about certain country-years (the data provided by Cheibub et al. (2013)
tends to code slightly more country-years as autocratic). Thus, a choice between
the two operationalizations of autocracy should is unlikely to make a difference for
the results of the analysis.
Coding of formal and informal authoritarian institutions
After dealing with the distinction between democracy and autocracy, it is possible
to discuss the operationalization of formal and informal authoritarian institutions.
As a basis of my classification of informal authoritarian institutions, I will use
typology by Barbara Geddes. As discussed in the Chapter I, this typology of in-
formal authoritarian institutions is one of the most influential. Most studies follow
Geddes’ typology as it is, without recoding it or recoding it in a way which is pre-
scribed by the codebook. However, for the purposes of this study, it seems more
reasonable to modify it to make the typology fit the theoretical argument of this
work. Below, I explain why and how Geddes’ typology is modified for this study.
Since my main argument for why some types of authoritarian regimes perform
differently from others is the argument of constraints imposed on the dictator, then,
from the point of view of the theory, military and single-party regimes are not the-
oretically different from each other in this respect – they are both constrained.
For the same reason, it does not make sense to make a theoretical distinction be-
tween personalist regimes and monarchies – they are both unconstrained51. Hybrids
which involve a personalist element (regimes coded as party-personalist or military-
personalist) are in between fully constrained and fully unconstrained regimes, thus
I label them “semi-constrained”. This also does not deviate too much from an estab-
lished literature. Wright (2008) and Wright & Escribà-Folch (2010) in their analysis
cratic at least from mid-XXth century because the dominant party in these countries eventually
lost power under the same institutions under which it previously used to win. However, I made
this counterfactual to explain how Przeworski’s approach can lead to mistakes.
51As it has been shown above, military and single-party regimes are dramatically different in
terms of longevity and a mode of breakdown. The same goes for personalist regimes and monar-
chies. However, regime longevity and modes of breakdown are not the focus of the current project.
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make a distinction between non-personalist and personalist dictatorships. By non-
personalist ones, they understand Geddes’ categories of military and single-party
regimes while by personalist ones, they understand Geddes’ categories of personalist
regimes and monarchies.
This recoding is justifiable not only theoretically. From the empirical point of
view, monarchies have been rare since mid-XX century (for this reason, in the first
version of the dataset, Geddes did not even include them), and military regimes
became extremely rare since late 1980s, when all military regimes in Latin America
collapsed. For example, in 2010, there have been only 7 monarchies and 2 mili-
tary regimes in the world, according to the dataset (excluding the countries whose
population was less than 1 million people). Given that, using the original Geddes’
categories would mean making an inference about military regimes and monarchies
based only on a very small sample of countries, and, even if the results for these
regimes happen to be statistically significant, they would have been highly unre-
liable. This warning about inferences on monarchies was explicitly mentioned in
Geddes et al. (2014).
As for formal authoritarian institutions, it seems more sensible to operationalize
them in a way which is similar to existing studies. Formal authoritarian institu-
tions are coded based on Przeworski et al. (2013) dataset “Political Institutions
and Political Events” (PIPE). In this dataset, parties are defined simply by their de
jure existence and legislatures are defined as bodies which have formal, and solely,
legislative power; thus, it excludes juntas52 (as these bodies combined legislative
and executive functions) and consultative councils, even if they are elected, as they
don’t have formal legislative functions. Based on their data on parliaments and
parties, I code any given authoritarian regime as “institutionalized” if 1) there is
parliament with multiple parties, 2) there are elections in which voters can choose
between at least two parties53. It is coded as “non-institutionalized” if there is
no legislature and no legal opposition is permitted54. Otherwise, it is coded as
52There may be some degree of arbitrariness here, since, for example, a Soviet legal doctrine did
not acknowledge separation of power and, formally, the Soviets (legislative councils) in socialist
countries concentrated both legislative and executive power in their hands; nevertheless, all so-
cialist dictatorship which had Soviets are coded as having a legislature. However, in all socialist
countries, there was also a government functioning separately from the Soviets.
53Some regimes have parliaments with multiple parties but they all go on elections as a single
list, so voters have no choice. Also, in some regimes, a single party (or party block) participates
in elections together some independent candidates but other parties or blocks cannot participate.
PIPE dataset has a special dummy variable “opposition” to account for that, which indicates
whether or not a given political system legally allows for some kind of political pluralism. In these
cases, I code a regime as semi-institutionalized.
54As Geddes (2006) mentions, occasionally, there have been authoritarian regimes with no legis-
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“semi-institutionalized”: an example of a semi-institutionalized regime may be con-
temporary China (present legislature with one party and absence of multiparty
elections) or United Arab Emirates (present legislature without parties and only
partially elected). This is close to coding used in Gandhi (2008, 2008a), except that
in this study, I do not count regimes with multiple parties but with non-competitive
elections as fully institutionalized because a situation in which several parties which
participate in elections as a single front with a single list is closer to a situation of
a single party than it is to the situation of multiple parties. I also do not consider
regimes with legislatures but without parties as completely non-institutionalized, as
Gandhi (2008, 2008a) does, since legislature, even without parties in it, is also an
institution which, at least formally, have legislative power and thus can be regarded
as a partial concession to potential rivals of the dictator, compared to the situation
when there are no legislature at all. Courts are not considered in the definition of
formal institutions as judiciary independence is part of the dependent variable of
this study, and the same is the case for economic institutions.
It is necessary to underline that I treat formal and informal authoritarian in-
stitutions as mutually exclusive, non-overlapping concepts. Formal institutions are
defined based on presence of absence of certain formal bodies and nothing more:
even if there are valid reasons to suspect that, in a given country, presence of par-
ties, parlament with multiple parties, and multiparty alternative elections makes
absolutely no impact on decision-making (like in Zimbabwe during Mugabe’s rule),
their formal presence allows to code this regime as institutionalized. Likewise,
presence of a legislature and a single party allows to classify North Korea as a semi-
instititonalized regime even though, their de facto role may be negligible. In turn,
as far as informal institutions are concerned, coding regimes as constrained, semi-
constrained or unconstrained is completely independent from presence or absence
of parties, parliaments, or elections: for example, the military regime in Myanmar
did not have a parliament, parties, or elections for many years, yet it is defined
as constrained as in military regimes it is junta which makes decisions rather than
just the dictator. At the same time, Russia since 1994 is coded as a personalist
regime in spite of having a parliament, multiple parties, and multiparty elections,
as neither the ruling party nor the military could constrain Yeltsin or Putin in their
decision-making.
lature but with the single party present. However PIPE dataset does not contain a specific variable
for de jure existence of parties specifically. In any case, since the early 1990s, these kind of regimes
are extremely rare, if at all present.
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One can point out that there is an overlap between definitions of formal and
informal institutions: it is not possible to have a single-party regime in a situation
in which parties are legally prohibited (thus, there cannot be a single-party non-
institutionalized regime by definition). If I used Geddes’ typology as it is, that would
have been a methodological problem. However, in this study, I combine single-party
and military regimes into the same category of constrained regimes, for the reasons
outlined above, which resolves the problem of overlap between categories: a given
authoitarian regime can be constrained (regardless of which body is constraining the
dictator) and at the same time lack any legislature, parties, or elections. As demon-
strated in Chapter IV, all combinations of formal instititonalization and informal
constraints are possible not just theoretically but also empirically.
I can summarize our theoretical framework as following:
1. Formal institutionalization:
(a) Non-institutionalized regime (no institutions: no legislature, no legal op-
position permitted).
(b) Semi-institutionalized regimes (underdeveloped institutions, such as: and
unelected legislature; an elected legislature without parties or with a sin-
gle party; an elected legislature with multiple parties going as one list so
that voters have no choice; an elected legislature in which there is one
party in the electoral list with other candidates run as independent).
(c) Institutionalized regime (fully developed formal institutions, on paper
resembling institutions in democracies: legislature with multiple parties
and elections in which voters can choose between at least two parties).
2. Informal constraints (original Geddes’ types in brackets):
(a) Unconstrained regimes (regimes in which a dictator’s decision-making is
not constrained by the ruling group: personalist, monarchy).
(b) Semi-constrained regimes (regimes in which a ruling group keeps its orga-
nizational autonomy but can influence the decision-making only to a lim-
ited extent: party-personal, military-personal, party-military-personal).
(c) Constrained regimes (regimes in which a dictator is constrained and can
be replaced by a ruling group: military, indirect military, party, party-
military, oligarchy).
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In other words, I distinguish between two dimensions of authoritarian institu-
tions: the first one is a degree of formal institutionalization of a given autocracy,
and the second one is a degree of informal constraints. The latter makes the current
typology different from the original typology by Geddes et al. (2014), which does
not have a single underlying dimension: essentially, their typology has two dimen-
sions, the first being the type of the ruling group (party, military, both party and
military, royal family, or dictator’s narrow circle), and the second being a degree
to which the ruling group is constraining the dictator (which is high in military or
single-party regimes, medium in hybrids with a personalist element, and close to
zero in personalist regimes and monarchies). Applying the terminology of Collier et
al. (2012), their typology can be qualified as “free-floating”. According to Collier et
al. (2012), some of the most innovative typologies tend to be free-floating, and this
kind of typology is widespread in social sciences; however, free-floating typologies
can be refined by teasing out the underlying dimensions. In this study, since I am
interested only the degree of informal constraints imposed on the dictator and not in
the nature of the ruling group, I change this typology to leave only one dimension.
Both dimensions are composed of mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive
categories: any possible autocratic regime in any given year belongs to one and
only one category based on the level of formal institutionalization or on the level
of informal constraints. Moreover, if I intersect the two categories to obtain a 3 by
3 matrix, the resulting types do not contain any combinations which are logically
or practically impossible: while some combinations are more frequent than others,
none of the cells of this matrix is empty. In a table below, I intersect the two
categories and quote an empirical example of each cell55:. Those examples clearly
show that each cell in the table represents really existing regimes.
55For the evidence that none of the cells is empty also for the time period under study, see
Chapter IV
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Sources: Geddes et al. (2014), Przeworski et al. (2013), own elaboration.
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Ideally, following the template for typology formation by Collier et al. (2012),
one would clearly formulate a separate concept for each of the 9 categories obtained
by intersecting the two typologies I formulated (e.g. one would need to call an inter-
section of fully institutionalized and fully constrained regimes something else rather
than just “institutionalized constrained autocracy”). This was done, for example, in
Dahl (1971) who, having classified political regimes based on the level of competi-
tion and participation, coined for concepts: closed hegemony (low competition, low
participation), open hegemony (low competition, high participation), competitive
oligarchy (high competition, low participation), and polyarchy (high competition,
high participation). However, in this particular case, it seems to be unfeasible to
find meaningful names for each cell, so I leave it as it is, which is also common in
social sciences (e.g. Rogowski et al. 1989, Tilly & Tarrow 2007, cit. in Collier et
al. 2012).
According to the above-mentioned literature, formal and informal institutions
interact with each other in a way that the same formal authoritarian institutions
may have a different role in different types of authoritarian regime, and, conse-
quently, their impact on the state of the rule of law may also vary. Thus, apart
from checking the impact of formal and informal institutions on my dependent vari-
ables separately, I will test an impact of interaction effects between variables, which,
since the variables are not truly interval, means a cross-tabulation of the categories.
Summary
In this chapter, I discussed the concept of autocracy used in this project and an
operational definition which allows distinguishing between democracy and autoc-
racy. I provided a number of reasons for not relying on several popular concepts and
operationalizations of autocracy and autocratic institutions, the concept of hybrid
regimes, and the concept of totalitarianism, as well as using indices as a way to oper-
ationalize democracy/autocracy. The main reason not to use the concepts of hybrid
regimes and not to use the indices of democracy is that both are incompatible with
procedural defintion of democracy. The main reason not to rely on concepts intro-
duced by Juan Linz is their limited empirical relevance since 1990s onwards. I also
introduced an original typology of formal and informal authoritarian institutions,
which is based on the existing literature but which modifies existing typologies to
suit better the purposes of the current study.
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In the following chapter, I formulate the research question and hypotheses to
test. I also describe the methodology of the ensuing empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD-
OLOGY
Research question and hypotheses
Following up on the theoretical premises outlined in previous chapters, the research
question of this project can be articulated as follows: what impact do formal and
informal authoritarian institutions have on different aspects of the rule of law?
Particular operationalization of authoritarian institutions was discussed in the
Chapter II. Operationalization of the rule of law, as well as of its sub-components,
is provided in respective empirical chapters; however, here, it is necessary to specify
that I am using a narrow definition of the rule of law. As stated in the introduction, I
rely on the definition of the rule of law provided by Kaufman et al. (2009), according
to which the rule of law means
...the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by the rules of
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime or violence.
This definition is useful for studying the rule of law in authorirarian regimes because
it does not make any assumptions about the nature of the law-making process. The
“rules of the society” may be introduced by decrees of the dictator, by decisions of
some unelected body (like junta, party central committee, or unelected legislature);
however, as long as these rules are generally stable and be relied upon, one can assert
that, in a given country, the rule of law is present. This definition also corresponds
to the meaning of the rule of law for scholars in instututional economics mentioned
in Chapter I (North 1987, Rodrik et al. 2004, Acemoglu & Robinson 2012): what
matters for economic development is not how laws are made but how predictable
their application and enforcement is.
Also, even though the focus of this work is the regime (in other words, the
state), property rights protection can be undermined tot just by the state but
also by private actors (such as organized crime). As Acemoglu & Robinson (2012)
demonstrate, even in democracies, such as the ones in contemporary Latin Amer-
ica where there are no state repressions, pervasive crime and violence effectively
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undermine property rigths protection and thus the institutions in these countries
are characterized as extractive and not inclusive. Thus, prevalence of crime and
violence, alonglide with predictability of law enforcement, need to be included in
the definition of the rule of law.
The theoretical expectations on the impact of authoritarian institutions on our
dependent variable, based on the literature reviewed above, are the following.
First, as outlined in details in Chapter I, formal authoritarian institutions such
as parties, parliaments, and elections, are suggested to be arenas in which dictators
can make some concessions to groups whose cooperation is needed and can create
somewhat credible commitments, without risking their power (Gandhi & Przeworski
2006, Gandhi 2008, 2008a). It has been also suggested in the literature that, al-
though authoritarian institutions are not as credible as democratic, they stil lower
uncertainty about the rules, improve the flow of information between the dictator
and the population, and decrease the possibility of violent uprisings(Gandhi 2008).
This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: higher the degree of institutionalization of an authoritarian regime
leads to less arbitrarity in law making and law enforcement, as well as better pro-
tection from abuses by private actors.
Second, as for informal constraints, it is plausible to expect that constrained
regimes (military or single-party according to Geddes’ classification) are less likely
to behave in arbitrary way, because in military and single-party regimes the dictator
can be stopped from taking arbitrary actions or even removed by his fellow party
members or military collagues. This expectation is based on the definitions of
military and single-party regimes provided in Geddes (1999), Geddes et al. (2014):
accroding to these definitions, military and single party regimes are the ones in
which the leadership selection, access to offices and control over policies (at least
partial) belongs to, respectively, to the military and to the party. Constraints
on the dictator and a real threat of ousting may decrease the risks of arbitrary
actions (including, but not limited to, expropriations or repression), since these
actions would require consent of the ruling group rather than just a will of the
dictator. In some constrained regimes, rotation of dictators within the regime is a
routine practice (like in China between Deng Xiaoping and the current President Xi
Jinping, in Mexico during 70-years long PRI rule, or in Brazil during the military
rule in late 1960s - mid-1980s), therefore, in these regimes, dictators’ actions become
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crucial in determining whether he will continue to serve as a dictator or not...
Even if, in a given constrained regime, dictators normally rule the country till their
death, like in the Soviet Union, the risk of ousting does not disappear, and this
point can be illustrated by the following example. As Thomson (1991) claims, the
main reason for Nikita Khrushchev’s (C.P.S.U. First Secretary and de facto ruler
of the U.S.S.R.) ousting in 1964 were his constant administrative reorganizations
and frequest turnover of party and state officials, which not only threatened the
positions of the party elite but was also economically damaging. Besides, Thomson
(1991) claims that Nikita Khrushchev’s policies were already unpopular among
population by 1964. High-rank party officials were aware of the dangers of popular
dissatisfaction, which contributed to their decision to oust the First Secretary. A
following leader, L. Brezhnev, promised during his first speech to adhere to the
principles of collective rule, and actually adhered to those principles (as mentioned
in Chapter II). This example demonstrates that in regimes with informal constraints
it may be dangerous for the dictator’s political career to behave in an unpredictable
way. Hence:
Hypothesis 2: More constraints imposed on a dictator by the ruling group de-
creases arbitrarity in law making and law enforcement, as well as improves protec-
tion from abuses by private actors.
Third, the effect of formal authoritarian institutions may be conditional on infor-
mal constraints. More specifically, it has been demonstrated, for example, in Wright
(2008) that, in constrained regimes, formal institutions are somewhat binding for
the dictator, meaning that it is not easy for the dictator to completely ignore the
opinion of the parliament or the party. At the same time, in unconstrained regimes,
authoritarian institutions just empower the dictator, without constraining his be-
havior. To illustrate that, in personalist regimes, authoritarian parliaments are
non-binding, Wright (2008) provides multiple evidence from different personalist
autocracies, including the one in Dominican Republic in during Trujillo’s rule, the
ones in Jordan and in Morocco, that, far from constraining dictator’s behavior, legis-
latures are used by the dictator to redistribute rewards and punishments among his
cronies, as a seat in the parliament can be is some cases regarded as a punishment,
if an official is sent to the parliament from a more high-rank position. At the same
time, for moderate opposition, a possibility to get some seats in the legislature can
be regarded as a reward for their loyalty. In both cases, one can expect little, if any,
impact of the legislature on dictator’s discretion, and, consequently, on the state of
67
the rule of law in the country. Conversly, those scholars who look at constrained
regimes such as Gandhi (2008), make different conclusions about the role of au-
thoritarian partiaments. Gandhi (2008) provides an example of a Brazilian military
regime under which the parliament was able to reject government-sponsored tax
bill, an international trade bill, and an effort to lift the immunity of a parliamen-
tarian who was accused of insulting the military – which is something that would
be close to impossible in a situation in which the dictator is completely free in his
actions.
The same can be said about parties in personalist regimes. IIsaacs & Whitmore
(2014) conducts two case studies of the ruling parties in Russia and Kazakhstan
(respectively, “United Russia” and “Nur Otan”) and convincingly argues that nei-
ther of the two parties play any role in policy-making, or drafting any legislation,
they don’t have independent resources, and their function is limited to consolidat-
ing elites and mobilizing masses for supporting the leader. In these countries it
is the state bureaucracy which completely controls the party, not the other way
around56. IIsaacs & Whitmore (2014) compare it with the situation in Mexico be-
fore 1990s or in current Singapore (which, according to Geddes’ classification, are
single-party regimes), where the ruling party had a real autonomy, independent
resources, and substantial influence in policymaking. This reasoning leads to the
following hypothesis:
Thus, I can hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 3: higher degree of institutionalization of an authoritarian regime
improves predictability of law making, law enforcement, and protection from crime
and violence if informal constraints are present. However, in absence of informal
constraints, higher degree of formal institutionalization has little or no impact of
the rule of law.
Finally, it may happen that authoritarian institutions affect some aspects of the
rule of law and not the others. Historically, in Western Europe, property rights pro-
tection developed hand in hand with personal rights protection, and for this reason
many authors (including Rodrik et al. 2004, as well as Acemoglu & Robinson 2012)
tend to use the rule of law and the property rights protection as interchangeable
concepts. However, in many authoritarian regimes (such as Chile during the mili-
tary dictatorship, or South Korea during military and civilian dictatorships before
56In the USSR, which was a classical single-party regime, the Communist party bureaucracy
duplicated state bureaucracy, and essentially made state bureaucracy largely redundant.
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1987, or in current China), repressions and even extrajudicial killings of political
opponents coincided with strong property rights protection. In Chile, the military
regime of Pinochet was even more favorable to private property than the preceding
democratic regime under the presidency of Allende who conducted extensive expro-
priation of agricultural land and nationalized large industries such as copper mining
and banking (Shiraz 2011).
One may take a closer look at the Chinese single-party regime to better illustrate
this point. Current China is not less violent towards its political opponents and
to any independent activism in general than any other authoritarian regime. It
has been persecuting member of a religious group “Falungong” since 1999, and,
since then, multiple examples of extrajudicial killings of thousands of its members
was provided by members of the group themselves57, and by members of Chinese
diaspora abroad58. Persecutions of people in Tiben who are struggling for a genuine
cultural autonomy of their region are also well-known. Even Western backing does
not help Chinese dissidents to avoid persecutions: one of them, Liu Xiaobo, who
had been sentenced to 11 years of prison in 2009, was granted a Nobel Peace Prize
for non-violent struggle for human rights in 2010, however, Chinese government
did not release him, and he was only released shortly before his death from cancer
in 2017. China is also one of the most restrictive countries in terms of freedom of
speech: since 2003, it has the most sophisticated system of Internet censorship in the
world, which is officially called “The Golden Shield” and colloquially known as “The
Great Firewall of China”: the system blocks Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Google,
and many other popular Western websites, and their local alternatives (Sina Weibo
for Twitter, Baidu for Google, and other) are closely monitored by the authorities.
Thus, one cannot speak of any guarantees for human rights China.
At the same time, in terms of property rights protection, China is ranked quite
highly. According to International Property Rights Index, China got a score of
5.712 out of 10 and was ranked 52nd out of 127 countries under study – overtaking
even several Western democracies such as Cyprus (5.447), Greece (5.389), Romania
(5.042), among others (Levy-Carciente 2017). While Chinese laws in general are
still not in full correspondence with international standards in terms of investors’
protection, in multiple special economic zones they created (the most important
57A book on this issue entitled “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party” was
published anonymously in China and translated into English. It can be found here:
http://www.ninecommentaries.com/english/
58An American news agency “The Epoch Times”, founded in 2000 by members of Chinese dias-
pora in the US, constantly reports about human rights violations against Falungong members, as
well as about other cases of human rights violations for which they manage to find evidence.
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one is in Shenzhen) the legal regime for foreign investors is close to the Western
standards, and they also have multiple benefits in terms of taxation and customs
duties (Tantri 2012).
This disparity between property rights protection and human rights protection
also makes sense theoretically. For dictators, there seem to be few rational reasons
to protect human rights. International pressure, as it is clear from the example
of China, is not strong enough to generate costs for the dictator for human rights
abuse59. There is also no evidence that international capital punishes countries for
human rights violations: to continue Chinese example, short after massacre on a
Tiananmen square in 1989, foreign direct investments in China started to rapidly
grow, and the FDI inflows accounted for 6% of Chinese GDP in 199360, and contin-
ued to be significant later on. Also, there is a lot of FDI influx Myanmar (which is
a military regime), especially in textile industry (in 2015, they accounted for almost
7% of GDP), in spite of continuous atrocities committed against Muslim popula-
tion of the country61. One can cite multiple examples of countries in which the
international capital continues to inflow in spite of massive human rights violations.
However, ensuring property rights protection is crucial for economic develop-
ment, since it the only way to stimulate domestic investments and attract foreign
capital. While a ruling group in authoritarian regime may not care about economic
development of his country as such, economic crises endanger any regimes, both
authoritarian and democratic, (Geddes et al. 2014), so it is in their best interests
to make sure that the country’s economy does not collapse. At the same time,
members of the ruling group may also have a strong personal interest to protect
their own property from expropriation by the dictator.
Hence, it is plausible to suggest that the relation between authoritarian insti-
tutions and property rights protection is stronger than the one between the same
institutions and human rights protection. Even if, in a military or a single-party
regime, the military or the party are able to push for less human rights abuse,
they have little, if any, incentives to do so: there are little benefits from improving
the situation with human rights in a country. What is worse, potential costs of
59It may be important to check whether this is true for smaller countries who may be more
vulnerable for external pressures; this can be approximated by country’s population.
60Source: World Bank
61An extensive legal analysis of persecutions against Muslim population of
Myanmar which studies the question whether these persecutions are severe
enough to qualify them as genocide was conducted by Yale Law School. URL:
http://www.fortifyrights.org/downloads/Yale_Persecution_of_the_Rohingya_October_2015.pdf
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improving human rights protection may be high: easing repressions and better re-
spect for civil and political rights may endanger the regime. For example, Mikhail
Gorbachev in the U.S.S.R. eventually lost power partly because the liberalization
that he himself started went out of control. However, the military or the party
has all the incentives to stop the dictator from violating property rights, as, while
these actions can benefit the dictator personally, they can endanger the power of
the military of the single party regime as a whole. The same line of reasoning may
work also for formal authoritarian institutions: for opposition groups, co-opted into
the legislature or into one of the authoritarian parties, it may be more important to
make sure the dictator does not violate property rights (as they are obviously inter-
ested in protecting their own property) than to prevent the dictator from repressing
opposition which is not co-opted or just random people.
Thus, I may suggest the following:
Hypothesis 4: An overall impact of authoritarian institutions on property rights
protection is stronger than on human rights protection.
Description of control variables
A number of controls will be used in the empirical analysis to take into account
two possibilities. First, one has to account for other factors affecting for the state
of the rule of law or the state of human and property rights protection in a given
country. Second, it is necessary to account for factors which, according to the liter-
ature, affect existence of formal or informal authoritarian institutions. Introducing
these variables will allow to be certain that the effect of authoriarin institutions, if
significant, can be genuinely attributed to these instituions and not to background
conditions under which these institutions exist. Most of the variables described be-
low serve both functions: they represent additional factors which affect the stateof
the rule of law and serve as contextual factors which affect the probability of having
formal institutions or informal constraints.
An obvious control variable to include is logged GDP per capita as the measure-
ment of economic development. The relation between economic development and
rule of law is a mutually reinforcing relation. On the one hand, the rule of law rein-
forces the economic development, according to all institutionalist literature (North,
1987, North, 1989, Rodrik et al., 2003, Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). On the other
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hand, the economic development may lead to higher demand for the rule of law and
higher capacity to deliver one (Charron & Lapuente, 2011 use similar argument for
the quality of government). However, since it is not the primary variable of our
interest, the fact that the coefficients for GDP per capita can be overestimated in
the models will not necessarily affect the main variables of interest. If anything, the
regression coefficients for GDP per capita can be biased upwards, which can bias
the coefficients for the main variables of interest downwards. Thus, if any statisti-
cally significant relation between authoritarian institutions and the rule of law and
its subcomponents can be found in this study, one can trust the results more, not
less. GDP per capita is also important to control for because different formal and
informal authoritarian institutions emerge under different socioeconomic conditions
(Wright 2008), so, in spite of endogeneity problem, it cannot be simply omitted.
Since exchange rate does not allow to account for price difference between coun-
tries, I am using PPP estimate of GDP per capita and 2011 international dollars
(if one uses exchange rate instead of PPP, one could confuse actual rises and drops
of production of goods and services with fluctuations on the exchange rates).
Another indicator of economic development which is sometimes used in the
literature is infant mortality (measured as a number of children who died before 1
year of age per 1000 live births), which allows to correct the bias which occurs when
GDP per capita is used to assess economic development of resource-rich countries
(whose GDP per capita is high just because of resource exports, not because of
country’s actual economic development) or of city-states. It was used, for example,
by Obydenkova & Libman (2013) to complement GRP per capita as a measurement
of economic well-being on the regional level.
Wright (2008) finds evidence that countries with smaller populations are more
likely to have personalist regimes, for which it can have an indirect negative effect
on the rule of law. However, population may also have a direct positive on human
rights protection due to a higher vulnerability of smaller countries to international
pressure for democratization (since smaller countries are more vulnerable for eco-
nomic sanctions or to Western military intervention which may happen if country
seriously violates human rights). Although I avoid controlling for international
pressures explicitly (more on that in this chapter below), country size is can serve,
implicitly, as a proxy for the intensity of these pressures Thus, this variable can
affect the rule of law in a positive or in a negative way, and, in either of the two
cases, logged population has to be introduced in the regression model.
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Another variable which has to be taken into account is dependence on primary
commodities export, measured as a share of resource revenues in a country’s GDP
(meaning oil, natural gas, and minerals) minus costs of extraction and normal cap-
ital returns. This variable can be regarded as a proxy for the need for cooperation
for the dictator, as higher oil, gas, or mineral rents decrease the necessity to tax
citizens (and foster citizens’ cooperation in order to collect these taxes) and increase
his ability to redistribute spoils among potential rivals, and thus alleviates the need
to institutionalize more. This argument is made, for example, in Wright et al.
(2013): studying the impact of oil revenues on autocratic regime survival, authors
demonstrate that oil revenues decrease the chance of replacement of one autocracy
by another (while they do not necessarily affect the chances of democratization).
The suggested mechanism is that oil revenues facilitate both redistributing spoils
to potential rivals and increasing the level of repression by investing into security
forces. More generally, and irrespective of the regime type, the resource revenues
can affect the rule of law also directly, by facilitating patronage, which is one of the
arguments of the whole literature on “resource curse” (see, for example, Robinson et
al. 2006). I calculate resource revenues as a simple sum of three values, which are
oil, gas, and mineral rents, each of them defined as revenues from oil/gas/minerals
minus the production costs and normal capital returns, divided by a country’s GDP
in a given year. Compared to oil reserves, which is a more classical measurement of
resource dependence, it has two advantages. First, it takes into account not just oil
revenues, but all the income which is independent from country’s economy. While
most countries affected by “resource curse” are indeed dependent on oil, some of
them, like Turkmenistan, depends on natural gas export, while Mauritania depends
on exporting gold, iron, and cooper. Second, another advantage of using resource
rents is that this measurement takes into account that having large oil reserves is
not equal to high oil extraction or high oil dependence.
In order to control for path dependence, I use democratic legacy, as the previous
democratic experience may make it harder for the dictator to openly repress people.
At the same time, this variable may also be regarded as a proxy for the strength of
potential opposition, which is, as Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) suggested62, is one
of the factors affecting the degree of institutionalization in autocracies. Democratic
62Instead of democratic legacy, Gandhi & Przeworski (2006) used inherited parties, which is a
dummy variable indicating whether there is any party in a given regime which survived since the
previous regime, regardless of whether that regime was democratic or not. However, I believe that
democratic legacy serves not just a factor which affects the need to introduce formal institutions
(the same way as the variable for inherited parties) but also as a factor directly contributing to
the rule of law, that is why for the purposes of this study it is preferable.
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legacy is used as a dummy variable, coded as 1 if a previous regime was democratic
and 0 if otherwise.
There might be some relation also between the regime longevity and rule of law,
since, frequently, the worst human right abuses and expropriations happen when
the regime is just established because it is normally the time when the dictator
needs to suppress all the opposition which remained from the previous regime, no
matter if autocratic or democratic (Rorbaek et al., 2015). Rorbaek et al. also
hypothesized that the repressiveness of authoritarian regimes may increase as the
regime approaches its collapse but do not find evidence in favor of that; suggesting
that the relation between regime longevity and repressiveness is linear rather than
parabolic. The reason for the linear relation is that, while some regimes become
more repressive struggling to stay in power, a bigger number actually conduct lib-
eralization before collaplse, so, on average, as authoitarian regimes get older, they
tend to rely on repressions less. Thus, the longevity of the current regime (a number
of years from its establishment to a given year) is also included in the regression.
Time frame
As mentioned in the introduction, time frame for this research is 1992-2008, for
the following reasons. Excluding observations after 2008 is determined simply by
the fact that the PIPE dataset, which serves as a basis for my coding, covers only
country-years up to 2008. The most obvious reason to exclude observations before
1992 is also data availability: some of the variables described above are not available
at all or are available only for a limited number of countries before that. For
example, the data on infant mortality from the World Bank is available only from
1990. However, this is not the main reason for excluding observations before 1992:
it is always possible to find proxies which would capture the phenomena one is
interested in.
More importantly, this temporal scope allows to control for external pressures.
The time frame of 1992-2008 is characterized by strong pro-democratic pressure
of the West worldwide and, on the contrary, absence or at least weakness of pro-
autocratic pressures from any country (since the systematic Soviet and American63
63Pro-autocratic external pressure does not necessarily have to be exercised by autocratic coun-
tries: although the U.S. is a democracy, it supported a number of anti-communist autocratic
regimes during the Cold War. See Shiraz (2011) on American involvement in a coup in Chile in
1973 which brought Pinochet to power. Likewise, occasionally, autocratic countries can actually
support democracy in other countries if it suits their pragmatic interests (Way 2015 mentions
Russian support of the opposition to the president of Kyrgyzstan in 2010 as an example of that).
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support of friendly non-democratic regimes worldwide has stopped after the end
of the Cold War, and autocracy promotion by Russia or China started to become
relevant closer to early 2010s. Even if there had been a number of instances of
Russian interference in domestic affairs of a number of post-Soviet countries before
2010s (such as an attempt to facilitate electoral fraud in Ukraine in 2004 in favor
of pro-Russian presidential candidate Yanukovitch and further backlash against the
“Orange Revolution” or military invasion to Georgia in 2008), these efforts induced
instability rather than actually promoted autocracy; they were also largely incon-
sistent, and their efficiency was claimed to be doubtful (Way 2015). Thus, this
selection of the time frame makes it possible to avoid controlling for international
dimension of regime change. Systematically controllig for external democratic or
autocratic pressures requires a lot of data. The variables that are sometimes used
in the relevant literature to capture international democratic or autocratic influence
in a parsimonious way (like the number of democracies in the world, like in Escribà-
Folch (2009) or the Cold War dummy, like in Wright 2008) have no between-case
variation. In other words, these variables have the same value for all countries in
any given year. A case-invariant variable is of limited usefulness in a situation in
which the dependent variable as a constant global yearly mean (in this study, the
WGI Rule of Law index, used in the Chapter IV, is an index which is constructed
in this way), which makes it problemaic to use it in this particular study. Finding a
variable or a set of variables which would capture a pro-democratic or pro-autocratic
pressure which every particular autocracy experiences in any given year would be
complicated for a number of reasons. First, both pro-democratic and pro-autocratic
pressure can come in a number of forms, ranging from military interventions and
financial support to diplomatic and rhetoric tools (Obydenkova & Libman 2015),
for some of which it is hard to elaborate any quantitative indicators. Second, even
it is possible to find indicators of potential pressure that the democratic or auto-
cratic powers can exercise on a given country, it is not possible to assume that any
pressure coming from democratic countries is pro-democratic, or that any pressure
from autocratic countries is autocratic: as mentioned before, it is not rare for demo-
cratic countries to support autocracies, and vice versa, especially before the end of
the Cold War. Thus, eliminating the need to control for external pro-democratic
or pro-autocratic pressures helps to avoid a number of problems associated with
complexities of international dimension of democratization or autocratization64
64The fact that many prominent scholars working in the field of authoitarian studies use short-
cuts for taking into account international pressures for democratization, such as Cold War dummy
(Wright 2008, Wright & Escribà-Folch 2011) or the number of democracies in the world (Escribà-
Folch 2010) demonstrates that it is difficult to account for international pressures for democrati-
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In addition, excluding observations before 1992 ensures that the argument about
the necessity of the rule of law and especially property rights protection for economic
growth holds true for virtually any country. This was definitely not the case for
socialist countries in which all or most means of production belonged to the state,
as these countries mostly simply did not need any foreign (or even any private
domestic) investments in order to grow. As these countries did not need to attract
foreign investments to foster economic growth, they did not have any economic
incentives to improve the rule of law , without even speaking about property rights
protection (as the mere notion of private property in these economies does not exist
or exists in a restricted way). However, by 1992, almost all socialist economies
either collapsed (like in all Central European and post-Soviet countries) or had to
open up to the international capital and to transit to market economy (like China
or Vietnam). Thus, excluding observations before 1992 makes it unnecessary to
take into account socialist countries, making overall research design simpler. As
mentioned further in Chapter IV, Cuba and North Korea, which are the only two
remaining socialist economies in the world, are droped from the dataset due to lack
of data so there is no need to exclude them specifically.
Methodology
The data which is used in this project is data on as many autocratic countries as
data allows over the period of 17 yers, from 1992-2008. Using the data for as many
cases as possible for appropriate time frame seems to be the only way to make
generalizable conclusions about the impact of authoritarian institutions on the rule
of law and its aspects. By nature, this is panel data, as it contains observations
of multiple units in multiple points in time and, thus, has both cross-sectional and
temporal variation. For this reason, the research methodology of this study must
be approprite for this type of data. A description of panel data methodology used
in this project is presented below.
This is not a full technical description of methodology of panel data regression
analysis. I outline only the main idea behind the models used for panel data analysis
rather than the details of the estimation process.
zation in a large-N, cross-country study and that some simplifications have to be made in order
to make any inference at all. The fact that Western leverage over a given country is inversly
proportional to its population and economic development is indirectly taken into account by GDP
per capita, infant mortality, and population.
76
As said before, data is data which contains observations of several cases observed
over time. So, it differs both from regular cross-sectional data, in which every case
is observed just once at the same point in time, or from regular time series data,
in which one case is observed over multiple time periods. For this reason, both
cross-sectional and temporal variation in the data has to be taken into account.
Some scholars (notably, Beck and Katz 1995, Beck and Katz 2004) also make a
distinction between panel data and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data: while
panel data contains below 10 temporal observations per unit, TSCS data contains
20 or more, with 20-100 cross-sectional units (Beck and Katz 2004). This difference
has implications for statistical analysis: while panel data is more similar to cross-
sectional data, TSCS data in more similar for time series data, which makes a
difference in terms of methods applied. Below, I go in further details on that.
The main assumption behind any panel data analysis or TSCS analysis is the
assumption of poolability, that is, the assumption that all units are characterized
by the same regression equation at all points in time (Beck and Katz 1995), or,
in other words, the relation between the variables of interest remains the same (or
at least sufficiently similar) across units of analysis and across points in time. If
there are valid reasons to assume that, then it is possible to proceed with panel
data analysis. Conversly, if there are strong reasons to believe that the relation
between phenomena under study is substantially different across cases or across
time periods, then panel data analysis is not a suitable methodology. In this case,
it is necessary to apply cross-sectional or time series analysis for every time period
or for every unit respectively. Bartels (1996) suggests a formal test for poolability,
called Chow’s test; essentially, it estimates regression coefficients for each cross-
sectional unit separately and then test the hypothesis on whether the difference
between coefficients are statistically significant; however, this test would require
much more observations per cross-sectional unit than available in the data for this
project. Thus, I have to assume, without formal testing (as all scholars working
in the field of authoritarian studies do), that the consequences of authoritarian
institutions are, in general, similar across countries and across time. The fact that,
by choosing the time frame of 1992-2008, I excluded the Cold War period, which was
substantially different in terms of foreign pro-democratic pressure and also excluded
socialist countries, for which the rule of law was less, if at all, relevant for economic
activity, makes the poolability assumption more plausible.
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If one makes poolability assumption, the simplest way to analyze panel data is
simply to ignore its panel nature and treat all observations (e.g. country-years) as
if they were separate units. With this simplification, it is possible to construct a
simple regression model, which is not different from a standard linear regression:
yit = β0 + β1x1t + β2x2t + ...+ βnxnt + εit
where:
- i is an index of cases,
- t is an index of time,
- n is the number of independent variables,
- yit is a value of the dependent variable for a case i and time t
- x1, it , x2, it . . . xn, it are values of independent variables for a case i and
time t
- β0 is an intercept (a value of y if all x are set to 0),
- β1, β2...βn are regression coefficients of independent variables,
- εit is a random error distributed normally both across cases and across time.
This model is called pooled OLS.
However, if this simple method is applied, a number of specific features of panel
data can be overlooked.
First of all, one can overlook unit effects. While, by making poolability assump-
tion, one assumes that the relation between the variables of interest is the same,
regardless of units and time periods, it is still necessary to control for the fact that
there are some factors associated with the units of analysis which affect the de-
pendent variable. In other words, in addition to a random error, which is normally
distributed across cases and across time, it is necessary to estimate this unit-specific
error component.
It can be done in two ways. Following the first way, one assumes that time-
invariant and unit-specific random errors may be correlated with dependent vari-
ables. To take this into account, it is possible to create a dummy variable for
every entity, which allows to account for time-invariant, panel-specific unobserved
variables which affect the dependent variable. The model then becomes:
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yit = β1x1,it + β2x2,it + ...+ βnxn,it + γ1E1 + γ2E2 + ...+ Ekγk + εit
where:
- k is the number of entities,
- E1 , E2 . . . Ek are dummy variables for every entity except one,
- γ1, γ2 ... γk are coefficients for these dummy variables,
- the rest of the notation is the same as in pooled OLS.
Essentially, this model is a regular OLS regression in which each unit has its
own individual intercept; thus, the model does not have a general intercept. This
model is called fixed effects model.
Fixed effects model can also include not just entity effects but also time effects, if
there are reasons to believe there is some temporal trend in the dependent variable,
independently of regressors, or there were some important unobserved events in
some of the time periods which equally affected the dependent variable for all the
cases in these time periods. This is technically done by creating a dummy variable
for each year and estimating coefficients of these variables. More formally: δ1T1 +
δ2T2 + ... + δpTp , where p is the number of time periods, T1, T2 . . . Tn is a
dummy variable for each time period, δ1, δ2 . . . δp-1 are the coefficients of these
dummy variables. As in the previous case, this model is a regular OLS regression
with individual intercepts for each time period. Time effects can be used instead of
entity effects or together with them65. However, including dummy variables both
for time periods and for units leads to the need to estimate too many parameters on
too little data, which makes the estimators inefficient. Also, in country-level studies,
it is more reasonable to believe that the difference between countries is much more
drastic that the difference between years; thus, time fixed effects are rarely used in
this kind of studies.
An advantage of a fixed effects model is that it allows to take into account
not just observed but also unobserved time-invariant characteristics of cases, since
their effect is “included” in the effect of dummy variables, and to allow for the fact
that these individual characteristics may be somehow correlated with the variables
present in the model. In case where the cases are countries (as in the current project)
65Some software, such as Stata, estimates general intercept also for fixed effects model; however,
in this case, one of the coefficients for a dummy variable for an entity or a time period is not
estimated, otherwise, it will be perfectly collinear with a general intercept.
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it is possible to implicitly take into account such time-invariant characteristics of
cases as political culture, colonial legacy and other variables not explicitly included
in the regression and which could influence the dependent variable.
The problem is that if one or more independent variables are time-invariant
(which is quite likely if these variables are not interval), then it becomes impossible
to distinguish between the effect of this variable from the effect of a dummy variable
introduced for each entity (more technically, in this case a time-invariant variable is
perfectly collinear with the intercepts and thus the model cannot be estimated). For
instance, if one wants to study the impact of monarchies (as defined by Geddes et al.
2014) on economic growth using the data for 1990s and 2000s using fixed effects, that
would not be possible: no old monarchies collapsed and no new monarchies emerged
in this time period, thus, it would not be possible to distinguish between the effect
of monarchies from the effect of the dummy variables for each country that was a
monarchy in this time period. Another problem of this model that, by introducing
entity-level dummy variables, one essentially disregards all between-case variation
(as it is all “absorbed” by these unit dummies), so only within-case variation is taken
into account in estimating the effect of the independent variables66; in other words,
using fixed effects, one can only answer the question how a temporal variation of the
dependent variable depends on a temporal variation of independent variables (Beck
2008). This may create a problem if variables are changing over time very slowly,
which is very frequently the case with institutional variables. Lastly, if the number
of observations is not high enough, estimating a separate parameter for each case
leads to inefficient estimates (so-called incidental parameters problem, Zorn 2018).
In this case, one can use a model which is called random effects model. This
model also assumes that there is a time-invariant unit-specific component in the
model; however, unlike in the fixed effects approach, it assumes that this component
is normally distributed across entities and is correlated neither with the regression
coefficients, not with the general error term. Thus, the model becomes:
yit = β0 + β1x1,it + β2x2,it + ...+ βnxn,it + νi + εit
where νi is a time-invariant, entity-specific error component while εit is a general
error term which is normally distributed both across entities and across time. Es-
66For this reason, a fixed effects model is also called a “within” model. There are also “between”
models, which disregard the within-case variation and take into account only between-case one;
however, they are almost never used in practice.
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sentially, time-invariant, entity-specific error component just becomes part of a
general error.
In this specification, time-invariant characteristics of units can be included in
the analysis. Also, both within-case and between-case variation are considered in
estimation procedure, which is preferable to an estimator which takes into account
only between-case variation. However, this model gives unbiased results only if
the assumption that entity-specific error is uncorrelated with regressors or with the
general error holds true
If both a random effects model and a fixed effects can be estimated for the same
dataset, it is possible to run a Hausman test (Hausman 1978) to identify whether
there is a statistically significant difference between coefficients of the two models.
If the difference is statistically significant, a fixed effect model is the one which is
unbiased and which should be chosen. If there is none, both random effects model
and fixed effects model are unbiased, however, a random effects model is more effi-
cient and should be preferred for this reason67. However, Hausman test is a general
specification test is biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis (thus, towards se-
lecting a fixed effects model) in case of any additional specification problems, such
as omitted variables, or errors in measurements (Zorn 2018); even if there is statisti-
cally significant difference between the two models, it may be still preferable to use
random effects model as long as unit effects have low explanatory power (that is,
when there are no obvious outliers), in order not to lose the advantages of random
effects models (Beck and Katz 2001). Thus, I apply both models and assess if the
results across models are consistent for the main variables of interest.
Both fixed effects model and random effects model deal with the problem of
different intercepts between units of analysis. However, they do not take into ac-
count the time dimension, i.e. a possibility that error terms within units are serially
correlated (i.e. that there is some dependency between ei,t and ei, t-1 for every unit
i in the analysis). Also, they do not take into account that there may be a het-
eroskedasticity caused by different error variance for different units, due to unit
heterogeneity (that is, a difference in standard errors between cases). These issues
may become a important as the number of time points becomes high enough (which
67In statistics, an estimator is called efficient if it has the least possible standard error and is
called unbiased if the bias of an estimator is 0 (i.e. for this estimator, the mean of the sampling
distribution is equal to the population mean). If there are several estimators which are equally
unbiased, the one which is more efficient is preferable; however, if an estimator is biased, it does
not make sense to assess whether it is efficient or not.
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is the point in which the data becomes TSCS data rather than panel data). In the
data for this particular research, the number of time periods is around 10 for WGI
Rule of Law index and 17 for V-Dem index of the Rule of Law, which is exactly
in between panel data and TSCS data, as defined by Beck and Katz (1995, 2004).
Thus, it makes sense to also apply the models suitable for TSCS data.
To solve these problems, Beck and Katz (1995) suggested a following two-stage
estimation procedure. On the first stage, one estimates a simple OLS regression for
the panel data with AR(1) autoregression parameter for standard errors:
yi,t = β0 + β1x1,t + β2x2,t + ...+ βnxn,t + εi,t
εi,t = ρεi,t−1 + νi,t
At this stage, the only difference between this model and pooled OLS is that an
additional parameter ρ is estimated to account for serial correlation of error terms.
It is technically possible to estimate a separate ρ for each panel but Beck and Katz
(1995) do not recommend that: they claim that, if one makes poolability assumption
in the first place (that is, that the relation between Xs and Y is the same regardless
of the unit and time), then it is also logical to assume that the serial correlation of
error terms is characterized by the same parameter. Also, estimating a separate ρ
for every cross-sectional unit means estimating too many parameters based on too
little data; for this reason, I estimate only a common ρ in my empirical analysis.
On the second stage, to take into account for heteroskedasticity caused by possibly
different variance for different cross-sectional units, one estimate standard errors
which are robust in presence of this heteroskedasticity (so-called panel-corrected
standard errors). The details of estimation procedure are available in Beck and Katz
(1995). With this procedure, the coefficients from the first stage do not change;
what changes is the estimation of standard errors (they typically become much
larger). This model is widely used in country-level panel studies in general and in
authoritarian studies in particular (see Wright 2008, Genschel et al. 2016, Charron
and Lapuente 2011, among many others). For this reason, I also apply this model
alongside with simple fixed and random effects models.
Note on interaction effects
Interaction effects between formal and informal institution are needed in order to
test whether the effect of formal institutions is conditional on informal constraints,
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in other words, whether, under higher levels of informal constraints, the positive
effect of formal institutions on the rule of law becomes stronger68.
If there was a fine-grained continuous measurement of both the level of formal
institutionalization and the level of informal constraints, one could have used both
measurements as continuous variables, construct a regression model with an inter-
action term between these two variables, and then plot marginal effects in order
to see how the impact of formal institutionalization on the rule of law changes
depending on the level of informal constraints. However, the measurements I am
using for both phenomena are just ordinal and have only three possible values each
(which correspond to low, medium, and high degree of formal institutionalization
and informal constraints). While it is not uncommon to treat ordinal values as con-
tinuous in regression analysis (as it is frequently done for Likert scales, i.e. scales
with values from 0 to 5 or 0 to 9), for the variables with only 3 possible values this
is stretching. In the case of this study, it would require to make an assumption
that the distance between non-institutionalized and semi-institutionalized regimes
is the same as between semi-institutionalized and fully institutionalized, and the
same goes for informal constraints. These assumptions do not look plausible be-
cause in both cases the middle categories are composed of heterogeneous types of
regimes. As it was discussed in the methodological chapter, Polity IV index which
could potentially operationalize institutional openness also has its flaws as it merges
several theoretically distinct dimensions of political institutions in one index. Thus,
it is methodologically more correct to use these variables as categorical. In order
to identify whether the interaction effect between formal institutionalization and
informal constraints is present, I am conducting a series of chi-square test of differ-
ence between regression coefficients. So, for unconstrained, semi-constrained, and
constrained regimes, I compare the regression coefficients, pairwise, for:
1) non-institutionalized and semi-institutionalized regimes,
2) semi-institutionalized and institutionalized regimes,
3) non-institutionalized and institutionalized regimes
Based on the hypothesis stated in the theoretical chapter, my theoretical expec-
tations are the following:
1) for unconstrained regimes, there is no significant difference between different
levels of institutionalization,
68Technically, the opposite interpretation (i.e. under higher levels of formal institutionalization,
the positive effect of informal constraints on the rule of law becomes stronger) is also plausible, as
the interaction effects do not allow to distinguish between the two interpretations. However, from
a theoretical perspective, it is the indicated interpretation which makes sense.
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2) for semi-constrained regimes, there is some significant difference between
different levels of institutionalization,
3) for constrained regimes, there is highly significant difference between different
levels of institutionalization.
Summary
In this chapter, I formulated the research question and testable hypotheses for
further analysis. I also described the methodology of the following analysis, paying
particular attention to the panel nature of the data I will be dealing with, as well
as to challenges of testing interaction effects between ordinal variables.
In the following chapter, I will conduct the empirical analysis of the impact of
formal and informal authoritarian institutions on the rule of law in general. To do
that, I will also discuss the operationalizations of the rule of law I will need to use
and then conduct a regression analysis.
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CHAPTER IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: RULE OF
LAW
I start the empirical analysis by studying of the impact of both formal and infor-
mal authoritarian institutions on the rule of law in general, without distinguishing,
for the moment, between property rights protection and human rights protection
aspects.
Concerning informal authoritarian institutions (i.e. constrained, semi-constrained,
and unconstrained regime types, recoded from original classification by Geddes
1999, Geddes et al. 2014), according to the theory outlined in the theoretical
chapter, the expectation is that, if a dictator’s decision-making is influenced and
constrained by the top military or by the party leadership, it is more likely that
the dictator’s actions will be more predictable and more rule-abiding. This means
a better state of the rule of law compared to the situation if the dictator is com-
pletely free in his decision-making. Concerning formal authoritarian institutions,
such as parties, parliaments, and elections, according to theories, they are needed
to make policy concessions to potential rival groups without risking dictator’spower
and to create somewhat credible commitments that these concessions will be ful-
filled (Gandhi&Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008), which means higher degree of the
rule of law. As for interaction between formal and informal institutions, it is argued
in the literature that formal institutions are binding for dictators only in regimes
which have informal constraints (Wright 2008), thus, I can expect that a positive
effect of formal institutions on the rule of law is stronger if a regime has informal
constraints. Below, these hypotheses will be empirically tested.
Operationalization of the rule of law
A general definition of the rule of law used in this project was given in Chapter III:
the rule of law is “the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime or violence” (Kaufman et al. 2009). This
definition is used to construct WGI Rule of Law index (ibid.), thus, it is logical to
use this indicatior as operationalization of the rule of law in general.
WGI Rule of Law index index aggregates the data on each of the dimension of
governance from dozens of sources, both expert surveys and mass surveys69 and then
69The full list of sources used to construct the index of the rule of law can be found here:
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combines them in a single index with global yearly mean of 0, standard deviation
of 1 and range form -2,5 to 2.5. The individual sources operationalize things such
as prominence of violent crimes, property rights protection and expropriation risks,
enforcing the contracts, judiciary independence. For different countries, a different
set of sources is used, depending on the availability of the data for the given country
in these sources. This can be regarded as a disadvantage, as for different countries
the index value can come from different data sources, however, precisely because
Kaufman et al.(2007) use as many sources as possible, they manage to cover virtually
all countries over the time period since late 1990s. It is also possible to access most
of the sources individual sources online and free of charge, with some exceptions70.
One potential concern the use of this index pertain is endogeneity, meaning
that WGI Rule of Law index may already include indicators which operationalize
either formal or informal authoritarian institutions. However, among a list of over 50
indicators which are included in the index, only two of them - “Separation of powers”
from Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) and part of “Liberal Component
Index” from V-Dem databases – can be regarded as somewhat overlapping with
the notions of formal or informal authoritarian institutions. All the other variables
used in the construction of this index are covering efficiency and independence
of justice system, property rights protection, and prevalence of different types of
crime, all of which has little to do with presence or absence of formal institutions or
informal constraints to the dictator. In addition, a notion of informal constraints
for authoritarian regime is not the same as a notion of separation of powers as it
is known in democratic countries, thus, some constrained regimes get worse scores
than some unconstrained ones. For example, for 2010, China (which is a single-party
regime) gets a BTI “Separation of powers” score of 3/10, while the score is for both
Jordan (which is a monarchy) and Azerbaijan (which is a personalist dictatorship)
is 4/10. Thus, the risk that endogeneity can bias the result is minimal.
In order to completely exclude the possibility of endogeneity which still may
be associated with the use of the WGI Rule of Law index, I use an additional
indicator of the rule of law, namely, “Equality before the law and individual liberty
index” elaborated by “Varieties of Democracy” (V-Dem) project (Coppedge et al.
2018a). This index is composed from a number of indicators, such as: impartiality of
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#doc
70For example, indicators included in International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), used in the
construction of WGI Rule of Law index, is available only upon paid subscription
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public administration, predictability of law enforcement, access to justice, physical
integrity, property rights, freedom of religion, and freedom of movement. This
is somewhat different from the World Bank operationalization, as it includes also
individual liberties and excludes crime and violence; however, this is still consistent
with the general narrow concept of the rule of law. Every individual indicator is
coded by country experts, who are usually citizens or residents of countries being
coded (no less than five coders per indicator, unless explicitly specified otherwise
in the dataset), whose scores are then aggregated to ensure reliability. In the end,
they obtain an index ranging from 0 to 1, 0 meaning the lowest degree of the rule
of law and individual freedoms and 1 meaning the highest. Some details on criteria
of expert selection and on aggregation procedure can be found in Coppedge et al.
(2018b). As it becomes clear from this description, presence or absence of formal
institutions or informal constraints on the dictator does not have any impact on
the construction of this index as there are no components of this index related
to institutional properties of the regime. Another benefit of this index is that,
unlike WGI Rule of Law index, it is available for all country-years under study,
which increases the number of country-years available for regression analysis. The
Pearson’s correlation between WGI Rule of Law index and V-Dem index is 0.54,
meaning that these two varaibles, while related to each other, are not identical,
thus, one can be certain that if the results of regression models with both variables
are similar, this can genuinely validate the findings.
Data sources and data collection
Data on my main dependent variable and control variables is collected with the use
of World Bank API71 and Python (v. 3.6) scripts which allowed to scrape the data
from the World Bank website and to merge it with Geddes et al. (2014) data on
informal authoritarian institutions and with Przeworski et al. (2013) data on formal
authoritarian institutions. As mentioned above, the data on “Equality before the
law and individual liberty” index is obtained from 8th version of V-Dem dataset
(Coppedge et al. 2018c).
As it is impossible to find any reliable data on North Korea and Somalia, these
countries are dropped entirely from the analysis, as well as Afghanistan from 1996 to
2002 (a time period when Afghanistan was under Taliban rule and did not disclose
any data). In addition, there is no data on GDP per capita (purchase parity)
71https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/889392-api-documentation
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for Cuba (all country-years) and for Libya (1996-1998), so these observations are
also dropped. Dropping North Korea and Cuba also removes the only two currently
existing socialist economies from consideration, which is beneficial for the analysis in
any case, since, as mentioned in the methodological chapter, for socialist economies
the theoretical argument about the need to protect the rule of law in order to attract
foreign and domestic investments does not hold.
In the World Bank databases, some data on oil and gas rents is missing. Thus,
I used the data for oil and gas extraction from United States Energy Information
Administration72. If, for the country-years missing in the World Bank databases,
the figures of oil and gas extraction are 0 (or for oil extraction, less than 200 barrels a
day), then the value of oil/gas rent for this country-year is coded as 0; if the figures
are substantial, the data for the oil/gas rent for this country-year is left empty,
since, with the available data, any estimates of oil/gas rents would be imprecise.
When this procedure applied, however, only and 12 country-years (out of 993) were
dropped from the dataset: Iraq (1996-2003) and Myanmar (1996-1999).
In total, after all the deletions, only 56 country-years out of 1037 (5,4%) were
dropped, which is a totally acceptable number.
The data on informal authoritarian institutions is the dataset by Geddes et
al. (2014). The data on formal authoritarian institutions is available at Political
Institutions and Political Events (PIPE) dataset (Przeworski et al. 2013).
Prior to 2002, WGI index of the Rule of Law was estimated on a biannual, not
annual bases, which leads to a significant number of missing observations (observa-
tions for this index are missing for 1997, 1999 and 2001 for all countries). I avoid
imputing any of these missing values with single or multiple imputation algorithms
(such as the ones suggested in Honaker & King 2010, Honaker et al. 2011), as it
is not clear because validity of these methods critically depends on validity of their
assumptions about the distibution of the data, which are hard to test. For this
reason, these observations are omitted. As for V-Dem index of the rule of law, it is
available for all 981 country-years under study.
Analysis
a) Distribution of autocratic country-years by institutions
72Available through the website www.indexmundi.com.
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First, I show some descriptive statistics.
The final dataset contains 981 country-years, 81 countries, with average number
of observations per case of 12.1, minimum of 1 and maximum of 17 observations
per case.
Distribution of country-years by informal constraints (excluding country-years
representing democracy, foreign occupation, civil war and provisional governments)
for the time period from 1992 to 2008 is the following:
Table 3: Distribution of informal constraints in 1992-2008, country-years
Constrained Semi-constrained Unconstrained
375 130 476
As one can see, authoritarian regimes, most of them are unconstrained, con-
strained ones (single-party, military) are less prominent, and semi-constrained (all
hybrids with a personalist element) are the most rare. It is also worth noting
that autocratic country-years represent over 40% of all country-years in the dataset
(excluding the country-years under war, foreign occupation, or provisional govern-
ments) – which again indicates that autocracies in the world are almost as prevalent
as democracies, and this is one of the reasons why political scientists need to study
autocracies as thoroughly as democracies.
The same table is presented for formal institutions:







It is clear from this table that, in 1996-2008, virtually all authoritarian regimes
got at least some institutions and in more than half of the cases these regimes got
fully-fledged institutions, meaning parliaments, parties, and alternative elections.
This can be explained both by the Western pressure to have seemingly democratic
institutions (Levitsky & Way 2008) and by benefits that the institutions bring to
the dictators (Gandhi & Przeworski 2005, Gandhi 2008, Wright 2008, Escribà-Folch
2009, among others).
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As the intention of this chapter is to test the interaction between formal in-
stitutions and informal constraints, I provide below a cross-tabulation of the two
categories, to make sure none of them is empty:
Table 5: Cross-tabulation of formal and informal authoritarian institu-
tions, country-years
constrained semi-constrained unconstrained
institutionalized 257 47 312
semi-institutionalized 106 73 106
non-institutionalized 12 10 58
As it becomes clear, while some categories are empirically rare (as one can
see, there are very few country-years in which a regime is constrained or semi-
constrained and at the same time is not institutionalized), none of the combinations
is empirically impossible, thus, it is meaningful to study interaction effects.
b) Regression analysis: interaction of formal and informal authoritar-
ian institutions
Further, I present the regression analysis, in order to identify if there is a statis-
tically significant difference between formal and informal authoritarian institutions
on the one hand and WGI Rule of Law index on another. I first test a separate im-
pact of formal and informal authoritarian institutions and then test the interaction
effect because, as I discussed in a theoretical chapter, formal authoritarian institu-
tions are likely to play a different role in constrained and unconstrained regimes,
thus, their impact on the rule of law may also depend on these informal constraints.
From all the models, categories which do not represent an authoritarian regime
(democracy, foreign occupation, civil war, provisional government and their mixes)
are excluded.
The justification for including every of the variables in the regression models is
provided in the methodological chapter. Here, I only repeat the list of variables:
1. Logged GDP per capita (PPP, 2011 international dollars).
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2. Logged population.
3. Infant mortality(deaths before 1 years of age per 1000 live births).
4. Regime types, recoded as “constrained”, “semi-constrained” and “unconstrained”;
“semi-constrained” is a reference category
5. Institutionalization, coded as “institutionalized”, “semi-institutionalized”, and
“non-institutionalized”; “semi-institutionalized” is a reference category
6. Resource dependence (sum of oil, gas, and mineral rents).
7. Democratic legacy (dummy).
8. Regime longevity (years).
The columns represent random effects model, fixed effects model and AR(1)-PCSE
model (in that order), first without interactions and then with them(in the same
order). The results of the analysis are presented below in the following table.
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Table 6: Impact on authoritarian institutions on the WGI Rule of Law
index: interaction effects
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. 0.228∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.056) (0.032) (0.042) (0.056) (0.032)
Logged population −0.129∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗ −0.423∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.123) (0.017) (0.038) (0.122) (0.015)
Infant mortality −0.002∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.002 −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Resource −0.007∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Constrained 0.298∗ 0.136 0.325∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.233 0.128
(0.140) (0.257) (0.062) (0.154) (0.276) (0.073)
Unconstrained 0.017 −0.069 0.031 −0.077 −0.289 −0.027
(0.134) (0.240) (0.051) (0.147) (0.261) (0.099)
Institutionalized 0.088∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.044 −0.177 −0.149 −0.196
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.093) (0.098) (0.105)
Non-institutionalized −0.033 −0.058 −0.064 −0.009 −0.064 0.048
(0.070) (0.070) (0.073) (0.157) (0.161) (0.089)
Regime duration 0.002 −0.000 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.001 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Democratic legacy 0.226∗∗ 0.339∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.337∗∗ 0.102∗∗
(0.081) (0.106) (0.043) (0.081) (0.104) (0.032)
Inst. X Constr. 0.434∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.117) (0.096)
Inst. X Unconstr. 0.216∗ 0.224∗ 0.189
(0.102) (0.106) (0.151)
Non-inst. X Constr. 0.356 0.385 0.145
(0.228) (0.228) (0.276)
Non-inst. X Unconstr −0.167 −0.122 −0.253
(0.181) (0.184) (0.162)
Intercept −0.614 −1.103∗ −0.756 −1.006∗
(0.814) (0.454) (0.821) (0.454)
R2 0.230 0.153 0.513 0.259 0.190 0.530
Num. obs. 564 564 564 564 564 564
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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All the models show a positive and statistically significant relation between
logged GDP per capita and the state of the rule of law. As it was argued above,
this is a two-way relation so the coefficients may be overestimated, however, even if
it biases the result for other variables, the bias is downwards rather than upwards.
The impact of infant mortality (which is used as a second proxy for economic de-
velopment) is negative and significant for most models, which also confirms my
expectations (as infant mortality is another proxy for economic development). The
impact of resource dependence is, as expected, negative and highly significant for
all the models. The impact of democratic legacy is, as expected, positive, while the
impact of regime duration is not stable across models. The impact of population
size is statistically significant for all models, and negative. This is counter-intuitive
because, as Wright (2008) shows, smaller population is associated with higher prob-
ability of establishing a personalist regime, as in smaller countries it is more likely
that the dictator does not have to rely on population in order to govern; thus, one
would expect that smaller population decreases the need for the dictator to main-
tain the rule of law. A possible interpretation of the finding is that smaller countries
generally rely more on international capital movement and benefit more from any
measures that help to attract international capital (Genschel et al. 2016), thus,
smaller countries may face higher incentives to maintain the rule of law. Another
possible explanation is that smaller countries are more vulnerable to international
pro-democratic pressure (Levitsky and Way 2010). I do not research further which
of the two causal mechanisms is more plausible, as it goes beyond the research
question.
Speaking of the main variables of interest, the findings are the following. In
the models without interaction effects, the impact of formal institutionalization on
its own or informal constraints on their own seems to be irrelevant for the rule
of law, as the statistical significance of coefficients depends on the model choice.
Once interaction effects are introduced, individual effects of formal and informal
institutions remain insignificant, however, the interaction effect between being for-
mally institutionalized and informally constrained becomes highly significant and
huge in magnitude for all the three models: formally institutionalized and infor-
mally constrained autocracies increase the value of the WGI Rule of Law index by
around 0.4 (measured in standard deviation units), or by around 8% compared to
the reference category of semi-institutionalized and semi-constrained regimes, after
controlling for other variables. However, other interaction effects are not statis-
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tically significant for all models, meaning that there is no statistically significant
difference between these categories and the reference category. Thus, it shows that
only authoritarian regimes which are both formally fully institutionalized and in-
formally fully constrained are different from all other authoritarian regimes; partial
institutionalization (such as introduction of the legislature without parties or leg-
islature with one party) or imposing partial constraints on the dictator does not
seem to make any difference in terms of the rule of law compared no institutions or
no constraints at all.
In order to still formally test the presence of interaction effects between formal
institutionalization and informal constraints, I do the following. First, I calcu-
late, using a random effects model and AR(1)-PCSE model calculated above73,
I show the intercepts for each of the 9 categories, obtained by intersecting cate-
gories for formal and informal institutions. Second, I test the difference between
regression coefficients for non-institutionalized, semi-institutionalized, and institu-
tionalized regimes, for three separate groups: constrained, semi-constrained, and
unconstrained ones. p-values are reported. The theoretical expectations are out-
lined in Chapter III, in a note about interaction effects. The empirical results are
presented in the following tables:
73With fixed effects model, it is not possible to do as this model does not estimate a general
intercept – which in these calculations represent an intercept for semi-institutionalized and semi-
constrained regimes.
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Table 7: Intercept values for different combinations of formal and informal






regimes -0.17 -0.08 0.22
Semi-constrained
regimes -0.01 -0.76 -0.18
Constrained
regimes 0.36 0.05 0.43
Table 8: Testing interaction effects between formal institutions and in-













regimes 0.1653 0.1653 0.0529
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.367 0.4885 0.3516
Constrained
regimes 0.274 0.0858 0.7575
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Table 9: Intercept values for different combinations of formal and informal






regimes -0.25 -0.03 0.19
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.05 -1.01 -0.20
Constrained
regimes 0.14 0.13 0.38
Table 10: Testing interaction effects between formal institutions and infor-












regimes 0.3816 0.3816 0.0091**
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.0168* 0.089 0.0469*
Constrained
regimes 0.9546 0.1119 0.3956
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From these tables, one can see that the theoretical expectations do not hold. In
theory, one would expect that, among constrained regimes, the difference between
levels of institutionalization should be highly significant. However, the empirical
results do not demonstrate that.
Thus, it turns out that, although, from the existing theories, we could expect
that there would be more complex interactions between formal institutions and
informal constraints, from the empirical findings it turns out that it is only dicta-
torships which are both formally institutionalized and informally constrained that
are genuinely better in terms of the rule of law compared to other dictatorships.
The same analysis is conducted using V-dem index as the dependent variable.
The order of models is the same as before:
97
Table 11: Impact on authoritarian institutions on V-Dem Rule of Law
index: interaction effects
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. 0.024 0.048∗∗∗ 0.005 0.023 0.050∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Logged population −0.004 0.147∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.002 0.157∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.025) (0.011) (0.013) (0.025) (0.010)
Infant mortality −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Resource −0.000 −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.000 −0.001∗ −0.001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constrained 0.075∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.039 0.095∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Unconstrained −0.050∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.045 −0.127∗∗∗ 0.039
(0.022) (0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021)
Institutionalized 0.025∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037 0.027 0.100∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.007) (0.011) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030)
Non-institutionalized −0.012 −0.002 −0.018∗ −0.040 −0.067∗ 0.020
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.028) (0.027) (0.020)
Regime duration −0.001∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.001∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Democratic legacy −0.013 −0.013 0.014 −0.015 −0.020 0.020
(0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Inst. X Constr. −0.006 0.009 −0.068∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.028)
Inst. X Unconstr. −0.017 −0.005 −0.077∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029)
Non-inst. X Constr. 0.003 0.058 −0.056∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.020)
Non-inst. X Unconstr 0.043 0.082∗∗ −0.039
(0.031) (0.030) (0.022)
Intercept 0.448 1.125∗∗∗ 0.411 1.105∗∗∗
(0.248) (0.304) (0.250) (0.278)
R2 0.153 0.165 0.497 0.158 0.174 0.505
Num. obs. 981 981 981 981 981 981
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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In this case, the pattern of interaction is even less clear that in case of WGI
Rule of Law index. Thus, it does not make sense to test for the interaction terms
in the same way as with WGI index.
c) Regression analysis: fully institutionalized and fully constrained
regimes as a special case However, the fact that formally institutionalizerd and
informally constrained regimes are better that all other regimes in terms of the rule
of law, at least judging from WGI Rule of Law index, is also a relevant finding
which requires further testing and robustness checks. Thus, I change the model
and simply dichotomize authoritarian regimes, distinguishing between instititonal-
ized constrained autocracies and all the others. I further run fixed effects model,
random effects model, and AR(1)-PCSE model with a dummy variable for fully in-
stitutionalized and fully constrained regimes instead of separate variables for formal
and informal authoritarian institutions, and with all the other variables as before.
To ensure the robustness of the findings and to avoid a possibility of endogeneity,
I run the same three models using V-Dem index of the rule of law as a dependent
variable. The first three columns are RE, FE, and AR(1)-PCSE models for WGI
index, and the second three are the same models for V-dem index. The results are
presented below:
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Table 12: Impact on authoritarian institutions on the WGI and V-Dem
Rule of Law inices: dichotomous distinction
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. 0.241∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.023 0.035∗ 0.002
(0.041) (0.056) (0.031) (0.012) (0.014) (0.016)
Logged population −0.107∗∗ −0.421∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ 0.008 0.113∗∗∗ −0.032∗
(0.036) (0.123) (0.016) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015)
Infant mortality −0.002 −0.004∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.000 −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Resource −0.007∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.000 −0.000 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fully institutionalized 0.305∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.058) (0.032) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Regime duration 0.002 0.000 0.005∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗ 0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democratic legacy 0.206∗∗ 0.304∗∗ 0.092∗∗ −0.028 −0.039∗ −0.009
(0.078) (0.095) (0.033) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
Intercept −1.016 −1.237∗∗ 0.225 1.104∗∗
(0.759) (0.415) (0.266) (0.380)
R2 0.243 0.159 0.516 0.107 0.096 0.461
Num. obs. 564 564 564 981 981 981
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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As one can see, in this model, the impact of formal institutionalization and in-
formal constraints is positive and statistically significant for all model specifications,
both for WGI and V-dem indices, even if, for V-dem index, the results for other
variables are inconsistent across different model specifications.
Finally, I have to control for a self-selection bias, that is, for the fact that
authoritarian institutions are not assigned to authoritarian regimes randomly but
are deliberately chosen by dictators or (in case of informal constraints) are heavily
influenced by them. While I already control for observable factors which affect the
need for institutions (such as economic development, resource rents and democratic
legacy), it is still possible that, for example, that “benevolent” dictators which have
higher propensity to establish formally democratic institutions and at the same time
to improve the rule of law in the country; thus, one cannot be sure whether it is
institutionalization or the “benevolence” of dictators that leads to better state of
the rule of law.
To deal with that, they apply two-stage Heckman model (Heckman 1979), which
is a statistical model elaborated to correct for self-selection bias. A classical example
of application of Heckman model is Heckman and Macurdy (1980), where the scholar
models wages of the working women. The main innovation of this study, compared
to previous ones on the same topic, what that Heckman took into account that
the choice by women whether or not to work was not random but depended (at
least at times when the studies were written) on multiple factors, some of which are
unobserved74. A failure to account for these unobserved factors which affect this
self-selection into the workforce leads to biases in estimating the impact of different
factors on wages. In order to deal with that, he invented a two-staged procedure.
On the first stage, he runs a binary probit model with factors which, according
to the theories, influenced a choice whether to work or not. On the second stage,
he calculated inverse of Mill’s ratio, which serves as a proxy of unobserved factors
which affected female participation (that is, a proxy of a random error)75 in the
labor force and added this variable into a regular regression analysis. The factors
which affect the probability of being selected in the sample (in this case, in the
sample of working women) can be different from the factors which affect wages but
they may be also similar; the model works in both cases.
74The intuition was that, if a woman could be more productive in a household than in the
workplace, she preferred not to work; this, in turn, depended on her education, number of years
of experience, number of children, and other factors, some of which cannot be observed.
75I omit the details of estimating inverse of Mill’s ratio here, it can be found in Heckman (1979).
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In case of authoritarian institutions, the situation is slightly different: while in
the example of Heckman, the potential salary of women who chose not to work was
not observable at all, in our case, the values of the rule of law are observed for
all country-years, both when a given regime in a given year is an institutionalized
constrained autocracy and when it is not. However, a problem of self-selection
remains: since dictator heavily influence the choice of institutions and since not all
factors influencing the choice of institutions are observable, it is still possible that,
for one reason or another (for example, due to dictators’ motives), dictators who
choose to improve the rule of law in their countries tend to also prefer to open a
legislature, allow for multiple parties and have regular elections, and, at the same
time, improve the rule of law in the country. If this is the case, it might happen
that the observable impact of institutions on the rule of law is in fact the impact of
dictator’s good motives, and that, on their own, institutions do not have any effect.
To solve this issues, I need to implement the same procedure which was imple-
mented in many works assessing the impact of authoritarian institutions, such as
Gandhi (2008, 2008a), Wright (2008), Escribà-Folch (2010), and others.
The procedure is quite complex, and the algorithm can be described like this:
1. estimate a probit model which estimate the impact of factors affecting the
selection of institutions; in my case, it is a binary probit model where a de-
pendent variable is being institutionalized constrained autocracy:
Pr(Institutions it = j) = Zitα+ νit
where i, t are conscripts of a country and year respectively, α is a vector of
coefficients of the exogenous independent variables Z, which affect the proba-
bility of having institutions, ν is a random error;
2. calculate from this model an inverse of Mill’s ratio, for both presence and
absence of full institutionalization (λit,0 , λit,1), which serves as a proxy of a
random error of the probit model;
3. construct a regression model for each institution separately (i.e. a separate
regression for country-years in which regime is fully institutionalized and not
fully institutionalized), including an inverse of Mill’s ratio for, respectively,
presence or absence of full institutionalization as an explanatory variable; one
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can use a simple linear regression or also a regression correcting for autocor-
relation of errors76 (AR(1)-PCSE model used above is suitable); this way, one
gets unbiased estimates of coefficients, controlling for self-selection:
Yit , 0 = β0Xit , 0 + θλit , 0 + εit , 0
Yit , 1 = β1Xit , 1 + θλit , 1 + εit , 1
where i,t are subscripts of country and year and 0-1, and represent presence
and absence of full institutionalization;
4. use the regression coefficients β0 and β1 from step 3 to calculate predicted
value of the dependent variable (Ŷ) for all the data; in this way, one estimates
what the value of Y would have been if all country-years had been fully in-
stitutionalized and what the values of Y would have been if all country-years
had not been fully institutionalized:
Ŷit , 0 = β̂0Xit
Ŷit , 1 = β̂1Xit
where Ŷit,0 and Ŷit,1 are predicted values of the dependent variable under a
counterfactual that every country-year is not fully institutionalized (Ŷit,0 ) or
is fully institutionalized (Ŷit,1); note that Xit does not have a j subscript,
which indicates that the coefficients β0 and β1 are applied for all the data to
get predicted values of Y;
5. using a simple t-test, compare the averages of Ŷit,0 and Ŷit,0 , to determine
if the difference is statistically significant and has an expected sign.
Due to the length, all the calculations for the steps 1-4, here and thereafter,
are presented in the Appendix77. The results of the step 5 are presented in the
following tables:
76Unit effects models cannot be used because not all units which are present in the full data are
also present in the two regression equations; thus, one would not be able to apply the coefficients
obtained from these two equations to the whole dataset, which is what required at the step 4.
77See the first stage of the Heckman model in Table 31 and intermediate calculations for WGI
and V-Dem in Table 32 and Table 33 respectively.
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Table 13: Selection-corrected WGI Rule of Law Estimates
OLS AR(1)
Predicted average (fully institutionalized) -0.40 -0.38
Predicted average (not fully institutionalized) -0.78 -0.48
Difference 0.38*** 0.10***
Table 14: Selection-corrected V-dem Rule of law Estimates
OLS AR(1)
Predicted average (fully institutionalized) 0.67 0.62
Predicted average (not fully institutionalized) 0.46 0.48
Difference 0.21*** 0.14***
As one can see from these tables, corrrecting for self-selection does not change
the conclusions. Institutionalized constrained regimes perform better than all the
others according to WGI and V-dem index. Substantially, the difference is large for
V-dem index (14%-21% depending on the model) and much smaller for WGI index
(2%-7.6%) but is is statistically significant in both cases.
Summary
The results above contribute to the previous works on authoritarian regimes which
presented the evidence that, contrary to a conventional wisdom, both formal and
informal authoritarian institutions are relevant in authoritarian regimes, even if they
are relevant in a different way than they are in democracies. However, the findings
do not fully conform to theoretical expectations. While, according to theory, one
would expect that the role of formal institutions has to be conditional on the degree
of informal constraints, the empirical data suggests that is it only regimes that are
both fully institutionalized (have a legislature, parties, and multiparty elections in
which voters can choose between at least two parties) and informally constrained
(i. e. belong to the category of military or single-party regimes) are different from
the other autocracies in terms of the rule of law even after controlling for other
factors. It seems that constraining the dictator partially or introducing only some
nominally democratic institutions does not improve the rule of law.
I found that regimes which are formally institutionalized and informally con-
strained perform better that the others, and this difference is statistically significant
and substantially large irrespective of the choice of the model. Thus, this finding
can be considered robust. While there might be concerns about endogeneity be-
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tween the institutionalization and the WGI Rule of Law index, there are no grounds
for these concerns in case of V-Dem indicator, as the latter is constructed in a way
that does not include any institutional variables. Correction for self-selection bias
also does not change the results.
In this chapter, the rule of law is assessed as a whole, without a breakdown into
its components. As it was argued in the theoretical chapter, it might be that the im-
pact of authoritarian institutions on the property rights protection is stronger than
on human rights protection, as autocracies have higher incentives protect property
rights than human rights. It is also possible that, while the interaction effects pre-
dicted by the theory do not hold for the rule of law in a general sense, they may
still hold for property right protection or human rights protection. This hypothesis
is tested in the following two chapters.
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CHAPTER V. DISAGGREGATING THE RULE OF
LAW: THE IMPACT OF AUTHORITARIAN IN-
STITUTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION
After having measured the impact of authoritarian institutions on the rule of law
at large, in this Chapter, I will disaggregate this concept. Specifically, the analysis
that follows is directed at measuring the impact of authoritarian institutions on
human rights and property rights protection, which are two of the key aspects of
the rule of law as discussed in Chapter III. The purpose of the analysis is to test
the hypothesis 4 from Chapter III, according to which the impact of formal and
informal authoritarian institutions on property rights protection should be stronger
than on human rughts protection since authoritarian regimes face higher incentives
to protect property rights. Property rights are directly linked to economic perfor-
mance, thus, the ruling group or the members of authoritarian parliaments and
parties have an incentive to restrain dictator’s predatory behavior if they are capa-
ble of doing so. In contrast, human rights protection does not seem to be directly
consequential for economic development as investors normally pay little attention
to the degree of human rights violation in the country where they invested as long
as their property is protected. At the same time, since repression can serve as one
of the tools of keeping in power (together with co-optation), weakening repressions
may also weaken the regime.
The methodology used in this Chapter is the same as in Chapter IV. Below,
I overview and discuss the indicators of human and property rights protection in
order to justify my choice.
Human rights protection
a) Operationalization
Since the number of existing indicators of human rights protection is numerous
and it is not possible to use all of them, one has to select a limited number of
indicators suitable for this study. The following considerations are important in
selecting an appropriate indicator of human rights protection.
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First, since the focus of this project is on the impact of different authoritar-
ian institutions, a useful indicator is the one which operationalize only the state
violations of human rights. Obviously, human rights can be severely violated by
non-state actors too (such as rebel groups or organized crime), however, if I use
indicators which take into account activity of non-state actors, the results of the
analysis would be less valid, as they would demonstrate the impact of authoritarian
institutions on the general level of violence in the country rather than on the level of
state-sponsored violence. Moreover, it also seems more reasonable to use aggregate
indicators of human rights rather than indicators on separate rights (like, for exam-
ple, indices capturing freedom of torture or freedom of political killings by V-Dem),
since the information on human rights violations in many authoritarian countries is
very imprecise. Authoritarian regimes frequently try to hide the episodes of human
rights violation from the international audience or to present political persecutions
as ordinary criminal cases. It is in fact very frequent in authoritarian regimes that
people are persecuted for political motives are formally charged with non-political
crimes. Even if these cases are too obviously forged or even if the selective appli-
cation of the law to certain people and not others is too evident, it may be very
hard to definitely prove political motivation behind these cases. For example one
can take a case of imprisonment of M. Khodorkovsky, a former Russian tycoon who
in early 2000s funded Russian opposition and was later imprisoned, allegedly for
tax fraud. Even though it was too evident that the case was politically motivated
(which was recognized, for example, by Amnesty International), ECHR in its de-
cision (Khodorkovsky and Lebedev v. Russia) failed to recognize political motives
behind the criminal case, although it proved a lot of other violations of European
Convention of Human Rights that were present in that case. Thus, using more gen-
eral indicators which operationalize the overall degree of human rights violations
rather than the precise figures can reduce possible errors. Besides, since I treat
human rights protection as part of the rule of law concept, which means impartial
enforcement of legal norms, this means that it is only civil rights that have to be
considered, since, strictly speaking, lack of social or political rights does not neces-
sarily exclude civil rights protection. Historically, the ideas of equality before law
and individual freedoms were implemented in Western countries much earlier that
the ideas of political and social rights. For example, the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution, which covers main civil liberties and guarantees of fair trial,
was introduced in late XVIII century while universal suffrage was introduced only
in 1920, and social rights were non-existent before the Great Depression. In addi-
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tion, including political rights in the dependent variable would cause endogeneity
problem, as voting rights and alternative elections are already part of the definition
of a fully institutionalized authoritarian regime.
I review two widely used measurements of human rights protection for which
data is available for long time period, and which fit the criteria mentioned above.
These indicators are Political Terror Scale (PTS, Wood & Gibney 2010) and Physi-
cal Integrity index by Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project (CIRI,
Cingranelli & Richards 2010)78. Both indicators capture the intensity of state re-
pressions in the country, which is the clearest manifestation of civil rights violations.
These indicators have been used in multiple studies, and both indexes are some-
times used together to assure robustness of the findings. They were applied (either
one of them or both of them) to understand an impact of different factors on state
repression and human rights violation, such as youth population (Nordas & Daven-
port 2013), autocratic regime longevity (Rorbaek et al. 2014), free market policies
(De Soysa & Fjelde 2010), globalization (Harfer-Burton 2005), international human
rights activists (Harfer-Burton 2008, Murdie & Davis 2012), and to answer mul-
tiple other research questions so they can be considered standard and established
indicators of human rights protection in political science.
Both indicators fit the requirements outlined above: they capture only state-
sponsored human rights violations, provide an aggregate summary of human rights
situation in a given country-year, and take into account only physical integrity
rights, that is, the rights not to be killed, tortured, or imprisoned for political
beliefs by the state, in other words, the rights that are the most directly linked to
the concept of the rule of law as defined in this project.
The first one, PTS, operationalizes the degree of state repression in a country in
a given year, using a 5-point scale (1 meaning the lowest degree of political terror
and 5 meaning the highest). The coding is done based on two sources: Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices by the U.S. Department of State and Annual
Report by Amnesty International; the reports are treated separately, and result in
two different scores, PTS-S and PTS-A respectively. Coders are explicitly required
to ignore their own feelings or their knowledge of cases and rely only on the reports
while coding. The latter index contains more more missing values as U.S. Depart-
ment of State reports include mode countries; however, PTS-S score can be biased
78These two articles appear in the same journal issue, and their authors are very critical of each
other’s work.
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due to the fact that U.S. foreign policy preferences may affect the State Department
reports (for example, Poe et al. 2001 compared the two indexes quantitatively and
concluded that there is a systematic bias in the U.S. State Department reports in fa-
vor of U.S. friends and against U.S. foes, mostly against leftist regimes), even though
they claim the bias was the highest during Reagan’s presidency and that, later on,
the two reports started to converge. Speaking about Amnesty International reports,
it has been claimed in Ballesteros et al. (2007) that Amnesty International, while
being very accurate on the description of specific events, fail to adequately reflect
the dynamics of the situation with human rights and often indicates deterioration of
the situation with human rights when it actually did not take place; for this reason,
Ballesteros et al. (2007), having analyzed the Amnesty International reports on
Columbia, warn against the usage of these reports in constructing quantitative in-
dicators of human rights violations. Given that both U.S. State Department reports
and Amnesty International reports may contain their own bias, it is necessary to
treat both sources separately, to ensure that the findings are not caused by biases
of the source.
Importantly, the index does not account for violence committed by non-state
actors (like criminal gangs or insurgent groups) and also operationalizes only direct
violations of physical integrity of citizens, not a general level of political freedom (the
authors make an example of the USSR in the 1980s, where, in spite of all-embracive
control over society by the state security forces, the actual degree of citizens’ physical
integrity violations was quite low, thus, the USSR had a score of only 2-3 during this
time period). The underlying dimensions of coding political terror are: scope (type
of violence, i.e. whether it is arrests, torture, or killings), intensity (frequency with
which the acts of political terror occur), and range (proportion of population which
is subject to abuse). However, there are no separate scores for each dimension, and
all the three dimensions are taken into account simultaneously during the process of
index construction. Since the range of political terror is one of the coding criteria,
the coding depends on the country size. For example, an arbitrary imprisonment of
10 000 people in China would affect PTS score less than an arbitrary imprisonment
of 10 000 people in Cuba.
CIRI approach, is also based on coding of the report by the U.S. Department
of State and Amnesty International and also assesses state-sponsored repression.
Both reports taken into account while coding, there are no separate scores for
each document. CIRI and PTS scores are highly correlated (for the data used in
109
this project, correlation between PTS-S and CIRI score ranges from -0.73 to -0.83,
depending on the type of correlation coefficient79), however, there are important
differences. First, while PTS does not disaggregate between types of political terror,
CIRI explicitly distinguishes between disappearance, killing, political imprisonment
(for non-violent acts), and torture. All the four types of state-sponsored violence
are coded separately, and, for each dimension, a country can get a score of 0, 1
and 2, which corresponds to, respectively, frequent (over 50 instances), occasional
(between 1 and 50 instances), or zero occurrence of a given type of political terror
in a given year80. The final index is a sum of all the four values. Second, CIRI
does not make any “discount” for bigger countries, and, no matter how big the
country is, the coding scheme is based on an absolute number of instances if they
are available (so, even countries with good record of human rights protection, such
as Australia or Canada or Denmark, are occasionally getting the scores of 1 instead
of 2 if there is any single instance of breach of physical integrity in these countries
in a given year). CIRI defends this decision on the normative grounds, claiming
that, if one takes into account the country size while assessing the degree of human
rights violations in the country, then one effectively assumes that a human life is
worth less in a bigger country than it does in a smaller one, which contradicts to
a principle according to which each life has an equal value. In the author’s own
words, their coding is based on standards established by the international law and
not on relative position of one countries over others.
Among criticisms towards CIRI coding, mentioned in Wood & Gibney (2010),
there are two main ones which are relevant for this project and which determine
my choice of PTS score over CIRI index. The first criticism is that, while disag-
gregation of human rights violations into four categories by CIRI is an advantage
over PTS score, a simple sum of subcomponents of CIRI index might be prob-
lematic. Essentially, the assumption behind this summing is that disappearance,
killing, imprisonment, and torture have the same importance, which is unintuitive
as politically motivated imprisonment is a less serious violation of physical integrity
than a politically motivated murder. The second reason is that CIRI is coding hu-
man rights violations based on the absolute number of occurrences of a given type
79Minus sign just indicates that, in PTS score, the values range from best to worst and in CIRI
score they range from worst to best; the value of Pearson correlation (suitable for interval variables)
is -0.83 and the values of Spearman and Kendall’s correlation (both are suitable for ordinal data)
are, respectively, -0.83 and -0.73 (all for PTS-S scores)
80To be fair, Cingranelli&Richards (2010) make it clear that, in most cases, there is no precise
information on human rights violations in many countries so the assessment is based more on
qualitative description presented in the reports
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of violations, which, although it is justifiable from a normative point of view, may
create empirical problems. Based on absolute numbers, it is not possible to say
whether a given regime relies on targeted repression to deter potential opposition
or it has to use mass-scale state violence as the definition of “targeted” and “mass
scale” repression is based on the share of people affected by it, not on its absolute
number.
Thus, in the current chapter, only PTS score will be used as the dependent vari-
able; both PTS-S and PTS-A will be used, so that individual biases of U.S. State
Department and Amnesty International reports do not affect the result. PTS-S and
PTS-A indexes are, as expected, strongly correlated but are not identical (Pear-
son’s, Spearman’s, and Kendall’s correlation coefficients between the two indices
are, respectively, 0.73, 0.72 and 0.65). Thus, the use of both PTS-S and PTS-A
scores as separate dependent variables can genuinely be treated as a robustness
check.
For assessing the impact of authoritarian institutions on the human rights pro-
tection, I use the same methodology as Chapter IV. A statistically correct model,
which would fully take into account the ordinal nature of PTS would be an ordinal
logit model with random effects; however, these models cannot be estimated because
there are not enough observations to fit the model. Thus, I have to estimate linear
models, assuming that a score with 5 possible values can be reasonably treated as
interval.
Similarly to the methodology used to estimate the impact of authoritarain in-
stitutions on the rule of law at large, I first estimate fixed effects models, random
effects models, and AR(1)-PCSE models with typologies of formal and informal
institutions, with and without interaction. I also test the difference between the
intercepts for different regime categories for models with interaction. Then, I run
the same model using dichotomous distinction between the regimes which are fully
institutionalized and fully constrained and all the others. Heckman correction is
also made for the models with dichotomous distinction, to control for self-selection
of authoritarian institutions. The same procedure is applied to both PTS-S and
PTS-A scores, to ensure the robustness of the findings. Apart from PTS index,
available in appendix to Wood & Gibney (2010), the data is the same as in Chapter
IV, as well as the software packages.
b) Analysis
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First, I start with treating formal and informal authoritarian institutions sepa-
rately and with assessing their separate impact on human rights protection, as well
as the impact of interaction effects. The results of the analysis are presented in the
following tables, for PTS-S and PTS-A indexes respectively, and the models for both
tables are ordered as before: fixed effects, random effects, add AR(1)-PCSE model,
first without interaction effects and then with them. The sample of country-years
is the same as in the previous chapters.
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Table 15: Impact on authoritarian institutions on PTS-S index: interac-
tion effects
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. −0.168∗ −0.173 −0.105∗ −0.171∗ −0.193 −0.109∗
(0.080) (0.149) (0.046) (0.080) (0.150) (0.044)
Logged population 0.385∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.273) (0.031) (0.053) (0.278) (0.030)
Infant mortality 0.001 0.007∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.001 0.006∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Resource 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Constrained −0.315∗ −0.241 −0.124 −0.084 0.081 −0.020
(0.159) (0.225) (0.131) (0.200) (0.269) (0.151)
Unconstrained 0.162 0.921∗∗∗ 0.060 0.318 1.057∗∗∗ 0.134
(0.167) (0.269) (0.118) (0.199) (0.305) (0.141)
Institutionalized −0.097 −0.191∗ −0.024 0.267 0.110 0.206
(0.074) (0.082) (0.094) (0.190) (0.204) (0.221)
Non-institutionalized 0.122 0.116 0.282∗ 0.234 0.169 0.109
(0.117) (0.123) (0.138) (0.282) (0.298) (0.287)
Regime duration −0.004 0.013∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.003 0.016∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Democratic legacy −0.004 −0.270 0.090 0.028 −0.216 0.112
(0.137) (0.200) (0.134) (0.140) (0.203) (0.126)
Inst. X Constr. −0.472∗ −0.528∗ −0.246
(0.226) (0.246) (0.232)
Inst. X Unconstr. −0.393 −0.277 −0.284
(0.214) (0.228) (0.228)
Non-inst. X Constr. −0.375 −0.536 −0.127
(0.332) (0.356) (0.431)
Non-inst. X Unconstr −0.050 0.125 0.403
(0.321) (0.336) (0.343)
Intercept −1.676 −1.605∗ −1.802 −1.642∗
(1.249) (0.740) (1.263) (0.712)
R2 0.231 0.075 0.354 0.234 0.084 0.362
Num. obs. 978 978 978 978 978 978
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 16: Impact on authoritarian institutions on PTS-A index: interac-
tion effects
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. 0.051 0.255 −0.033 0.050 0.245 −0.034
(0.090) (0.172) (0.059) (0.089) (0.172) (0.060)
Logged population 0.386∗∗∗ 0.771∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.395∗∗∗ 0.738∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.314) (0.037) (0.059) (0.318) (0.035)
Infant mortality 0.006∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Resource 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Constrained −0.159 −0.193 −0.076 0.039 0.059 −0.155
(0.174) (0.239) (0.121) (0.216) (0.286) (0.136)
Unconstrained 0.176 0.849∗∗ −0.010 0.338 0.941∗∗ 0.084
(0.186) (0.300) (0.134) (0.219) (0.338) (0.138)
Institutionalized −0.258∗∗ −0.303∗∗ −0.113 0.302 0.288 0.128
(0.085) (0.095) (0.105) (0.220) (0.240) (0.198)
Non-institutionalized −0.099 −0.080 0.134 −0.375 −0.393 −0.500
(0.133) (0.141) (0.185) (0.311) (0.331) (0.335)
Regime duration −0.003 0.008 −0.004∗ −0.003 0.011 −0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
Democratic legacy 0.072 −0.091 0.100 0.093 −0.050 0.095
(0.152) (0.223) (0.125) (0.153) (0.226) (0.117)
Inst. X Constr. −0.635∗ −0.820∗∗ −0.097
(0.259) (0.285) (0.236)
Inst. X Unconstr. −0.634∗ −0.622∗ −0.385
(0.248) (0.269) (0.213)
Non-inst. X Constr. −0.080 −0.210 0.560
(0.369) (0.398) (0.464)
Non-inst. X Unconstr 0.446 0.560 0.855∗
(0.355) (0.375) (0.363)
Intercept −3.818∗∗ −2.335∗ −4.123∗∗ −2.538∗∗
(1.403) (1.015) (1.401) (0.968)
R2 0.192 0.066 0.256 0.204 0.084 0.266
Num. obs. 915 915 915 915 915 915
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Speaking of the control variables, the only variable which has a significant pos-
itive effect on PTS index for all models (that is, a negative effect on human rights
protection) is logged population – which, in this case, can only be explained by a
higher vulnerability of smaller countries to the Western pressure to respect human
rights (Levitsky and Way 2010). For most models, the effect of logged GDP per
capita and/or infant mortality is also significant and go in expected direction.
Speaking about the main variables of interest, the pattern is even more mixed
than in case of indicators of the rule of law, which have been examined in Chapter
IV. Both for PTS-S and PTS-A index, there interaction term between formally
institutionalized and informally constrained regimes is statistically significant and
negative, as expected – but only for fixed and random effects models, not for AR(1)-
PCSE ones.
In order to identify if, nevertheless, the initial hypotheses of the current re-
search about interaction effects between formal and informal institutions can hold
in case of human rights protection, I test the difference between institutionalized,
semi-institutionalized, and non-institutionalized regimes for three separate groups,
namely, for constrained, semi-constrained, and unconstrained regimes. The theo-
retical expectations, as in the case of the rule of law, are the following:
1) for unconstrained regimes, there should be no significant difference between
different levels of institutionalization,
2) for semi-constrained regimes, there should be some significant difference be-
tween different levels of institutionalization,
3) for constrained regimes, there should be highly significant difference between
different levels of institutionalization.
This is done for PTS-S and PTS-A indices, for random effects models and AR(1)-
PCSE models (it cannot be done for fixed effects models because they do not have
a general intercept).
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Table 17: Intercept values for different combinations of formal and infor-






regimes -0.05 0.32 -0.39
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.23 -1.80 0.27
Constrained
regimes -0.37 -0.08 -0.47
Table 18: Testing interaction effects between formal institutions and in-












regimes 0.0442* 0.0442* 0.2958
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.1145 0.1114 0.9138
Constrained
regimes 0.5302 0.2938 0.7718
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Table 19: Intercept values for different combinations of formal and infor-






regimes 0.40 0.13 -0.28
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.11 -1.64 0.21
Constrained
regimes -0.13 -0.02 -0.25
Table 20: Testing interaction effects between formal institutions and in-












regimes 0.211 0.211 0.0294*
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.0243* 0.0195* 0.7266
Constrained
regimes 0.8386 0.5106 0.7554
Table 21: Intercept values for different combinations of formal and infor-






regimes 0.45 0.34 -0.63
Semi-constrained
regimes -0.38 -4.12 0.30
Constrained
regimes -0.08 0.04 -0.64
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Table 22: Testing interaction effects between formal institutions and in-












regimes 0.0148* 0.0148* 0.0031**
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.0087** 0.0022** 0.0407*
Constrained
regimes 0.814 0.1001 0.1378
Table 23: Intercept values for different combinations of formal and infor-






regimes 0.85 0.08 -0.38
Semi-constrained
regimes -0.50 -2.54 0.13
Constrained
regimes 0.56 -0.16 -0.10
Table 24: Testing interaction effects between formal institutions and in-












regimes 0.0989 0.0989 0.0011**
Semi-constrained
regimes 0.0502 0.0101* 0.0849
Constrained
regimes 0.1738 0.8568 0.1771
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As it is possible to see here, the initial theoretical expectations again do not hold.
There does not seem to be any hierarchy between non-institutionalized regimes,
semi-institutionalized regimes, and institutionalized regimes, irrespective of the de-
gree of informal constraints.
Since from the regression table one can see that institutionalized constrained
regimes seem to have a significant impact on PTS index, I introduce a dummy
variable for institutionalized constrained regimes instead of separate variable for
each regime category, same way it was done in Chapter IV. I then estimate the
same three linear models (fixed effects, random effects, and AR(1)-PCSE models,
in that order) for PTS-S (models I, II, III) and PTA-A(models IV, V, VI) indexes.
The results are present in the following table:
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Table 25: Impact on authoritarian institutions on PTS-S and PTS-A in-
dices: dichotomous distinction
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. −0.161∗ −0.076 −0.090∗ 0.068 0.369∗ −0.016
(0.079) (0.148) (0.043) (0.090) (0.169) (0.061)
Logged population 0.350∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 1.003∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.267) (0.024) (0.058) (0.304) (0.031)
Infant mortality 0.001 0.004 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Resource 0.004 −0.002 0.006∗ 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Fully institutionalized −0.347∗∗∗ −0.536∗∗∗ −0.149∗ −0.344∗∗ −0.564∗∗∗ −0.063
(0.099) (0.124) (0.066) (0.111) (0.138) (0.093)
Regime duration −0.003 0.002 −0.005∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.004 −0.003∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001)
Democratic legacy 0.059 −0.066 0.157 0.120 0.123 0.116
(0.134) (0.193) (0.117) (0.151) (0.215) (0.131)
Intercept −1.161 −1.577∗ −3.829∗∗ −2.655∗∗
(1.196) (0.629) (1.364) (0.917)
R2 0.224 0.046 0.350 0.181 0.047 0.253
Num. obs. 978 978 978 915 915 915
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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As it becomes clear from these tables, full institutionalization combined with
full informal constraints has a negative effect on both PTS-S and PTS-A scores
for all the models, after controlling for other variables. This effect is statistically
significant in all models with PTS-S score, but is not significant for PTS-A score for
AR(1)-PCSE models. Unfortunately, while one can formally test whether fixed or
a random effects model should be preferred (Hausman test), it is no simple formal
way to check whether one should prefer fixed/random effects models or AR(1)-
PCSE because these models are applied to different types of data. As mentioned
in Chapter III, unit effects models (fixed/random effects) models are used in panel
data (where the number of time units is 10 or less) while AR(1) are used in time
series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, where the number of time units is 20 or more.
In the data used for this study, the number of years per each country is, average,
15, which makes it a middle case between panel data and time series cross-sectional
data (following Beck and Katz 1995, Beck and Katz 2004); so, there is no simple
way to identify whether it is crucial to take into account temporal autocorrelation
of errors and panel-wise heteroskedasticity. In any case, the evidence of the impact
of full institutionalization of the authoritarian regime on the degree of political
repressions is negative in all models and statistically significant for most models,
which allows to qualify this finding as relatively robust.
Similarly to what I did in the previous chapter, it is necessary to account for
self-selection bias in authoritarian institutions. The results of the models with
Heckman correction, both for simple linear regression and with regression corrected
for temporal autocorrelation of errors, for PTS-S and PTS-A indices, are presented
below (only the final step)81:
Table 26: Selection-corrected PTS-S estimates
OLS AR(1)
Predicted average (fully institutionalized) 2.92 2.91
Predicted average (not fully institutionalized) 3.05 3.07
Difference 0.13*** 0.16***
81See the first stage of the Heckman model in Table 31 and intermediate calculations for PTS-S
and PTS-A indices in Table 34 and Table 35 respectively (all in the Appendix).
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Table 27: Selection-corrected PTS-A estimates
OLS AR(1)
Predicted average (fully institutionalized) 2.92 2.99
Predicted average (not fully institutionalized) 3.00 2.90
Difference 0.08* 0.09**
As one can see, after correction for self-selection, formal institutionalization and
informal constraints have a statistically significant impact on the state of human
rights protection. As one can see, these regimes tend to be less repressive than
the others. Substantially, however, the difference is small: it is 2.6-3.2% for PTS-S
index and 1.6-1,8% for PTS-A index.
Property rights protection
a) Operationalization
Indicators of property rights protection are harder to find in open access than
indicators for human rights protection because the latter are used by businesses (es-
pecially be transnational corporations) which take decisions on whether or not to
invest in a given country based on these indices. Thus, data are not always publicly
available, and the creators of property rights protection indices also do not code
countries backwards (meaning that, if they start coding country-years, for example,
in 2000, they do not code country-years before 2000). For these reasons, it turned
out to be impossible to use several highly reputable indicators of property rights
protection. For example, “International Property Rights Index” (IPRI), which con-
tains sub-indicators on both physical and intellectual property protection for most
countries82 is, unfortunately, available only starting from 2006 onwards. Also, for
the earlier editions of this index, the data is not available for Middle East, Central
Asia, and most African countries. Thus, the use of this index in this project is
impossible, since the data on my main independent variables is available only up
to 2008. A country risk assessment provided by a Belgian political risk insurance
company “Credendo Group” (formerly, Belgian Export Credit Agency, or ONDD),
which includes assessment of expropriation risks, is currently not available longitu-
82An overview of IPRI methodology can be found at:
https://ipri2017.herokuapp.com/IPRI_Structure
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dinally; their official website features only the data for 201883. The same problem
is with the data by World Economic Forum, which provides the data (including the
data on property rights protection) only from 2007 onwards. The data from Inter-
national Country Risk Guide (IRCG) which contains indicators related to property
rights protection and risk of expropriation from 1980 onwards 84 is available only
on commercial basis 85
To the best of my knowledge, the only indicator which is both freely available and
covers a sufficient number of country-years under study is the Index of Economic
Freedom by the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal (Miller & Holmes
2009). This is the index composed of 10 (as of 2009, currently 12) indicators,
operationalizing different aspects of economic freedom in most countries in the world
on an annual basis. For each aspect, expects assign a score ranging from 0 to
100, where 0 means the worst score and 100 means the best. The methodological
description also contains a qualitative description of what the situation with the
property rights in the country have to be in order to qualify for a given score (i.e
there is a short description of what it means that the country’s score is within the
range of 91-100, 81-90, 71-80, and so on). The overall index is a simple average of
all the components.
This index has been widely used in a scholarly literature. For example, it has
been used for assessing the impact of economic freedom on economic growth (de
Haan & Strum 2000), on entrepreneurial activity (Aidis et al. 2010, Estrin et al.
2013), or on FDI influx (Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles 2003). Thus, it can also be
considered a reputable indicator acknowledged in social sciences.
In this study study, I am interested in the property rights component, which,
according to their codebook, represents legal protection of property rights, enforce-
ment of laws protecting property, access to justice in case of property rights viola-
tion, enforcement of contracts, and risks of expropriation. The index is constructed
by expects based on several publications issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit,
U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of State (Miller & Holmes
2009). As for endogeneity, there are no components in the index which would rep-
83According to papers which have been using their data previously (e.g. Jensen & Young 2008
or Jensen & Johnston 2011), it was publicly available in a longitudinal format at the website
www.ducroire.be . However, it is not available any longer, and an attempt to request this data
from Credendo Group itself did not lead to any result.
84An overview of ICRG indicators is and methodology is available at :
https://www.prsgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/icrgmethodology.pdf
85Even if it is possible to get this data for the current research, it would not be allowed to share
it in the replication material, which would diminish the replicability of the research.
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resent the formal or informal authoritarian institutions, thus, there are no reasons
to believe the relation between authoritarian institutions and the property rights
component of HF index may be endogenous.
b) Analysis First, I analyze the impact of interaction between formal and infor-
mal authoritarian institutions on Heritage Foundation indicator. The models are,
as before, random effects, fixed effects, and AR(1)-PCSE, fith without interaction
effects and then with them.
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Table 28: Impact on authoritarian institutions on HF index: interaction
effects
I II III IV V VI
Logged GDP pc. 8.038∗∗∗ −6.359∗∗ 10.494∗∗∗ 8.396∗∗∗ −5.725∗ 10.731∗∗∗
(1.619) (2.351) (1.499) (1.602) (2.371) (1.427)
Logged population −5.692∗∗∗ −57.863∗∗∗ −2.436∗∗ −5.192∗∗∗ −57.127∗∗∗ −2.060∗∗
(1.180) (5.069) (0.796) (1.162) (5.085) (0.737)
Infant mortality 0.098∗ −0.375∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.110∗ −0.362∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
(0.043) (0.052) (0.042) (0.043) (0.052) (0.040)
Resource −0.350∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.289∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.331∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.072) (0.054) (0.054) (0.072)
Constrained 3.377∗ 4.677∗∗ 4.884∗ 1.249 3.382 3.738
(1.622) (1.543) (1.925) (3.894) (3.446) (2.982)
Unconstrained 3.398 −0.110 1.510 1.796 −1.422 2.695
(2.500) (2.181) (1.761) (5.067) (4.453) (2.225)
Institutionalized −3.481 −14.376 −2.590 −7.798 −17.239 −7.461∗
(4.717) (10.519) (2.708) (5.310) (11.218) (3.567)
Non-institutionalized −9.829∗ −27.087∗∗ −4.830∗ −7.623 −26.388∗ −2.329
(4.668) (9.880) (2.143) (5.305) (10.682) (2.737)
Regime duration −0.135∗∗ −0.534∗∗∗ 0.049∗ −0.130∗∗ −0.556∗∗∗ 0.046∗
(0.046) (0.095) (0.022) (0.045) (0.096) (0.021)
Democratic legacy −0.646 2.352 −0.702 −1.045 2.137 −1.144
(3.047) (4.397) (1.748) (3.014) (4.404) (1.322)
Inst. X Constr. 7.367 3.954 7.739∗
(4.697) (4.237) (3.096)
Inst. X Unconstr. 7.319 11.015 3.015
(8.359) (7.206) (2.374)
Non-inst. X Constr. −1.349 −0.475 −1.916
(4.582) (4.151) (2.966)
Non-inst. X Unconstr −0.820 −1.336 −3.382
(6.058) (5.330) (3.138)
Intercept 70.040∗ −15.001 58.873∗ −22.108
(28.027) (26.433) (27.763) (24.643)
R2 0.154 0.371 0.502 0.163 0.376 0.522
Num. obs. 710 710 710 710 710 710
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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As Table 28 shows, the results are clearly inconsistent, and the difference between
random effects models and fixed effects models is particularly drastic. The effect of
logged GDP per capita and of logged population is quite small in random effects
models but is dramatically strong for fixed effects models. The opposite is true
for resource dependence: the effect of resource dependence is not significant for
fixed effects models and significant for the two others. What is worse, the effect of
infant mortality on IRCG index is positive and significant for random effects model
and AR(1)-PCSE model (which is to be expexted, since infant mortality is a proxy
for economic development, and better economic development should be negatively
related to the risk of expropriation) but is negative and significant for fixed effects
model. The most likely explanation for these discrepancies is that in a short time
period under consideration (less than 10 years for both indicators), socioeconomic
and demographic variables have have very little within-case variation because they
tend to change very slowly. Since fixed effects models (as mentioned in Chapter
IV) essentially remove all between case variation from consideration, even slight,
and, probably, accidental changes in these variables from one year to another may
dramatically influence the coefficients.
As for the main explanatory variables, the coefficients seem unstable and barely
significant. For this reason, it does not make sense to check the difference between
raw intercepts, as it is done with human rights protection indicators.
From previous findings of this study, however, it is possible to gather that there
is a substantial difference between institutionalized constrained autocracies and
autocracies with any other formal or informal authoritarian institutions in terms of
the rule of law in general as well as in terms of human rights protection. This gives
grounds to test the same relationship for the property rights protection indicator.
The models are, as previously, fixed effects, random effects, and AR(1)-PCSE, in
that order. The next table represents the results of this analysis:
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Table 29: Impact on authoritarian institutions on the HF index: dichoto-
mous distinction
I II III
Logged GDP pc. 7.862∗∗∗ −7.056∗∗ 10.120∗∗∗
(1.661) (2.365) (1.368)
Logged population −5.404∗∗∗ −59.195∗∗∗ −2.381∗∗∗
(1.181) (5.066) (0.572)
Infant mortality 0.115∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.052) (0.039)
Resource −0.333∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.250∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.067)
Fully institutionalized 7.945∗∗∗ 8.677∗∗∗ 6.316∗∗∗
(2.166) (2.288) (1.537)
Regime duration −0.160∗∗∗ −0.427∗∗∗ 0.033
(0.047) (0.089) (0.024)




R2 0.151 0.356 0.493
Num. obs. 710 710 710
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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As Table 29 shows, even if the impact of other factors remains unstable across
model specifications, the impact of insititutionalized constrained autocracies is pos-
itive and highly significant: these regimes on average have 6-7% better score of
Heritage Foundation indicator that others, controlling for other relevant factors.
Finally, in line with previous tests, I control for self-selection. The results of the
final step are presented below86:
Table 30: Selection-corrected HF estimates
OLS AR(1)
Predicted average (fully institutionalized) 44.4 46.2
Predicted average (not fully institutionalized) 37.4 36.8
Difference 7.0*** 9.4***
As Table 30 shows, controlling for self-selection does not affect the conclusions:
formally institutionalized and informally constrained regimes are still performing
better in terms of property rights protection than all the others. Substantially, the
difference is bigger than for human rights protection (it is 7-9.4% depending on
the model, after controlling for self-selection, versus a maximum of 3.2% for human
rights protection indicators). Even though there is an impact of formal institu-
tionalization and informal constraints both on human human rights protection and
property rights protection, the impact on the latter appears to be stronger.
Summary and discussion of results
In the theoretical chapter, I suggested that, compared to the property rights pro-
tection, human rights protection should not be affected to the same extent, if at all,
by formal institutions and informal constraints. The initial expectations was that
protecting the property rights was important for country’s economic development
and also relevant for those for members of authoritarian parliaments or parties, as
they need to protect their own property; thus, the ruling group or members of for-
mal institutions would have strong incentives for better property right protection.
In contrast, I expected that the benefits of improving situation with human rights
protection were not obvious for the ruling group or members of formal institutions.
Hence, I did not expect that formal or informal authoritarian institutions can affect
human rights protection. Overall, my expectation can be considered confirmed :
86See the first stage of the Heckman model in Table 31 and intermediate calculations for HF
index in Table 36 (all in the Appendix).
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the strength of impact of formal institutionalization and informal constraints on
property rights protection is three times stronger than on human rights protection.
However, it is worth discussing why the effect on the latter, even if small, is still
present, contrary to what I originally expected.
One potential explanation for the significant effect of authoritarian institutions
on human rights protection indicators may be that people who belong to the ruling
group or to formal authoritarian institutions are afraid of repressions against them-
selves. Violent purges against elites are very frequent in autocracies. One can think
of expulsion from the party and later execution or murder of the top-level party
officials in the USSR in 1930s87 or purges in Maoist China during the “cultural
revolution”, or, later after his death, repressions against those who organized this
“cultural revolution”88. Thus, while the ruling group or members of authoritarian
institutions may not be necessarily against repression against ordinary people or
against the opposition which is not co-opted, it would seem reasonable for them to
restrain dictators’ capability to repress to protect themselves from repression.
Another explanation for the significant impact of authoritarian institutions on
human rights protection can be found in Wright & Escribà-Folch (2009). They study
the impact of international human rights shaming campaigns on dictators’ turnover.
They provide some preliminary quantitative evidence that international shaming
campaigns of human rights violations (measured by UN Human Rights Council
resolutions) decreases the amount of foreign aid provided by international donors
and decrease foreign trade, which diminishes dictators’ possibility to redistribute
spoils and signals dictators’ weakness to domestic audience. Thus, intensifying
repressions can have a real economic effect as well, contrary to what I claimed in
Chapter III, based on some anecdotal evidence. In personalist regimes, that leads
to a lower chance of regular dictator’s exit (meaning voluntary resignation or losing
elections) but a higher chance of an irregular dictator’s exit (in other words, of a
coup), as in these regimes there is hardly any other way to remove the dictator.
In non-personalist regimes, however, this leads to a higher chance of a regular
dictator’s exit (meaning resignation or ousting by dictator’s own party). Thus, they
claim, a credible threat of regular ousting in party or military regimes can constrain
dictator’s repressive behavior. Wright & Escribà-Folch (2009) demonstrate it with
87Among the most prominent: Leon Trotsky, Grigorij Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev, Nikolai
Bukharin, all of them were, in certain periods of time, Politburo members and high-rank state
officials. Many of their supporters in the party were also punished, up to execution.
88The most famous was the trial against the “Gang of Four”, a group of four top-level party
activists who had a prominent role during the “cultural revolution”: Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao,
Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen.
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an example of Iran where international pressure on the country, combined with
a domestic pressure of a moderate faction within the ruling elite, forced Iranian
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad (who at that time faced new elections and has all
chances of losing) to release an Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi, who had
been arrested before allegedly for buying alcohol. These two potential explanations
can account for why, according to to the findings of the current study, regimes which
are formally institutionalized and informally constrained tend to repress to a lesser
extent, controlling for other factors.
Overall, the empirical study of the impact of authoritarian institutions on hu-
man rights and property rights protection demonstrates that this impact is sta-
tistically significant for both property rights and human rights protection. It also
demonstrates that the impact of authoritarian institutions is substantially larger for
property rights protection. Overall, these findings confirm my theoretical expecta-
tions, even though the actual relation between authoritarian institutions on different
components of the rule of law turns out to be different from the one hypothesized.
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CONCLUSIONS
After having examined the impact of formal and informal authoritarian institutions
on the rule of law at large, as well as on its human rights protection and property
rights protection components, I now summarize and elaborate on the main findings.
A huge scholarship shows that authoritarian institutions have an effect on eco-
nomic development, on foreign investment, and on citizens’ welfare in authoritarian
regimes. Both formal institutions and informal constraints have a positive impact
on the regime performance. The goal of this project was to go deeper than merely
asserting these differences, and to try to capture the causal mechanism which links
authoritarian institutions and their performance 89
I hypothesized that it was the rule of law which was the link between author-
itarian institutions and regime performance. This hypothesis was based on the
literature in institutional economics (starting from North 1987, 1989) which, firstly,
asserted that econometric development primarily depended on institutions, and,
secondly, claimed that the most important institutions which generate economic
growth were the rule of law and property rights protection. 90
I adopted an essentially dichotomous distinction of democracy and autocracy
based on the procedural criteria. I provided a number of reasons for disregarding
indices of democracy, such as Freedom House, Polity IV, Voice and Accountability,
and Tatu Vanhanen index of polyarchy index, both because they are all incompat-
ible with the procedural criteria of democracy and because, as I demonstrated, the
use of all these indices leads to obvious empirical mistakes in distinguishing democ-
racies and autocracies. I chose not to rely on the notion of “hybrid” or “competitive
authoritarian” regimes as the criteria for distinguishing between “pure” authoritar-
ian regimes and “competitive” authoritarian (or “hybrid”) regimes is vague, and, if
applied rigorously, would classify many established democracies as hybrid regimes
for some relatively minor flaws. I also decided not to use the famous typology
of Juan Linz who dinstinguished between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes,
because this typology was hardly useful for the time frame I studied. Choosing
89I am aware of the fact that, without in-depth qualitative analysis of particular cases, it is not
possible to trace actualcausal mechanisms that translate authoritarian institutions into better or
worse state of the rule of law and its components. However, using quantitative methods, it was
possible find more direct evidence of causal mechanisms which link the authoritarian institutions
and regime performance.
90This link has been extensively proven both quantitatively (e.g. Rodrik et al. 2004) and
qualitatively (e.g. Acemoglu & Robinson 2012), which led me to bracket the quest for additional
evidence of this relationship.
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between the two operationalizations of democracy and autocracy which are both
based on procedural understanding of democracy and are essentially dichotomous
I chose the classification of Geddes et al. (2014). Even if Geddes’ classification
is less parsimonious and clear-cut compared to the classification criteria of Adam
Przeworski, Geddes’ classification makes better use of contextual data, which makes
the overall coding to be more accurate.
I developed a classification of authoritarian regimes based on the level of for-
mal institutionalization and the level of informal constraints. Based on the de-
gree to which the ruling group (the military or the party) keeps its organizational
autonomy and can constrain the decision-making of the dictator, I distinguished
between unconstrained, semi-constrained, and constrained regimes. Based on pres-
ence of legislature, parties, and alternative elections, I distinguished between non-
institutionalized, semi-institutionalized and institutionalized autocracies. These
classifications were based on existing literature (primarily, Geddes et al. 2014,
Gandhi & Przeworski 2006) but, compared to the classifications used in other works,
were substantially modified: I coded the regimes by the degree of formal institu-
tionalization and by the degree of informal constraints, leaving aside the question of
the nature of the ruling group. Doing so, I obtained a classification of authoritarian
regimes with two clearly defined dimensions which produced 9 resulting categories
which are mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive.
Based on previous literature, I formulated four hypotheses about how the dif-
ferent combination of formal and informal institutions led to different outcomes in
terms of the rule of law. I suggested that the impact of formal institutions was
conditional on informal constraints. Namely, I expected that, in unconstrained
regimes, the impact of formal institutionalization of the rule of law would be non-
existent while in constrained regimes, the effect of formal institutionalization would
be positive and significant. I could hypothesize that based on other research, for
example, Wright (2008) or Wright & Escribà-Folch (2011), who theorized that the
impact of formal authoritarian institutions on, respectively, economic growth and
the likelihood of democratization after the regime failure, depended on whether a
given regime is personalized or not.
The results of empirical analysis I conducted can be summarized as follows.
First, this dissertation contribute to already existing evidence that authoritarian
institutions genuinely matter for regime performance. Conventional wisdom tells us
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that authoritarian parliaments, parties, and elections, are merely window-dressing
which have no effect on real decision-making, and that dictators’ support group is
always handpicked and can be replaced at dictator’s will. However, the literature
on authoritarian institutions has long shown that these institutions make a huge
difference in authoritarian regimes, even though they do not play the same role as
they do in democracies. This study lends support to this scholarship.
In this research, I found out that my initial hypotheses about the interaction
between formal and informal institutions did not hold true. I did not find empirical
evidence that interaction effects between formal and informal authoritarian institu-
tions are significant; in other words, there was no evidence that formal institutions
mattered more for the rule of law or any of its aspects when informal constraints
were present. However, it became clear from the initial results that institutionalized
constrained regimes had, on average, better degree of the rule of law than all the
other regime types under study, and that this difference was statistically significant
even after controlling for other variables. Using two different operationalizations of
the rule of law and controlling for socioeconomic variables and for potential self-
selection of institutions, I demonstrated that institutionalized constrained autocra-
cies performed significantly better than other types of autocracy. These findings
remained robust across different model specifications.
I also hypothesized that the impact of authoritarian institutions on property
rights protection should be stronger than on human rights protection, as for the
ruling group or for groups co-opted into authoritarian parliaments or parties the
incentives for improving property rights are higher. In the theoretical chapter,
I mentioned several examples of authoritarian regimes in which widespread state-
sponsored human rights abuse coexists with strong property rights protection, like
contemporary China or Myanmar. Once I tested the available indicators of human
rights protection and property rights protection, it turned out that the impact of
formal institutionalization and informal constraints on property rights protection is
indeed around three times stronger than on human rights protection. However, the
latter is also statistically significant, meaning that authoritarian institutions still
decrease the level of regime repressiveness. From that, it may be concluded the
ruling group or co-opted groups may be willing to avoid repressions against them-
selves, popular backlash, or potential economic consequences of violating human
rights (which, according to Wright & Escribà-Folch 2009, are still present, at least
in case if human rights violations are internationally exposed) thus, in a situation
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in which they can influence the dictator’s decision-making, they are likely to also
deter the dictator from violating human rights.
Thus, the findings suggest that two conditions have to be fulfilled simultane-
ously in a given dictatorship genuinely improve the situation with the rule of law.
First, a given authoritarian regime has to have a parliament, multiple parties, and
multiparty elections in which the voters have a choice between at least two parties.
Second, in a given authoritarian regime a ruling group (the party or the military)
must be genuinely able to constrain the decision-making of the dictator. If either
of the condition is unfulfilled, the dictatorships become indistinguishable from each
other in terms of rule of law in general, as well as in terms of property rights
protection and human rights protection.
The fact that not all of my theoretical expectations were satisfied can be ex-
plained in several ways. On the one hand, part of the problem is that the regimes
which I put in the categories of semi-institutionalized or semi-constrained regimes
are in fact very heterogeneous: for example, both the Chinese regime with a leg-
islature, one party and no elections, and U.A.E., which have a legislature without
parties, fall under the same category of semi-institutionalized regimes. Similarly, I
coded all hybrids with a personalist element as “semi-constrained”, even if they are
as different as a military-personalist regime in Musharraf’s Pakistan (until 2008)
and party-personalist regime in Milosevic’s Serbia/Yugoslavia (1990-2000). Given
this heterogeneity, it is perhaps not surprising that there is no clear pattern that
these regimes would follow in terms of the rule of law, human rights protection
or property rights protection. On the other hand, the reason behind the limited
support for some of my hypotheses may be simply not enough variation in the data
rather than a theoretical flaw. The number of non-institutionalized regimes has
been very small, thus, an inference on these regimes had to be based on a small
number of cases. This is because, by 1990s, most dictatorships introduced at least
some formal institutions, both because of the Western pro-democratic pressure and
because it became clear for dictators that formally democratic institutions can ac-
tually strengthen their power rather than undermine it; thus, in the data, there
are very few country-years classified as non-institutionalized. If more country-years
were analyzed, it might have been possible to find more empirical support to my
hypotheses.
The motivation for the decision to include only country-years from 1992 to 2008
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was threefold. By this selection of my sample, I ensured better availability of
reliable data, removed the need to control for democratic or autocratic pressures
and removed the socialist economies from consideration. However, precisely because
of that, one had to make inference based on a very small number of observations
for some categories. Thus, further research would need to extend the time frame
of the analysis, including all country-years for which the data is available. To do
this, it would be necessary to explicitly control for both external pressures and for
particularities of socialist countries. Dealing with this question could be the avenue
for the future research, which could further improve scholarly understanding of how
authoritarian regimes differ from each other and how they function.
The dissertation thus makes a number of theoretical and empirical contributions.
One of its theoretical contributions is a classification of authoritarian regimes
based on degree of formal institutionalization and the degree of informal constraints.
In this particular research, my theoretical expectations about how exactly the inter-
action of these two dimensions leads to different levels of the rule of law, property
rights protection and human rights protection were not met. I expected that the
impact of the level of formal institutionalization on the rule of law and its compo-
nents was higher when informal constraints were also present; I did not find evidence
to support this claim. However, the typology developed in this dissertation may
be still relevant for those scholars who to study the impact of authoritarian insti-
tutions on other phenomena of who want to replicate the analysis conducted in
this dissertation using data for other country-years. The procedure which I used
for coding regimes based on the level of formal institutionalization and the level of
informal constraints is simple and transparent, as it is based on recoding publicly
available datasets by Geddes et al. (2014) and Przeworski et al. (2013). Thus,
future scholars should not encounter difficulties if they choose to use this typol-
ogy for their studies. A more important theoretical contribution of this thesis is
demonstrating that authoritarian institutions affect economic performance via the
rule of law. This theoretical argument follows, on the one hand, from the schol-
arly works on authoritarian regimes, and, on the other hand, from the literature
on institutional economics. Combining these two streams of literature allowed to
improve the existing theories on authoritarian institutions. The dissertation’s main
empirical contribution was to demonstrate that, even after controlling for other
factors and taking into account possible self-selection of institutions, a combina-
tion of formal institutionalization and informal constraints improves the state of
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the rule of law overall, as well as the state of human rights protection and property
rights protection. Even though neither theoretical nor empirical contribution of this
thesis represent a breakthrough in understanding authoritarian institutions, they
contribute to further improvement and validation of existing theories, which is an
important accomplishment.
Unfortunately, understanding how authoritarian regimes function is relevant not
only scientifically. Overall, the number of dictatorships is high, and growing. Recent
developments in a number of countries, including Poland, Hungary, and Turkey,
demonstrate that even countries with a relatively long history of democracy can
autocratize, and this trend seems to be continuing. Even in a time period covered in
this study (1992-2008), which can be considered a "golden age" of liberal democracy,
the share of autocratic country-years has been around 40%. In recent years, the
share of autocracies has grown well above this figure and it keeps growing, which will
make it increasingly impossible to avoid interactions with non-democratic regimes.
Thus, the scholarship on how autocracies differ from each other, what their patterns
of behaviour are, and what to expect from them will become increasingly relevant
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Heckman models: stages omitted in the chapters
In Chapters IV and V, to control for potential self-selection of authoriarin insti-
tutions, two-stage Heckman model was used; the necessary steps to estimate the
model are provided in Chapter IV. However, in Chapters IV and V, only the results
of the fifth step are reported. Below, I report the results from intermediate steps:
1) Table 31: the first stage of Heckman model, which is a binary probit model
estimating the probability of having institutionalized constrained regime in a given
country-year. The first stage was used for calculating an inverse of Mill’s ratio for
presence and absence of full institutionalization and full constraints (not shown) for
all further models.
2) Tables 32-36: estimations of regression models for each sub-sample of the
data (respectively, a sub-sample of institutionalized constrained regimes and a sub-
sample of all other regimes) which contains all the control variables used in the
Chapters IV and V, as well as an inverse of Mill’s ratio for, respectively, being and
not being fully instititonalized and fully constrained. This is calculated for every
dependent variable separately, and, for every variable, both simple OLS model
and AR(1)-PCSE models were calculated. These coefficients were then used to
calculate the predicted variables of the dependent variable for all the data; in this
way, I estimated what the values of the dependent variables would have been if
all country-years were, respectively, under institutionalized constraned regime and
under any other authoritarian institutions (see step 4, p. 99 in Chapter IV). Since,
for these calculations, significance tests are irrelevant, I do not report significance
levels in the models.
For tables 32-36, the models are the following:
I - OLS, subsample of regimes which are not fully institutionalized and not fully
constrained;
II - OLS, subsample of institutionalized constrained regimes;
III - AR(1)-PCSE, subsample of regimes which are not fully institutionalized
and not fully constrained;
IV - AR(1)-PCSE, subsample of institutionalized constrained regimes.
146
Table 31: Self-selection of authoritarian institutions: first stage (binary
probit model, common for all DVs)
DV: institutionalized constrained autocracy
















∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
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Table 32: Self-selection of authoritarian institutions: second stage (linear
models for each institutional outcome), WGI index
I II III IV
Logged GDP pc. 0.207 3.254 0.090 1.931
(0.095) (0.985) (0.054) (0.436)
Logged population −0.071 0.735 −0.062 0.254
(0.034) (0.323) (0.021) (0.166)
Infant mortality −0.005 0.077 −0.006 0.041
(0.003) (0.027) (0.002) (0.010)
Resource −0.008 −0.283 −0.000 −0.164
(0.007) (0.091) (0.003) (0.036)
Regime duration 0.005 0.002 0.006 0.005
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001)
Democratic legacy −0.045 −2.577 0.125 −1.260
(0.107) (1.059) (0.085) (0.486)
IMR, not fully inst. 0.634 0.560
(0.797) (0.392)
IMR, fully inst. 13.644 8.035
(4.808) (1.914)
Intercept −1.411 −58.381 −0.596 −31.661
(1.051) (20.097) (0.601) (8.903)
R2 0.556 0.758 0.518 0.616
Num. obs. 420 144 420 144
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Table 33: Self-selection of authoritarian institutions: second stage (linear
models for each institutional outcome), V-Dem index
I II III IV
Logged GDP pc. 0.108 0.790 −0.003 −0.046
(0.038) (0.267) (0.017) (0.240)
Logged population −0.004 0.139 −0.017 −0.120
(0.014) (0.086) (0.013) (0.095)
Infant mortality 0.001 0.021 −0.001 −0.002
(0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.006)
Resource −0.011 −0.075 −0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.025) (0.001) (0.022)
Regime duration 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Democratic legacy −0.052 −0.604 −0.024 0.230
(0.045) (0.287) (0.026) (0.240)
IMR, not fully inst. −0.679 −0.035
(0.322) (0.102)
IMR, fully inst. 3.731 −0.190
(1.314) (1.115)
Intercept −0.043 −13.413 0.882 3.177
(0.423) (5.434) (0.328) (5.038)
R2 0.137 0.550 0.474 0.510
Num. obs. 724 257 724 257
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Table 34: Self-selection of authoritarian institutions: second stage (linear
models for each institutional outcome), PTS-S
I II III IV
Logged GDP pc. 0.130 −2.753 0.148 −2.244
(0.151) (1.355) (0.191) (1.147)
Logged population 0.352 −0.338 0.342 −0.144
(0.054) (0.437) (0.073) (0.350)
Infant mortality 0.013 −0.070 0.012 −0.055
(0.004) (0.037) (0.006) (0.031)
Resource −0.013 0.267 −0.013 0.216
(0.012) (0.125) (0.015) (0.108)
Regime duration −0.004 −0.011 −0.005 −0.012
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Democratic legacy 0.175 2.483 0.060 1.900
(0.175) (1.461) (0.252) (1.206)
IMR, not fully inst. −2.006 −1.810
(1.265) (1.682)
IMR, fully inst. −13.202 −10.808
(6.677) (5.728)
Intercept −3.440 49.702 −3.401 38.990
(1.666) (27.610) (2.156) (23.151)
R2 0.350 0.525 0.350 0.472
Num. obs. 721 257 721 257
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Table 35: Self-selection of authoritarian institutions: second stage (linear
models for each institutional outcome), PTS-A
I II III IV
Logged GDP pc. 0.049 −3.609 0.051 −2.848
(0.176) (1.517) (0.173) (2.202)
Logged population 0.304 −0.598 0.325 −0.339
(0.061) (0.494) (0.062) (0.731)
Infant mortality 0.009 −0.098 0.008 −0.076
(0.005) (0.041) (0.006) (0.061)
Resource −0.004 0.352 −0.004 0.280
(0.013) (0.140) (0.013) (0.205)
Regime duration −0.002 −0.013 −0.002 −0.013
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)
Democratic legacy 0.311 3.551 0.153 2.805
(0.203) (1.636) (0.212) (2.304)
IMR, not fully inst. −0.244 −0.547
(1.463) (1.403)
IMR, fully inst. −18.036 −14.411
(7.483) (10.813)
Intercept −2.707 67.979 −2.886 52.301
(1.923) (30.987) (1.988) (45.266)
R2 0.240 0.396 0.239 0.399
Num. obs. 680 235 680 235
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Table 36: Self-selection of authoritarian institutions: second stage (linear
models for each institutional outcome), HF
I II III IV
Logged GDP pc. 10.014 75.423 6.623 21.709
(2.934) (23.700) (2.886) (25.671)
Logged population −3.931 16.282 −2.791 −1.104
(1.066) (7.722) (0.841) (8.696)
Infant mortality 0.090 1.830 0.058 0.377
(0.089) (0.645) (0.083) (0.729)
Resource −0.304 −6.195 −0.028 −1.255
(0.223) (2.192) (0.204) (2.381)
Regime duration 0.048 −0.016 0.040 0.074
(0.018) (0.060) (0.024) (0.136)
Democratic legacy 4.330 −57.681 0.440 −5.556
(3.418) (25.401) (3.014) (28.248)
IMR, not fully inst. 30.443 21.941
(24.768) (21.455)
IMR, fully inst. 289.888 50.564
(116.426) (124.310)
Intercept 0.188 −1258.122 13.137 −192.537
(32.705) (483.622) (31.092) (529.532)
R2 0.377 0.717 0.447 0.628
Num. obs. 515 195 515 195
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Software packages
The used packages in Python are: “pandas” (McKinney 2010), “numpy” (van der
Walt et al. 2011), and the packages from the standard Python library. The used
packages in R are: “car” (Fox & Weisberg 2013) “plm” (Croissant and Millo
2008), “panelAR” (Kashin 2014), “sampleSelection” (Toomet & Henningsen 2008),
“texreg”(Leifeld 2013), and “xtable” (Dahl et al. 2018).
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Replication materials
The final dataset with variables description is available at URL: https://github.
com/alexeygridnev/two-stage-heckman-model-pol-sci/blob/master/Data.csv.
An example of applying two-staged Heckman model with WGI Rule of Law index
as the dependent variable is available at URL: https://github.com/alexeygridnev/
two-stage-heckman-model-pol-sci/blob/master/Script.R.
A script for downloading the data from the World Bank website using the World
Bank API is available here: https://github.com/alexeygridnev/World-Bank-API-to-csv/
blob/master/Script.py.
Should you be interested in other data or scripts, do not hesitate to contact me
via email: alexeygridnev93@gmail.com .
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